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 Abstract 
 
In this work I address the study of language comprehension in an “embodied” 
framework. Firstly I show behavioral evidence supporting the idea that language 
modulates the motor system in a specific way, both at a proximal level (sensibility to 
the effectors) and at the distal level (sensibility to the goal of the action in which the 
single motor acts are inserted). I will present two studies in which the method is 
basically the same: we manipulated the linguistic stimuli (the kind of sentence: hand 
action vs. foot action vs. mouth action) and the effector by which participants had to 
respond (hand vs. foot vs. mouth; dominant hand vs. non-dominant hand). Response 
times analyses showed a specific modulation depending on the kind of sentence: 
participants were facilitated in the task execution (sentence sensibility judgment)  
when the effector they had to use to respond was the same to which the sentences 
referred. Namely, during language comprehension a pre-activation of the motor system 
seems to take place. This activation is analogous (even if less intense) to the one 
detectable when we practically execute the action described by the sentence. Beyond 
this effector specific modulation, we also found an effect of the goal suggested by the 
sentence. That is, the hand effector was pre-activated not only by hand-action-related 
sentences, but also by sentences describing mouth actions, consistently with the fact 
that to execute an action on an object with the mouth we firstly have to bring it to the 
mouth with the hand.   
After reviewing the evidence on simulation specificity directly referring to the 
body (for instance, the kind of the effector activated by the language), I focus on the 
specific properties of the object to which the words refer, particularly on the weight. In 
this case the hypothesis to test was if both lifting movement perception and lifting 
movement execution are modulated by language comprehension. We used behavioral 
and kinematics methods, and we manipulated the linguistic stimuli (the kind of 
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sentence: the lifting of heavy objects vs. the lifting of light objects). To study the 
movement perception we measured the correlations between the weight of the objects 
lifted by an actor (heavy objects vs. light objects) and the esteems provided by the 
participants. To study the movement execution we measured kinematics parameters 
variance (velocity, acceleration, time to the first peak of velocity) during the actual 
lifting of objects (heavy objects vs. light objects). Both kinds of measures revealed that 
language had a specific effect on the motor system, both at a perceptive and at a 
motoric level. 
Finally, I address the issue of the abstract words. Different studies in the 
“embodied” framework tried to explain the meaning of abstract words The limit of 
these works is that they account only for subsets of phenomena, so results are difficult 
to generalize. We tried to circumvent this problem by contrasting transitive verbs 
(abstract and concrete) and nouns (abstract and concrete) in different combinations. 
The behavioral study was conducted both with German and Italian participants, as the 
two languages are syntactically different. We found that response times were faster for 
both the compatible pairs (concrete verb + concrete noun; abstract verb + abstract 
noun) than for the mixed ones. Interestingly, for the mixed combinations analyses 
showed a modulation due to the specific language (German vs. Italian): when the 
concrete word precedes the abstract one responses were faster, regardless of the word 
grammatical class. Results are discussed in the framework of current views on abstract 
words. They highlight the important role of developmental and social aspects of 
language use, and confirm theories assigning a crucial role to both sensorimotor and 
linguistic experience for abstract words. 
 
 
Keywords 
concepts, words, sentences, language comprehension, perceptual system, motor 
system, embodiment, simulation, motor resonance, effectors, dominant hand, intrinsic 
objects properties, weight, concrete words, abstract words,  social-linguistic 
experience, language-dependence. 
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Notes 
All human studies reported in this thesis have been approved by the appropriate 
ethics committee and have therefore been performed in accordance with the ethical 
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Some references in the Thesis could appear redundant. This is to allow an 
autonomous reading of each  Chapter. 
The studies presented in Chapters Three, Four and Six are published in 
international journals. The study  presented in Chapter Seven is going to be submitted. 
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 1 Categories and concepts 
 
 
In this chapter I first discuss what we intend when we say that concepts are 
“embodied”. Then I briefly explain the notion of simulation, addressing also its neuro-
physiological basis. 
 
 
 
1.1 Classical view of concepts 
 
The classical propositional view of concepts and meaning proposes that 
concepts are generated by abstract, arbitrary and amodal symbols (Collins & Loftus, 
1975; Newell & Simon, 1976; Landauer & Dumais, 1997, Foltz, Kintsch & Landauer, 
1998; Landauer, McNamara, Kintsch & Dennis, 2006). In this framework, the mind is 
a mechanism for syntactically manipulating symbols, such as an information 
processing device. Perception and action are considered as “low level” and peripheral 
processes, and low and high level processes are seen as reciprocally independent. In 
addition, perception and action are posited as separate spheres (Sternberg, 1969; 
Pylyshyn, 1999). Therefore it is not possible to envision action as having effects on 
perception, because the assumption is that the perceptual process takes place in the 
same way independently from the kind of motor response involved.  
In this framework concepts are supposed to be “autonomous” from the body. 
They are represented in our mind in a propositional way, for example through list of 
properties, statements, frames, semantic networks (Fodor, 1998; Phylysin, 1973). 
According to this view a transduction process occurs, from the sensorimotor 
experience in the environment to the mind. The outcomes of this process are frozen 
Language and Embodiment 
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representations of the world: in the course of the transduction every link with the body 
is lost. The ensuing representations are just arbitrarily linked to the world and do not 
have any modality specific feature: in this sense we could refer to them as abstract 
symbols. For example, the concept “dog” is associated with the amodal, propositional 
feature “it barks”, rather than with the modal acoustic feeling of hearing a dog barking.  
Accordingly mind is conceived of as the specific software evolved by humans 
for manipulating these abstract symbols. These symbols are organized in a stable-
linguistic way, and they do not depend on the “hardware”, that is on our body with its 
peculiar sensorimotor functioning. 
The consequence of this approach is the elaboration of models, for extracting 
and representing the meaning of words, based on statistical computations applied to a 
large corpus of existing texts.  The underlying assumptions are that our knowledge is 
organized in a propositional way, and that the meaning of a concept/word depends on 
lexical co-occurrence and semantic relatedness. Examples of statistical models of 
semantic memory are the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL, Burgess & Lund, 
1997) and the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997). In both the 
models word meanings is represented as vectors, detected in matrices (spaces with 
different dimensions) which describe the co-occurrence of terms in documents. That is: 
the meaning of a word is derived by its relations to other words and other abstract 
symbols. In this way it is possible mathematically / spatially calculating if two or more 
words/sentences are equivalent, namely if people represent them as semantically 
comparable or not. A low estimated parameter indicates that two words appear in 
different, orthogonal, contexts. The meanings of words are considered as fixed, so the 
understanding of a sentence would be pretty the same for everyone. LSA models 
outputs fit various experimental results: they fit human word sorting judgments and 
word-word lexical priming; they also successfully predict text learnability.   
Nevertheless, there is much evidence that the predictions made by these models 
do not always match people understanding of sentences. For example, Glenberg and 
Robertson (2000) using LSA equivalent sentences, found that people actually 
distinguished between them depending on the perceptual characteristics of the objects. 
Categories and concepts 
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After a sentence like “Marissa forgot to bring her pillow on her camping trip”, people 
judged more sensible and imaginable the sentence “As a substitute for her pillow, she 
filled up an old sweater with leaves” than “she filled up an old sweater with water”, 
even though the words “leaves”  and “water” are similarly far from “pillow” in terms 
of LSA norms. A pillow made by a sweater filled up with leaves is not usual, but it is 
afforded, so more sensible and imaginable than a pillow made by a sweater with water. 
Authors explain the results positing that “the meaning of words in sentences is 
emergent: meaning emerges from the mesh of affordances, learning history, and goals” 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 2000, p. 388).  
 
 
1.2 Embodied view of concepts 
 
Embodied view suggests that concepts are grounded in sensorimotor processes 
(Barsalou, 1999a; Barsalou, 2008b). They consist in the re-enactment of the same 
neural activation pattern running when we perceive their referents or when we interact 
with them (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg 1997). With “referent” we bear on the 
extra-linguistic reality, real or imaginary, to which the linguistic sign refers. 
Revisiting Hjelmslev (1975) sign triad – that is an evolution of de Saussure’s 
(1959) concept of sign – we could say that the propositional classical view of concepts 
assumes that the mental representations of the external signified has the same format 
and syntactical rules of the external signifier, intended as the linguistic sign. So 
language is mentally represented in terms of linguistic symbols and the relationship 
with the external referent is not taken into account.  
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Instead the embodied theory states that the format of concepts matches the 
format of their referents, i.e. our experience with/in the extra-linguistic reality to which 
they refer. In keeping with this view, the Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg & Robertson, 
1999) – that relates the general theory of embodied cognition to language 
comprehension – claims that language refers to objects and situations, or to the 
affordances of a situation (Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000) (for a straightforward 
explanation of “affordance”, see Paragraph 3). 
The link between the mental representation of the signifier and the 
representation of the signified is arbitrary (for example, a “dog” is called “cane” in 
Italian). However, the internal representation of the referent is neither arbitrary nor 
abstract, but is rather grounded. Namely, in this view objects are represented in terms 
of perceptual symbols that are not arbitrarily linked but are rather analogically related 
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to them (Barsalou, 1999a). Perceptual symbols are multimodal, because they activate 
different motor and sensorial information tightly linked to the interaction with the 
world, pertaining vision, audition, taste, touch, motor action etc.   
A notion useful to capture how language comprehension is conceived of for the 
embodied view is that of simulation (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Simulating means 
that the same neural areas are implicated in perception and interaction with the objects, 
and in comprehending words that refer to them. For example, the word “glass” should 
reactivate the experiences of our previous interactions with glasses. So it leads to the 
activation of auditory, visual, and tactile information, for example the smoothness of a 
glass of wine, its sound banging into a dish, its shape and size, that surprisingly do 
affect the smell and the taste of the wine. The same word re-activates also 
proprioceptive and kinesthetic information, for example hand/arm feedback whereas 
bringing a glass to our mouth, as well as information on its affordance. 
In the present work I do not discuss the embodiment of phonogical aspects of 
language (in the figure, “Internal representation of the external signifier”). For a 
critical discussion on this topic I refer to Liberman and Mattingly (1985), and to 
Fogassi and Ferrari (2007). 
 
 
 
1.3 The body, the context, and the current goals 
 
When we claim that cognition is “embodied” we don’t just mean that 
perception and action generically influence our knowledge, but that our knowledge 
specifically depends on having a peculiar, unique body and sensorimotor system. This 
implies that concepts cannot be static. The concept of a “chair”, for example, is not the 
same for a child and for an adult because of the different kinds of interaction a child or 
an adult could have with the referent, a real chair.  
Language and Embodiment 
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So the concept of a “chair”, conveyed by the object as by the written or listened 
word, in the case of an adult evokes the action of “sitting down on it”. The same 
concept evokes a different motor representation in an one-year-old child, such as for 
example the actions of “leaning on it, standing upright on it”. In Gibson’s terms 
(Gibson, 1979) we could claim that the affordance of a chair is not the same for an 
adult and for a child. The notion of affordance refers to the fact that objects in the 
environment offer to us as stimuli for acting, as if they would “invite” us to act upon 
them. Affordances are not fixed objects’ properties, but they are variable, as they 
depend on the interaction between objects’ features, our peculiar body and the 
surrounding environment. Glenberg (1997) remarks also the role of learning, pointing 
out that the meaning of a situation depends on affordances tuned on personal 
experiences of actions and learned cultural norms. The resulting set of available 
actions in turn depends on each individual’s present goals. 
Importantly, according to the embodied view cognition is not only grounded in 
our body, but also situated, as it varies depending on the context and on the subject’s 
goals. So, for example, if we need to change a light bulb, the chair will no more afford 
some rest, but it will afford us a support for reaching the bulb. Therefore, our motor 
representations of the objects are guided by our current purposes and take into account 
both the constraints/possibilities of our body and the constraints/possibilities of our 
environment. In this perspective the subject, with his/her goals, is no more a passive 
spectator, and action is not simply the strict executive process that sequentially follows 
perception. The kind of motor response involved does have an effect on the perception 
of the present object/situation (Prinz, 1997; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 
2001). Our conceptual knowledge is grounded and built on our action and interaction 
with the objects: ago ergo cogito (Glenberg, 1997). 
Interestingly, the role of the body and of the context (the situatedness) in the 
representations is recently underlined also in social cognition. Also in this field the 
mental representations that underlie social behaviour were classically considered as 
abstract and stable. Recent evidence instead shows that also social representations, and 
Categories and concepts 
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the processes that underlie them, are adaptive and are modulated by the perceiver’s 
current goals, communicative contexts, and bodily states (Smith & Semin,  2007).         
 
 
1.4 Neural bases of simulation: a brief outline 
 
The neural substrate for the idea of simulation resides in the phenomenon of 
motor resonance. Recent neuro-physiological studies have led to important discoveries 
about the premotor cortex of the macaque monkey, the so called F5 area. This area 
contains two kinds of visuo-motor neurons: canonical and mirror neurons (Di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 1992). Canonical neurons fire when 
a macaque executes specific actions, for example when it grasps an object with a 
precision grip, an all fingers grip or with a whole hand grip. They fire also when the 
macaque observes an object. Mirror neurons, instead, fire when the monkey observes a 
conspecific, or the experimenter, executing a goal-directed action, such as grasping a 
nut, but not when it observes just the nut. 
Crucially to our aims, much evidence suggests that the homologue of F5 area in 
humans is the Broca area. In keeping with this, recently it has been demonstrated that 
the Broca area, traditionally known for its involvement in the production of language, 
contains a motor representation of the actions executed with the hand.   
An fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging: a technique to measure the 
hemodynamic response related to neural activity in the brain) study by Buccino, 
Binkofsky, Fink, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, Seitz, Zilles, Rizzolatti and Freund (2001) 
showed that when subjects observe actions involving the mouth, the hand or the foot, 
different regions of the premotor cortex and of the Broca area are activated, depending 
on the different effector used for executing the action. 
Symmetrically, also brain imaging and behavioral studies on language provide 
evidence of a somatotopic organization of the cortical areas. For example, 
Pulvermüller, Härle and Hummel (2001) have found topographic differences in the 
Language and Embodiment 
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cerebral activity pattern generated by verbs relating to legs-, arms- and mouth-actions. 
Further evidence in favour of the tight link between language and action comes from a 
study by Buccino, Riggio, Melli, Binkofsky and Rizzolatti (2005) who performed both 
a TMS and a behavioural study. In the TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation: a 
noninvasive method to excite neurons in the brain) study they found that the motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs, that is a measure for the motor response) amplitude recorded 
from hand decreases during listening to hand action related sentences. They found a 
symmetrical motor response modulation on foot during listening to foot action related 
sentences. Consistently, in the behavioral study they showed that sentences describing 
actions with the hand or the foot activate the motor system in a specific way, that is: 
participants responded faster to hand related sentences if the response device was a 
pedal rather than a keyboard. A symmetrical modulation effect of language on motor 
system was found for foot related sentences. (I will discuss these points more deeply in 
the Chapters 3 and 4.) 
Finally, as far as the tight link between the F5 area and the Broca area is 
concerned, it’s worth to mention the proposal by Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) about the 
important role that mirror neurons could have played in language evolution (see also 
Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Language and embodiment: behavioral, neuro-
physiological and kinematics evidence 
 
 
This chapter addresses the embodied view of cognition applied to language. I 
will focus on concepts mediated by language, presenting behavioral and neuro-
physiological evidence of the action/perception systems activation during words and 
sentences comprehension. 
 
 
 
2.1 Behavioral, neuro-physiological and kinematics evidence 
 
An increasing body of evidence shows that language understanding implies a 
mental simulation (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Zwaan, 2004). A heated debate within 
the embodied cognition community concerns whether the simulation activated during 
language comprehension is specific and detailed, or rather general. In the following 
part I will discuss studies performed using behavioral, neuro-physiological or 
kinematics methodologies, the results of which indicate that the simulation enacted by 
words is highly specific – that is, sensitive to the shape and orientation of the objects 
mentioned, to their motion direction, to the effector involved in the sentences etc. 
I will first review studies pertaining objects intrinsic and extrinsic properties. 
With the term “intrinsic properties” we refer to objects invariant properties, like for 
example objects shape and size. Conversely, “extrinsic properties” are objects 
properties that depend on the observer or on the particular condition of observation, 
such as for example the current orientation of an object. In the second part, I will 
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report evidence that highlight the role of different kinds of action and motor 
information for language processing. 
 
 
2.1.1 Intrinsic properties: shape 
 
Zwaan, Stanfield and Yaxley (2002) addressed if the simulation evoked during 
sentence comprehension is sensitive to subtle differences pertaining an intrinsic 
property, the shape. Participants were presented with sentences describing animals or 
objects in a different location, implying a different shape (e.g., [1] “He saw the lemon 
in a bowl” vs. [2] “He saw the lemon in the glass”). Their task consisted in deciding 
whether the picture represented a word mentioned in the sentence. The match 
condition led to an advantage in reaction times. For ruling out possible objections 
about the kind of task that could overtly require a comparison, authors designed a 
second experiment in which subjects had just to name the object/animal in the picture. 
In both experiments the results were straightforward: the response latency was lower 
when there was a match between the sentence and the picture (for example, when the 
sentence [2]  was followed by the picture of a slice of lemon rather than of a whole 
lemon). The results suggest that while comprehending a sentence we automatically 
activate a perceptual representation, even if the current task doesn’t claim for it. These 
results also show that sentence context has an important role in the building of these 
representations, that are dynamic and flexible. 
 
 
2.1.2 Intrinsic properties: size 
 
The specificity of the simulation for size was tested in different kinematics 
studies (Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998; Glover & Dixon, 2002). The peculiarity of the 
kinematics method is that it allows detecting the activation of motor system during 
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words processing. Glover and Dixon (2002), for example, asked subjects to reach and 
grasp objects on the surface of which either the word “Large” or “Small” were printed. 
The semantic meaning of the label shaped the early stages of both reaching and 
grasping movements; the semantic effect decreased over the course of the movement. 
A possible neurological explanation of the language effect on movement was ascribed 
to the closeness of language and motor planning centres, in the left hemisphere 
(Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). 
 
 
2.1.3  Intrinsic properties: color 
 
In an embodied view, the property of color is deeply different from typical 
multimodal properties, such as shape, because it is perceived by only one sense. The 
difference between theses two kinds of properties was well described by John Locke 
(1690/1975) who distinguished by primary properties, such as shape, size, and motion, 
that could be perceived by multiple senses, and secondary properties, such as color, 
taste, and smell, that are unimodal. He proposed that secondary properties could be 
represented less stably than primary ones. 
Connell (2007) analysed whether implicit perceptual information about object 
color is accessed during sentence comprehension. Participants were presented with 
sentences that implied a specific color for the object described, as for example: “John 
looked at the steak on his plate”. They had to decide if the picture showed after the 
sentence was mentioned in the sentence. The critical manipulation concerned the color 
of the picture: for example, either a brown or a red steak was shown. They found that 
perceptual information on color is activated during this task. However, participants 
were quicker when the object color implied by the sentence did not match the object 
picture color. The explanation they provide, consistently with the embodied view, is 
that accessing to shape, that is a stable property, is crucial for a recognition task. Thus 
if the color of the picture and the color of the object implied by the sentence do not 
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match, there will be a minimal interference.  Instead, if they match, the information on 
color is somehow difficult to ignore, even if color is a rather unstable property. This 
leads to a stronger interference on shape recognition. 
 
 
2.1.4 Extrinsic properties: orientation 
 
Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) demonstrated that we mentally represent the object 
orientation implied by a sentence in a figurative way. They showed participants a 
sentence suggesting a particular orientation of an object, for example horizontal or 
vertical (e.g., “He hammered the nail into the wall” vs. “He hammered the nail into the 
floor”). Then participants saw a picture showing the same object in an orientation that 
matched or not the orientation implied by the sentence. Responses were faster when 
the orientation suggested by the text matched the one of the picture. An amodal 
symbol system theory could possibly explain these results but it does not predict them. 
 
 
2.1.5 Modality 
 
In line with the view that  perception, action and cognition are closely related, 
Pecher, Zeelenberg and Barsalou (2003) demonstrated that concepts activate 
multimodal information. They selected concept nouns and properties pertaining vision, 
motor action, audition, taste, touch and smell. Subjects were presented with a sentence 
like “A lemon can be sour”. Their task consisted in judging if the sentence was true or 
false. Crucially, the task did not require to use mental imagery. Response times 
showed that switching modality, for example from a taste property (e.g.: lemon –  
sour) to an auditory property (e.g.: leaves – rustling), led to an increase in response 
times compared to the cases in which the modality remained constant. This 
demonstrates that concepts are multimodal rather than amodal. The only alternative 
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explanation is that amodal symbols for the same modalities are more associated than 
amodal symbols for different modalities. This account was ruled out with a control 
experiment, in which they obtained analogous results (that is, slower response times 
when changing modality) using properties pairs much more associated than the pairs 
used in the first experiment. These findings clearly demonstrate that subjects simulate 
the content of the sentence, and that this mental representation activates a neural 
pattern in different modality specific domains. This explains why transferring 
processing from one brain system to another implies costs.  
 
 
2.1.6 Perspective 
 
Borghi, Glenberg and Kaschak (2004) demonstrated that the simulation we 
build during language comprehension is sensitive also to the perspective implied by 
the sentence. Participants read a sentence describing an object or a location from an 
inside (e.g., “You are eating in a restaurant”), an outside (e.g., “You are waiting 
outside a restaurant”), or a mixed (e.g., “You are walking toward and entering a 
restaurant”) perspective. Then participants were presented with a concept-noun and 
they had to verify if the concept was or not a part of the location. For example, a 
“table” is a part typically found inside a restaurant, whereas a “sign” is typically found 
outside a restaurant. Responses were faster if the noun referred to an object more 
easily available in the perspective implied by the sentence. Interestingly, subjects also 
responded more quickly verifying that an object had a particular part if they were in 
the corresponding perspective and, within this perspective, for near than for far 
objects. Therefore, for example, they were faster if the inside sentence “You are eating 
in a restaurant” was followed by the inside part “table” than by the outside part “sign”. 
In addition, the inside near part “table” was processed faster than the inside far part 
“kitchen”. Results showed that the different perspectives suggested by the sentences 
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control the accessibility of information, making available different conceptual 
knowledge.  
In order to rule out a propositional explanation of the results, the authors 
computed the association degrees between sentences and parts, by using latent 
semantic analysis (LSA). The results were not explained by semantic associations 
between, say, inside sentences and inside parts: they are consistent with the idea that 
comprehension implies simulation. 
Finally, authors investigated perspective sentences that do not imply any action 
and that described an object in a particular orientation (e.g., “There is a doll upright in 
front of you”). Subject had to verify whether the noun presented after the sentence was 
a part of the object named in the sentence or not. The response device was a vertically 
oriented box. In order to provide a positive answer in the first part of the experiment 
participants had to move the hand upwards, and in the second part they had to move 
the hand downwards. Results showed faster responses when there was compatibility 
between the kind of response (yes-is-up vs. yes-is-down) and the location of the part 
(upper vs. lower). Crucially, these results were obtained using sentences that did not 
suggest any action. 
 
 
2.1.7 Motion event 
 
Two experiments by Kaschak, Madden, Therriault, Yaxley, Aveyard, 
Blanchard and Zwaan (2005) focus on motion direction, showing that the simulation 
we form is sensitive to the direction implied by the sentence suggested movement. 
Participants listened to sentences describing motion in four directions: away (e.g., “He 
rolled the bowling ball down the alley”), towards (e.g., “The dog was running towards 
you”), upwards (e.g., “The smoke rose into the sky”), and downwards (e.g., “The snow 
fell onto the ground”). Simultaneously they saw black-and-white motion perceptual 
stimuli: a clockwise and contraclockwise moving spiral picture (suggesting a motion 
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away or towards participants’ body); or an up or down moving horizontal stripes 
(suggesting a motion upwards or downwards participants’ body). Subjects had to 
decide if sentences were sensible or not. Results showed that in the mismatch 
condition participants were faster than in the match condition.    
In the second experiment participants were requested to make a grammaticality 
judgement on the sentence. The authors’ purpose was to examine if the same 
interference effect was found with a task that did not emphasize semantic processing. 
Again, they found quicker response times for the mismatch condition. This data 
provide support for the claim that language comprehension is grounded in perception 
and action, and that the simulation activated by language is fairly specific. 
The mismatch advantage (interference effect) found by Kaschak et al. (2005) is 
apparently in contradiction with previous evidence, showing faster response times 
when the sentence content matches the perceptual stimulus or the motor response. 
According to Kaschak et al. we need further empirical investigation in order to better 
understand these apparently contradictory results. However a possible explanation 
could be given by the interaction between two factors: the temporal overlap and the 
integratability (the degree in which the perceptual input could be integrated into the 
simulation activated by language). So the advantage of the mismatch condition could 
be due to the fact that visual perceptual stimuli engage the processing mechanisms 
needed to simulate the contemporarily listened sentences. The difficulty relies on the 
shared contents between the percept and the simulation of the sentence, and on the 
contemporaneous temporal overlap. 
According to Kaschak et al. (2005), in the previously shown experiments there 
was an advantage of the match condition because the perceptual stimuli were easy to 
integrate with the sentence. For example, the sentence: “He saw the lemon in the 
glass” (Zwaan et al., 2002) was followed by the picture of a slice of lemon, and not by 
a black-and-white stimuli. The match advantage in the integratability condition is 
expected for a temporal overlap as for sequentially presented stimuli. Instead, when the 
visual stimulus and the sentence are processed sequentially and they are not easy to 
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integrate there should be a null effect, because the stimulus is processed independently 
of the sentence.  
 
The effect of language comprehension on visual representation of a motor event 
was also addressed by Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley and Aveyard (2004). Participants had 
to listen to sentences implying a movement toward or away from the body. Then they 
were presented with two pictures of a ball, differing only in size: the first one could be 
smaller or bigger than the second one, thus suggesting a movement toward or away 
from the observer. Subjects’ task consisted of pressing two different keys to decide if 
the two pictures represented the same objects or not. In the match condition 
participants heard a sentence like “The shortstop hurled the softball to you” and then 
they saw a picture of a ball followed by a picture of a bigger ball. In the mismatch 
condition participants heard the same sentence and then a ball followed by a smaller 
ball. Results showed that in the match condition response times were faster than in the 
mismatch condition, suggesting that subjects activated a mental dynamic simulation of 
the sentence. More interestingly, these results were obtained with a task that did not 
involve in any way the content of the sentences. An amodal theory of cognition 
(Pylyshyn, 1986) can hardly account for these results. 
 
 
2.1.8 Action 
 
Further evidence for language grounding is provided by Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2002). They demonstrated that the simulation built during language comprehension is 
sensitive to directional aspects in action. Subjects were required to judge the sensibility 
of sentences moving the arm toward or away from the body. Half of the critical items 
referred to an action to perform by moving the arm toward the body, and the other half 
to a similar action done in the opposite direction. Critical items could be imperative 
sentences (e.g., “Put your finger under your nose” vs. “Put your finger under the 
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faucet”), as well as sentences implying a concrete transfer (e.g., “Courtney handed you 
the notebook” vs. “You handed Courtney the notebook”), or sentences implying an 
abstract transfer (e.g., “Liz told you the story” vs. “You told Liz the story”). 
They found an action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE) in each of the three 
conditions. Thus, for example, responses to the sentence “Open the drawer” were 
faster if participants were required to perform a movement toward their body than 
away from their body; the opposite was true for a sentence like “Close the drawer”. 
These results clearly support the idea that linguist meaning is grounded in 
bodily activity.  
 
 
2.1.9 Affordances 
 
The link between our knowledge and action was tested in a part verification 
task and in a sensibility judgment task by Borghi (2004). If concepts are represented as 
pattern of potential actions (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000) we would expect that 
different parts will be represented in a different way, depending on the more frequent 
action that we usually perform with the object. In other words, different objects parts 
can be good affordances depending on the situation at hand. So for example, in our 
representation of a “gas lighter” the button should be more salient than the body 
because canonically we use it for producing a spark. But the representation of the parts 
should change in relation to the requirements of the current situation. So for example, 
if we have just found a nice recipe in the book we were leafing through, the body gas 
lighter would become salient, allowing using the object as a bookmark. In the part 
verification task participants were faster when the object’s part word showed after the 
sentence was congruent with the part activated by the action suggested by the sentence. 
That is, “The child divided the orange” activates the mental simulation of the splitting 
action, and so the most salient part will be the “slice” rather than the “pulp” of the 
orange. The alternative propositional explanation, based on the semantic association 
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between the verbs and the affording/nonaffording objects part, was ruled out 
replicating the results with controlled materials. 
 
 
2.1.10 Effector and goal 
 
Studies in different areas of neuroscience and cognitive science demonstrate 
that simulations formed during language comprehension are sensitive to the effectors 
implied by the verb or by the sentence. 
Pulvermüller et al. (2001) investigated brain activity elicited by visually 
presented verbs that could be referred to movements of the arms (e.g., “to write”), of 
the legs (e.g., “to walk”) or of the face muscles (e.g., “to talk”). The behavioural part 
of the study consisted in a lexical decision task. In the physiological part they recorded 
Event Related Potentials (ERPs), that is a measure of the electrical activity produced 
by the brain in response to a sensory stimulus or associated with the execution of a 
motor, cognitive, or psycho-physiologic task. Behavioural results showed faster 
response times for face related verbs followed by arm related verbs and leg related 
verbs, supporting the idea that words semantic properties are reflected in the brain 
response they induce. Recorded ERPs revealed significant topographical differences 
250 ms after stimulus appearance. Results seem to demonstrate that verbs that refer to 
actions performed using different effectors are processed in different ways in the brain. 
Scorolli and  Borghi (2007) also investigated the involvement of motor system 
in linguistic comprehension, using not single words but sentences composed by a verb 
and a concept noun. Verbs could refer to actions usually performed with the hands, the 
mouth or the feet. Subjects were requested to evaluate the sensibility of the sentences 
by pressing a pedal or saying ‘yes’ at the microphone. Response times showed that 
using the microphone they were faster with “mouth sentences” than with “hand 
sentences”. Using the pedal there was not a significant difference between “mouth 
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sentences” and “hand sentences”; instead “foot sentences” were significantly faster 
than “hand sentences”. (I will discuss this study more deeply in Chapter 3.) 
This suggests that the same motor areas are recruited when a person 
understands action sentences or is actually performing the action. Importantly, this 
modulation occurred even with a task in which the information related to the involved 
effector was really irrelevant, such as the evaluation of the sensibility of sentences. 
It’s difficult to account for these results by means of abstract symbol theories of 
meaning. If words in these sentences are abstract, amodal and arbitrarily related to 
their referents, why did the effectors referred to by the sentence and used for 
responding  influence the latencies of subjects’ reactions? 
In line with the previous studies, Borghi and Scorolli (2009) demonstrate that 
the simulation activated by language is sensitive to the effector involved in the action 
expressed by the sentence and to the specific effector (right hand vs. left hand) used for 
responding, and that this sensitiveness seems to be modulated also by the goal implied 
by the sentence. Participants’ task consisted in evaluating the sensibility of sentences 
regarding hand, mouth and foot actions (e.g., “Unwrap the candy” vs. “Eat the candy”; 
“Throw the ball” vs. “Kick the ball”). Participants responded by pressing two keys on 
the keyboard. The authors found a facilitation of sensible over non sensible sentences 
in right hand responses to hand and mouth sentences. This facilitation wasn’t present 
in foot sentences. This finding suggests that the simulation evoked is quite detailed, as 
it is modulated both by the kind of effector the sentence refers to (hand vs. foot vs. 
mouth), and by the specific hand (dominant vs. non-dominant) the action expressed by 
the sentence typically involves. (This study will be explained in detail in Chapter 4.) 
The advantage of the dominant hand obtained with both hand and mouth 
sentences is particularly significant because it implies that people are sensitive both to 
the effector involved and to the goals expressed by the sentence. That is, mouth-related 
actions as “biting an apple” imply the simulation of the whole process of eating the 
apple, including bringing it to the mouth with the hand. On the contrary, the hand is 
typically not involved in foot related actions, such as “kicking a ball”. The relevance of 
the goal is consistent with ideomotor theories (e.g., Prinz, 1997), that stress that actions 
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are represented not only in terms of body movement but also in terms of the distal 
perceptual effects they aim to generate. The present data are also in keeping with 
Fogassi, Ferrari, Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi, & Rizzolatti (2005) findings about a kind of 
mirror neurons that differentially codes a motor act according to the final goal of the 
action sequence in which the act is embedded. Finally, the results are convergent with 
evidence indicating that at the neural level hand and mouth actions activate contiguous 
regions, confirming the existence of a strict interrelationship between the effector hand 
and the effector mouth. This is in line with recent studies showing that language 
evolves from gestures and manual actions (e.g., Corballis, 2002; Arbib, 2005; Parisi, 
Borghi, Di Ferdinando & Tsiotas, 2005) 
 
 
2.1.11 The role of experience: ambiguous spatial word 
 
Embodied theories underline the role of the physical experiences in guiding 
concept understanding (Barsalou,1999a; Glenberg, 1997; Wilson, 2002). Nonetheless, 
there is not much evidence on the role of experience in language comprehension. Most 
of the studies are restricted to paper-and-pencil tests (for example, concerning 
experience in motion, Boroditsky, 2000). 
Alloway, Corley and Ramscar (2006) used a virtual environment for simulating 
an experience of motion. Virtual reality allowed them to directly test the embodied 
experiences on spatial perspective in order to investigate how ambiguous spatial terms 
are understood. Through virtual reality participants could experience either an ego-
moving or an object-moving system. After having familiarized with the new 
environment, they were shown either an object moving linguistic prime (i.e., [1] 
“During the game, the green pillar is in front of the red pillar.”), or a non-spatial 
question, unrelated to motion (i.e., [2] “During the game, most of the doors are 
closed.”) They had to respond if the sentence was true or false. Results showed that 
participants were significantly influenced by the system of motion they represented. In 
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fact, in the [1] case the prime overcame the embodied ego-moving schema of motion. 
On the contrary, in the [2] condition, in which the linguistic prime was unrelated to 
any system of motion, they were influenced by the ego-moving schema in the virtual 
environment, namely they responded to the target task coherently with the virtual 
suggested perspective. 
Globally the results demonstrate that individual sensori-motor capabilities play 
an important role in guiding specific cognitive facilities. Focusing on language, it is 
crucial the finding that word meaning is not fixed, but influenced by our experience as 
well as by the linguistic context.  
 
 
2.2 Conclusion 
 
In this review I have shown that in the last ten years many studies have found 
support for the simulation theory, and have shown that the simulation we run during 
language comprehension is rather specific. Despite this huge amount of research, the 
amodal or propositional symbol system theory (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1981) remains 
the dominant theory of knowledge representation. According to this theory the link 
between the internal symbols and the external referents is just an arbitrary one. It’s 
hard to falsify this theory, because it can explain psychological phenomena. However, 
in many cases the explanation it can provide is just a post-hoc one. 
Instead, according to the perceptual symbol system theory, the relationship 
between the symbols and their referent is not arbitrary, so a change in the referent will 
cause a change in the perceptual symbol (Barsalou, 1999b). The advantage of this 
theory is not in its explicatory power (even if this theory explains the same effects in a 
more parsimonious way), but rather in its predictive power. 
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II part 
 
‘THE MEANING OF CONCRETE WORDS’: 
SENSORI-MOTOR EXPERIENCE 
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 3 The specificity of the simulation with respect to 
the body. Different effectors: the hand, the mouth and 
the foot 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address whether sentence comprehension 
modulates the motor system. Participants were presented with 24 pairs of nouns and 
verbs that could be referred to hand and mouth actions (e.g., to unwrap vs. to suck the 
sweet), in the first block, or, in the second block, to 24 hand and foot actions (e.g., to 
throw vs. kick the ball). An equal number of non sensible pairs were presented. 
Participants’ task consisted of deciding whether the combination made sense or not: 20 
participants responded by saying yes loudly into a microphone, 20 by pressing a pedal. 
Results support embodied theories of language comprehension, as they suggest that 
sentence processing activates an action simulation. This simulation is quite detailed, as 
it is sensitive to the effector involved. Namely, it leads to a facilitation in responses to 
‘mouth sentences’ and ‘foot sentences’ compared to ‘hand sentences’ in case of 
congruency between the effectors – mouth and foot – involved in the motor response 
and in the sentence.  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 1 and 2, recent proposals in cognitive science and 
neuroscience claim that cognition is embodied. The embodied view claims that 
knowledge is not abstract but grounded in sensorimotor experiences, and that there is a 
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deep unity among perception, action and cognition (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Pecher & 
Zwaan, 2005).  This view of cognition contrasts with the classical perspectice, 
according to which the mind is a mechanism for manipulating arbitrary and amodal 
symbols. In the classical cognitive view, concepts are seen as being inherently non-
perceptual: perceptual states arise in sensory-motor systems, but perceptual experience 
will be transduced in a completely new representational language. The resulting 
symbols do not correspond with the perceptual states that produced them. They are, 
therefore, amodal, and the link between the concept and the perceptual state is just 
arbitrary.  
Instead, in the embodied view concepts are not conceived of as being given by 
arbitrary and amodal symbols but rather by perceptual symbols. These perceptual 
symbols are neural representations located in sensory-motor areas in the brain: there is 
no transduction process (Barsalou, 1999a). More precisely, concepts consist of the 
reactivation of the same neural activation pattern that is present when we perceive the 
objects or entities they refer to and when we interact with them (Barsalou, 1999a, 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, Glenberg, 1997). For example, the concept of dog refers to a 
real or an imagined dog and, when encountered, reactivates any previous experiences 
with this extra-linguistic entity. In this view, object attributes are thought to be stored 
near the same modality-specific neural areas that are active when objects are being 
experienced (Martin, Ungerleider & Haxby, 2000). Moreover, symbols, according to 
the embodied view, are not amodal, but multimodal – for example, they refer both to 
the tactile experience of caressing a dog as well as the auditory experience of hearing a 
dog bark (Barsalou, 1999a; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).  
Contemporary neuroscience provides evidence in support of the claim that 
concepts make direct use of sensory-motor circuits of the brain (Gallese & Lakoff, 
2005). There is much neural evidence to indicate, for example, that the same areas are 
involved when forming motor imagery and when activating information on objects, 
particularly on tools. For example, evidence gathered through Positron Emission 
Tomography indicates that the naming of tools, as opposed to the naming of animals, 
differentially activates the left middle temporal gyrus, which is also activated by action 
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generation tasks, and the left premotor cortex, generally activated when participants 
imagine themselves grasping objects with their dominant hand (Martin, Wiggs, 
Ungerleider & Haxby, 1996). Along these same lines, fMRI studies have shown that 
the premotor left cortex responds selectively to images of tools, but not to images of 
animals and houses (Chao & Martin, 2001; see also Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib & 
Rizzolatti, 1997).  
An important consequence of this embodied view concerns language, as it 
makes use of concepts. According to the embodied theory there is no ‘language 
module’. Instead, language makes direct use of the same brain structures used in 
perception and action. Understanding language implies forming a “simulation”, that is 
the recruitment of the very neurons that would be activated when actually acting or 
perceiving the situation, action, object or entity described by language (Barsalou, 
1999a; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; McWhinney, 1999; 
Zwaan, 2004).  
There is much behavioural evidence in support of the role simulation plays in 
sentence comprehension (e.g., Borghi, 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak et 
al., 2005; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). For example, Zwaan et al. (2002) presented 
participants with two kinds of sentences (the ranger saw the eagle in the sky vs. the 
ranger saw the eagle in the nest), followed by a picture of an object. Participants were 
required to indicate whether or not the object in the picture was the same object 
mentioned in the sentence by pressing a different key on a keyboard. The authors 
found an advantage in the congruent condition, in contrast with the predictions of a 
classical amodal vision. Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) found similar results when they 
investigated the effect of the orientation of the objects in visual images presented to 
subjetcs participating in an experiment investigating the role of simulation in sentence 
comprehension. When participants were presented with a sentence like John put the 
pencil in the drawer, their response times were faster when recognizing a horizontally-
oriented pencil than when recognizing the same pencil presented vertically. The 
opposite was true in the case of a sentence like John put the pencil in the cup. 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) asked participants to indicate whether or not a sentence 
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made sense by pushing one of two buttons whose position entailed either moving 
toward the body or away from the body. Response times were longer when responding 
by pushing the button that required a movement in the opposite direction from that 
implied by the sentence. For example, participants were faster in responding that Close 
the drawer made sense when pushing the proper button entailed moving away from the 
body rather than toward it. The simulation activated while processing a sentence that 
referred to objects’ movement seems to be quite detailed, as it contains directional 
information. Recently Borreggine and Kaschak (2006) replicated the study by 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) in order to investigate timing effects during sentence 
processing. They manipulated the delay between the acoustic sentence presentation 
and the visual cue that triggered the response. This cue indicated whether the 
participant should press a button located near or far from the body (towards vs. away 
movement) in order to respond “yes”. The visual cue could come at the beginning of 
the sentence presentation or after it (delay of 0, 50, 500, or 1000 ms). The 
compatibility effect between action and sentence (ACE) was present only when the 
motor instruction was presented simultaneously with the beginning of the sentence 
rather than after the sentence presentation. This suggests that the simulation process 
takes place when participants can plan their motor response while processing the 
sentence. 
Even though the reported evidence suggests that during sentence 
comprehension we activate simulations, the extent to which these simulations are 
specific is still a matter of debate. In our work we sought to investigate the degree of 
specificity of these simulations. More specifically, we sought to understand whether 
reading sentences related to actions to be performed with different effectors (mouth 
and foot) activates the same neural systems activated during the effective execution of 
these actions. Though behavioural in nature, our study has relevant implications for 
physiological and neural models of the relationships between language and the motor 
system.  
Participants were presented with pairs of nouns and verbs that referred to ‘hand 
actions’ and ‘mouth actions’, in the first block, or to ‘hand actions’ and ‘foot actions’, 
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in the second one. They were asked to decide whether the combination made sense. 
Half of them indicated their responses by using a microphone, half by pressing a pedal. 
‘Hand sentences’ were used as a baseline. 
The rationale is as follows: if the simulation is specific, that is, if the same 
neurons are recruited while understanding an action sentence as while performing an 
action with a specific effector, then ‘mouth sentences’ should be processed faster than 
‘hand sentences’ when responding with the microphone than with the pedal. Similarly, 
‘foot sentences’ should be processed faster than ‘hand sentences’ when responding 
with the pedal than with the microphone. 
 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
 
Forty students of the University of Bologna took part in the experiment. All 
were native Italian speakers, right-handed, and all had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. They all gave their informed consent to the experimental procedure. Their ages 
ranged from 18 to 29 years old. 
 
 
3.2.2 Materials 
 
Materials consisted of word pairs (sentences) composed of a transitive verb and 
a concept noun. There were two different blocks: hand – mouth sentences, hand – foot 
sentences. For each block, we chose 12 nouns which refer to objects of daily use, each 
preceded by an action verb. In the first block (block mouth – hand sentences), verbs 
could refer either to an action usually performed with the mouth (e.g., to suck the 
sweet), or with the hand (e.g., to unwrap the sweet). In the second block (block foot – 
Language and Embodiment 
 44
hand sentences), verbs could refer to an action usually performed with the foot (e.g., to 
kick the ball) or to an action typically performed with the hand (e.g., to throw the ball).  
We decided to use two blocks because of the difficulty in finding triads of 
verbs that could be combined with the same noun, referred to actions with the three 
different effectors and had the same association rate. For example, we usually act with 
an object like an ice cream with the hand or the mouth, but not with the foot; similarly 
we typically interact with an object like a flower, daisy, with the hand or the foot, but 
not with the mouth. For this reason, the first block contained nouns that could be 
combined with both ‘mouth verbs’ and ‘hand verbs’, while the second block contained 
nouns that could be combined with both ‘foot verbs’ and ‘hand verbs’.  
A pre-test was performed before the experiment in order to be sure that the 
verb-noun pairs had the same association rate in the two conditions. We required 18 
subjects to produce the first five nouns they associated to each verb. Then we checked 
whether the noun we had chosen to associate with the verb of the critical pairs was 
present among the nouns they produced, and in which position it was produced. Then 
we calculated the weighted means for each participant, taking into account whether the 
noun was produced or not and, if it was produced, its production order.  The weighted 
means of the productions for each participant were submitted to two different mixed 
factor ANOVAs, one for each block of sentences (‘hand sentences’ vs. ‘mouth 
sentences’; ‘hand sentences’ vs. ‘foot sentences’). The results showed that there was 
no significant difference in production means between ‘mouth sentences’ and ‘hand 
sentences’, F (1,11) = 0.22, MSe = .09, p = .65,  and between ‘foot sentences’ and 
‘hand sentences’, F (1,11) = 0, MSe = .05, p = 1. This means that our results could not 
be explained on the basis of the degree of association between verb-noun pairs that we 
had chosen. 
At last we obtained 48 verb-noun pairs balanced for association rate. In 
addition to the critical pairs, we added 272 filler pairs. 40 were sensible verb-noun 
pairs – abstract sentences (e.g. to dream the summer). The remaining 232 were non 
sensible verb-noun pairs – false sentences (eg. to switch off the shoe) –. Each pair was 
presented four times in one of the two blocks. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Members of both 
groups were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. They sat on a comfortable 
chair in front of a computer screen and were instructed to look at a fixation cross that 
remained on the screen for 500 ms. Then a verb appeared on the screen. After 200 ms 
it was substituted by a noun, which was preceded by a determinative article. For each 
verb-noun pair, participants were instructed, if the combination made sense, to say yes 
loudly (first group) or to press a pedal with the right foot (second group), and to avoid 
responding if the combination did not make sense. Each noun was presented in the two 
different combinations, that is, preceded by a verb of ‘mouth action’ or ‘hand action’ 
in the first block, and by a verb of ‘foot action’ or ‘hand action’ in the second block. 
The timer started operating when the concept noun appeared on the screen, in order to 
avoid problems related to length and frequency of the noun, so in the response times 
analyses we compared each noun (e.g., candy) with itself. All participants were 
informed that their response times would be recorded and were invited to respond as 
quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy. Stimuli were presented in a 
random order. Sixteen training trials preceded the experimental trials, in order to allow 
the participants to familiarize with the procedure. 
 
 
3.3 Results 
 
All incorrect responses were eliminated. As the error analyses revealed that 
there was no speed-for-accuracy tradeoff, we focused on the RT analyses. To screen 
for outliers, scores 2 standard deviations higher or lower than the mean participant 
score were removed for each participant. 
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The remaining response times were submitted to two different mixed factor 
ANOVAs, one for each block (‘hand sentences’ vs. ‘mouth sentences’; ‘hand 
sentences’ vs. ‘foot sentences’). The factors of each ANOVA were Sentence Modality 
(‘hand’ vs. ‘mouth’ for the first analysis; ‘hand’ vs. ‘foot’ for the second one) and 
Response Modality (microphone vs. pedal), with Response Modality as a between 
participants variable. 
 
In the block ‘mouth-hand’, participants responded 84 ms more quickly with the 
pedal than with the microphone, F (1, 38) = 12.39, MSe = 11322.55, p < .001. The 
advantage of the pedal over the microphone (87 ms) was present also in the block 
‘foot-hand’, F (1, 38) = 14.74, MSe  = 10167.86, p < .0005. In addition, in the block 
‘foot-hand’ we also found a significant effect of the main factor Sentence Modality, 
with ‘foot sentences’ 21 ms faster than ‘hand sentences’, F = 17.98, MSe  = 482.52, p 
< .0001. 
  
        Figure 1. Block Mouth – Hand. Bars represent standard error. 
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Figure 2. Block Foot – Hand. Bars represent standard error. 
 
Further analyses were performed in order to better understand the results. We 
performed four separate ANOVAs, one for each Response Modality (microphone vs. 
pedal) and for each block (‘hand sentences’ vs. ‘mouth sentences’; ‘hand sentences’ 
vs. ‘foot sentences’).  
The first two ANOVAs performed on participants who responded with the 
microphone confirmed the hypotheses advanced. As predicted, participants using the 
microphone responded with significantly greater speed to ‘mouth sentences’ than to 
‘hand sentences’, F (1,19) = 8.28, MSe = 377.65, p < .009. The difference between 
‘foot sentences’ and ‘hand sentences’ was less marked, F (1,19) = 5.45, MSe = 405.84, 
p < .05. Even though the last difference also reached significance, the marked 
difference between the effect sizes ( p <.009 vs. p <.05) confirms that the simulation is 
effector-specific.  
The ANOVAs performed on participants who used the pedal as their 
responding device showed that there was no significant difference between ‘mouth 
sentences’ and ‘hand sentences’, that is, between sentences referring to effectors not 
involved while using the device, 2 ms, F (1,19) = 0.0056, MSe = 559.41, p < .81. 
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Instead, as predicted, we found that response times were significantly faster, 26 ms, for 
‘foot sentences’ than for ‘hand sentences’, F (1,19) = 12.84, MSe = 559.21, p < .002. 
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The results support the view that the act of comprehending sentences leads to 
the creation of an internal simulation of the action read. This simulation seems to be 
fairly specific, as it leads to a different modulation of the motor system depending on 
the effector (hand, mouth, foot) necessary for performing the actions described by the 
sentence. This suggests that the same motor areas are recruited whether a person is 
understanding action sentences or actually performing the action. Importantly, this 
modulation occurred even with a task in which the information related to the involved 
effector was really irrelevant, such as the evaluation of the sensibility of sentences. 
Our results clearly show that ‘mouth sentences’ were processed faster than ‘hand 
sentences’ when participants were responding with the microphone rather than with 
the pedal. The same facilitation effect was obtained with ‘foot sentences’ compared to 
‘hand sentences’ when participants were responding with the pedal rather than with the 
microphone. Even though our study clearly suggests that an internal simulation occurs, 
our results do not permit us to definitively determine when this process takes place 
because we recorded reaction times after the appearance of the noun. Namely, the 
motor resonance effect could occur either during sentence comprehension or after the 
sentence has been understood in order to prepare for action. Data from Borreggine and 
Kaschak (2006) suggest that the ACE effect, at the very least, was due to the 
simultaneous occurrence of a motor preparation phase and sentence comprehension. 
However, to our knowledge there has been no systematic study on the influence of 
timing on effector-specific effects in sentence comprehension. In order to solve this 
complex matter, more detailed studies on the relationship between timing and effector 
specific effects on sentence comprehension are needed. Evidence on timing could 
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provide stronger support to the idea that a simulation process is necessary and not just 
epiphenomenal in order to understand the sentence. Our results are also in line with 
previous fMRI studies showing that listening to sentences expressing actions 
performed with the mouth, the hand and the foot produces activation of different 
sectors of the premotor cortex, depending on the effector used in the listened sentences 
(Tettamanti, Buccino, Saccuman, Gallese, Danna, Scifo, Fazio, Rizzolatti, Cappa, & 
Perani, 2005). Of particular significance, they represent a behavioural extension of 
these results.  
Some may object to the results of our study on the grounds that the advantage 
of ‘foot sentences’ over ‘hand sentences’ is significant not only with the pedal but also 
with the microphone. However, this effect does not go against our main hypothesis – 
that is, that the effector used to respond facilitates responses to sentences implying the 
same effector – for a number of reasons. First, the effect is much stronger with the 
pedal than with the microphone, as the comparison of the effect sizes demonstrates. 
Second, ‘foot words’ have wider cortical distributions compared to ‘mouth words’, 
that have a more narrow distribution (Pulvermüller, 2005). This can easily account for 
the slight asymmetric result we found.  
Our results are in line with recent neurophysiological and behavioural 
evidence. Pulvermüller et al. (2001) recorded neurophysiological (they calculated 
event-related current source densities from EEG) and behavioural responses (reaction 
times and errors) to verbs referring to actions performed with the face, the arms and 
the legs. They found topographical differences in the brain activity patterns generated 
by the different verbs in a lexical decision task, starting from 250 ms after word 
presentation.  The behavioral experiment indicated that response times were shorter for 
face-related words compared to leg-related words, whereas the arm-related words were 
in the middle. 
Our study represents both an extension and a modification of the results 
attained by Pulvermüller et al. (2001). First of all, the study by Pulvermüller et al. 
focused on verb comprehension, whereas the purpose of our research is to study 
whether understanding simple sentences composed of a transitive verb and a noun 
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activates the motor system. In addition, the kind of task we used implied access to 
semantic knowledge, unlike the study by Pulvermüller et al., who used a lexical 
decision task on verbs. Importantly, however, we used a task for which the information 
pertaining to the kind of effector involved in the action described was not relevant. 
Given that Pulvermüller et al. found a significant difference between face-related and 
arm-related verbs on the one hand and leg-related verbs on the other – with manual 
responses –, we decided to compare ‘mouth sentences’ and ‘foot sentences’ and to use 
the ‘hand sentences’ as a baseline. Moreover, instead of employing a manual response, 
we used either a ‘mouth response’ or a ‘foot response’ (microphone and pedal). 
Namely, our purpose was to directly test whether or not understanding a sentence 
directly involves the motor system, affecting motor responses with the effector referred 
to by the sentence. 
Another recent study using both transcranial magnetic stimulation and a 
behavioral paradigm provides evidence for a modulation of the motor system 
depending on the effector referred to by action sentences. Buccino et al. (2005) 
presented three kinds of sentences: hand action, foot action and abstract content related 
sentences. Participants were required to respond with the hand or the foot if the verb 
was concrete and had to refrain from responding if the verb was abstract. Results 
showed that if subjects responded with the same effector necessary for executing the 
action described by the sentence, they were slower than if they had to respond with the 
other effector. Although this study shows that the meaning of the sentence modulates 
motor system activity, the authors found an inhibition rather than a facilitation. Even 
though our study investigates the difference between ‘foot actions’ and ‘mouth 
actions’ and Buccino et al. (2005) study the difference between ‘foot actions’ and 
‘hand actions’, further differences between the two behavioural studies may account 
for the result. The first is the modality used to deliver the stimuli. In our experiment, 
participants had to read the sentences, whereas in the study by Buccino et al. (2005), 
stimuli were acoustically presented. Furthermore, the stimuli were not the same. More 
importantly, Buccino et al., also used a task that implied a higher depth of processing 
than lexical decision, as we did, but they required the participants to evaluate the 
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action described rather than the meaning of the whole sentence. This is clearly implied 
by the fact that they gave the “go” signal to respond in coincidence with the second 
syllable of the verb, when the noun hadn’t yet been presented. On the contrary, we 
recorded response times from the noun presentation, and focused on comprehension of 
the sentence rather than of the verb alone. This explanation is in line with recent 
experiments on language and motor resonance that have shown that the timing 
between linguistic stimulus and motor response is crucial (e.g., Borraggine & Kaschak, 
in press; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). In addition, in our task the information relating to the 
effector is really irrelevant, given that we asked participants to evaluate whether the 
sentence made sense and didn’t require them to focus on the verb meaning.  
In conclusion, our results clearly show that understanding action sentences 
implies an effector specific modulation of the motor system, suggesting that a 
simulation effect takes place. This modulation leads to a facilitation of responses in 
case of congruency between the effector – mouth and foot – involved in the motor 
response and the effector involved in the sentence. 
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 4 The specificity of the simulation with respect to 
the body and to the goal. The hand: dominant vs. non-
dominant hand 
 
 
In five experiments participants were presented with pairs of nouns and verbs. 
They were asked to decide whether the combinations made sense or not. Half of the 
participants responded “yes” with the dominant hand, half with the left hand. When 
pairs referred to manual and mouth actions, participants responded faster with the 
dominant than with the left hand with sensible sentences. When pairs referred to 
manual and foot actions the result was opposite. Results suggest that language 
processing activates an action simulation that is sensitive both to the effector involved 
and to the goal expressed by the sentence.  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Concepts are the minimal units of our knowledge, a sort of “mental glue” 
linking our past experiences with our current interaction with the world (Murphy, 
2002). This paper will focus on object concepts mediated by words, and particularly on 
the relationship between words and action.  
In contrast with the view that concepts are generated by arbitrary and amodal 
symbols (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), the embodied view suggests that concepts are 
grounded in sensorimotor processes (Barsalou, 1999a; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; for a 
review on object concepts and action see Borghi, 2005). Concepts are not amodal but 
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multimodal, and conceptual information is distributed over modality specific domains 
(Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; Boronat, Buxbaum, Coslett, Tang, 
Saffran, Kimberg, & Detre, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Martin et al., 1996). Thus, 
according to the embodied theory, thinking of a telephone leads to the activation of 
auditory, visual, and tactile information – the sound of the telephone ringing, the color 
of the receiver, the smoothness of its surface etc. In other words, thinking about an 
object leads to a re-experiencing (simulation) of the interaction with the object 
(Barsalou, 1999a; Barsalou et al., 2003). Simulations consist of reenactments of our 
sensorimotor experiences with objects and entities. Significantly, these experiences are 
both perceptual and motor. It has been shown that a subset of the same neurons fire for 
sensory modalities like vision, hearing, touch, and are integrated with motor 
information (for a review, see Fogassi & Gallese, 2004).  
 
Accordingly, the neural areas recruited when we think about an object or about 
an entity and prepare to act are the same that are recruited when we perceive and 
interact with its referent. The multimodality of object concepts and the centrality of 
action information in their construction is demonstrated in a variety of experiments 
showing that visual stimuli activate motor information. Even with tasks that are 
intended as unimodal, the multimodality of concepts emerges (Smith, 2005). For 
example, Tucker and Ellis (2001) asked participants to evaluate whether different-
sized objects are artifact or natural kinds by mimicking a precision or a power grasp. 
They found a congruency effect between the object size and the kind of grip used to 
respond, even if the object size was not relevant to the task. 
According to the embodied view, words mediating concepts also enhance the 
neural pathways involved in perceiving objects and interacting with them: thus, the 
word “telephone” would re-enhance the experiences of past interactions with 
telephones. Substantial evidence from fields ranging from psychology to neuroscience 
to cognitive linguistics (for reviews see Bergen, 2005; Gibbs, 2003; Pecher & Zwaan, 
2005) provides support for this embodied view of linguistic meaning. The indexical 
hypothesis put forth by Glenberg and Robertson (2000) explains in an embodied 
perspective the nature of the relationships between words and their referents. 
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According to this hypothesis, words are linked to objects in the world, their referents, 
or to analogical representations such as pictures or perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 
1999a). For example, the word “handle” refers to its referent, a handle, or to an 
analogical representation of the handle. Therefore, words that refer to objects would 
evoke first of all perceptual information relative to such objects. Given the close 
relationship between perceptual and motor processes, words should also evoke motor 
information. Depending on their perceptual features, in fact, objects can activate 
affordances (Gibson, 1979). For instance, different kinds of handles may afford 
different actions: some must be turned, others are pushed upon as when opening a 
door, etc.  
When applied to words and sentence comprehension, the simulation theory 
holds that language comprehension entails a mental simulation of the situation or 
action described by the sentence (Zwaan, 2004). The neural substrate for the idea of 
simulation resides in the phenomenon of motor resonance. Recent neurophysiological 
studies have produced important discoveries regarding the macaque monkey’s 
premotor cortex (area F5). Practically speaking, this area contains a vocabulary of 
“motor acts” (Gentilucci, 2003). Unlike F1 neurons, which encode different kinds of 
movements, F5 neurons refer to goal-directed actions. Some neurons are sensitive to a 
general action category (hold, grasp, tear etc), others to the way an object can be 
grasped (e.g., precision vs. whole hand grasp). Further neurons are concerned with the 
temporal segmentations of actions (e.g., hand opening, closing, holding etc.) (Fadiga, 
Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000). Recent studies have shown that many F5 
neurons respond to actions performed with different effectors, provided that they share 
a common goal, for example discharging when reaching for an object with the left 
hand, the right hand or with the mouth. The F5 area contains two varieties of 
visuomotor neurons: canonical and “mirror” (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; for a recent 
review see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Canonical neurons discharge when 
macaques see graspable objects and when they execute specific actions (for example, 
when they grasp an object with a precision or with a power grip), while mirror neurons 
fire when the monkey performs an action or when it observes another monkey or an 
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experimenter performing a goal-directed action, such as, for example, grasping an 
object. Importantly, they do not discharge when the object alone is presented. Recently 
it has been proposed that these neurons may help explain various cognitive phenomena 
such as empathy, mind reading abilities and conceptual organization (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).  
Of particular relevance in relation to our aim is the fact that recent studies 
suggest that the homologue of the F5 area in humans is Broca’s area, and it has been 
proposed that mirror neurons may play a role in language evolution (Rizzolatti & 
Arbib, 1998). Broca’s area was considered to be devoted to speech production. 
Recently, however, it has been shown that a motor representation of hand actions is 
present in this area. In addition, Buccino et al. (2001) found that different regions of 
the premotor cortex and Broca’s area are activated depending on the effector involved 
in their fMRI study that required participants to observe videos of actions involving 
the mouth, the hand and the foot. Other brain imaging and behavioral studies provide 
evidence, consistent with these findings, that cortical areas are organized in a 
somatotopic way. For example, Pulvermüller et al. (2001) found topographical 
difference in the brain activity patterns generated by verbs referring to actions 
performed with the legs, the face, and the arms starting from 250 ms after word 
presentation. Other recent evidence suggests that the simulations activated while 
processing a sentence are quite detailed. Buccino et al. (2005) showed that simulations 
run while processing action sentences are sensitive to the kind of effector required to 
perform the action. In Buccino et al.'s study, participants had to listen to sentences of 
three kinds: abstract sentences, sentences describing actions performed with hands, and 
sentences describing actions performed with feet. The task required participants to 
respond with the hand or foot, for concrete sentences, and to avoid responding for 
abstract sentences. The results showed that sentences can prime the motor system in an 
effector specific way.  
Our experiments sought to test whether the simulations running while 
processing pairs of verbs and nouns (sentences) are detailed enough to be sensitive to 
the difference between the dominant and the non-dominant hand. It is well known that 
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right-handed individuals are more dexterous to perform skilled actions with their right 
hand. This could lead to a general advantage in response times with right hand 
responses. However, we predict an advantage of right hand responses only during the 
comprehension of words that refer to sensible actions. Namely, as we typically use the 
dominant hand to perform skilled actions with objects (e.g., writing with a pen), one 
might expect that if while reading a verb-noun combination we form a mental 
simulation of such an action, we would activate more the dominant (right) than the 
non-dominant hand. This advantage of the dominant hand should not occur when the 
simulation we run is not coherent, that is, when the verb-noun combination is 
meaningless. Thus, in a sentence sensibility task we predict faster responses of the 
dominant hand compared with the non-dominant one in the case of sensible 
combinations, whereas in the case of combinations that did not make sense we do not 
predict any advantage of the dominant hand. If we found an advantage of the dominant 
hand for sensible combinations referring to hand action, this would suggest that the 
simulations formed while reading sentences (or, more precisely, by reading verb-noun 
pairs) are very detailed, that is, that they are not only determined by the kind of 
effector (e.g., hand vs. foot), but also by the specific effector (e.g., right vs. left hand). 
But what becomes of the advantage of the dominant hand when we process sensible 
combinations referring to mouth actions (e.g., bite an apple) or to foot actions (e.g., 
kick a ball)? In Experiment 2 and 3, sentences involving a hand movement and 
sentences involving the mouth or a foot movement were compared. If the simulation 
formed is sensitive to the effector alone, then we should not find the advantage of the 
dominant hand in the case of pairs that refer to mouth and foot movements. However, 
if the sensitivity to the effector involved is modulated by the goal expressed in the 
sentence, as the literature on mirror neurons and on motor resonance suggests, then we 
should find an advantage of the dominant hand with mouth actions as well, but not 
with foot actions. This is because eating something typically implies bringing it to the 
mouth with the hand while performing an action with the foot does not imply a prior 
hand action. 
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4.2 Experiment 1.a 
 
The aim of Experiment 1.a was to test whether or not an internal simulation of 
the action described is activated during comprehension of a verb-noun combination 
describing a hand action with an object. Participants were presented with verbs 
followed by nouns; their task consisted in pressing a different key in order to decide 
whether the combination verb-noun was sensible or not (e.g., to paint – the picture vs. 
to melt – the chair). All verb-noun pairs that made sense referred to hand actions with 
objects. Participants were randomly assigned to two different groups; half of them 
were required to respond “Yes, it makes sense” with the dominant hand and “No, it 
doesn’t make sense” with the left hand; the other half were asked to do the opposite.  
If comprehending a sentence entails a simulation of the described action, then 
reaction times (RTs) with sensible sentences should be faster with the dominant hand 
than with the left hand. Such an advantage of the dominant hand should not appear in 
the case of combinations that didn’t make sense. 
 
 
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Fourteen volunteers took part in the experiment. They were all students of the 
University of Bologna, native Italian speakers and right-handed according to the 
Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971). 
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4.2.1.2 Materials 
Materials consisted of word pairs composed of a verb and a noun. We 
constructed 48 critical pairs composed of a verb followed by a concept noun. 24 
concept nouns designating common objects, for example, toothbrush, pencil, shoe, 
spoon, and hammer were chosen. Half of the objects are typically manipulated with the 
dominant hand; the other half requires bimanual manipulation. In addition, for each 
object we selected one verb referring to a skilled action to perform with the dominant 
hand, and another verb referring to an action not necessarily performed with the 
dominant hand.  
Each concept noun could be paired with one of 2 verbs (e.g. spoon – to eat; 
spoon – to dry). Of the 2 critical verbs, one designated an action which could be 
performed with both hands, another referred to an action to be performed with the 
dominant hand. For example, the object “picture” was paired with the action “to paint” 
and with the action “to take off”, the object “spoon” with the action “to eat” and “to 
dry”. Consider that typically the first kind of action referred to an object’s function; for 
this reason it typically requires a skilled behavior to be performed with the dominant 
hand. For example, the action of “hammering” (in Italian it is expressed through a verb 
and a noun, “battere con il martello”) requires more skills than the simple action of 
“lifting a hammer”. In order to select the materials, an independent group of 16 
participants evaluated a set of 56 sentences on a 7 point scale according to the degree 
of necessity to use the dominant hand to perform the described action with the object. 
We chose the 48 pairs with a higher difference between the degree of dominance of the 
two actions performed with the same object: for example, “to paint a picture” was 
selected as a Right Dominant action, “to take off a picture” as a Not-Right Dominant 
one. From now on the pairs implying a Right Dominant hand action will be called 
Right-Dominant, the pairs that do not imply a right dominant action will be named 
Not-Right-Dominant. 
In addition to the 48 critical pairs, 48 filler pairs were constructed. In these 
pairs, each of the 24 concept noun was combined with 2 verbs leading to sentences 
Language and Embodiment 
 60
which didn’t make sense. So, each concept noun appeared 4 times, twice in a critical 
pair and twice in a filler pair. 
The materials of all the experiments can be found at the following links: 
http://laral.istc.cnr.it/borghi/BS-Exp1a.htm,http://laral.istc.cnr.it/borghi/BS-
Exp1b.htm,http://laral.istc.cnr.it/borghi/BS-Exp2.htm,http://laral.istc.cnr.it/borghi/BS-
Exp3.htm . 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Participants in both 
groups were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. They sat in front of a 
computer screen and were instructed to look at a fixation cross that remained on the 
screen for 1000 ms. Then a verb appeared on the screen. After 600 ms the verb was 
substituted by a concept noun. The timer started operating when the concept noun 
appeared on the screen. For each verb-noun pair, participants were instructed to press a 
key if the combination made sense, and to press another key if the combination did not 
make sense. 
Participants in the first group were asked to respond “yes” with their left hand 
and “no” with their right hand; participants in the other group were required to do the 
opposite. All participants were informed that their response times would be recorded 
and invited to respond as quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy. Stimuli 
were presented in a random order. The 96 experimental trials were preceded by 12 
training trials. 
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4.2.2 Results 
 
One participants’ data were removed as their responses included errors over 
15%. All incorrect responses were eliminated. As the error analysis revealed that there 
was no speed-for-accuracy tradeoff, we focused on the RT analysis. To screen for 
outliers, scores 2 standard deviations higher or lower than the mean participant score 
were removed for each participant. Removed outliers accounted for 3.6% of response 
trials.  
The remaining response times were submitted to a 2 (Sensibility: Sensible vs. 
Non-Sensible verb-noun pairs) X 2 (Mapping: yes-right / no-left vs. yes-left / no-right) 
mixed factor ANOVA with Mapping as a between participants variable. Due to our 
experimental design, in the analysis conducted with items as random factor, the factor 
Mapping turned into the factor Response Hand (Right vs. Left). In the analysis on 
items Response Hand was manipulated within items, while Sensibility was 
manipulated between items. Analyses denoted F1 were conducted with participants as a 
random factor; analyses denoted F2 with items as a random factor in the design (for 
analyses with participants and items as random factors, see Clark, 1973; Coleman, 
1964). 
Participants responded 50 ms more quickly to Sensible than to Non-Sensible 
sentences, F1 (1,11) = 6.71, MSe = 2405.21, p<.05; F2 (1, 62) = 10.36, MSe = 6830.29, 
p <.005. Most interestingly, responses were quicker when participants had to respond 
to sensible sentences with the right hand (M = 572.98 ms) than with the left hand (M = 
711.63 ms), as clearly indicated by the main effect of Mapping, F1 (1,11) = 6.74, MSe 
= 18425.54, p <.05, in the analysis on participants. In fact in this kind of analysis the 
variable Response Hand is not considered per se, as it is embedded in the Mapping 
factor. In the items analysis, the same outcome is showed by the significant effect of 
Response Hand, F2 (1,62) = 3.25, MSe = 15222.55, p =.07 and by the interaction 
between Sensibility and Response Hand,  F2 (1, 62) = 121.74, MSe = 4681.91, 
p<.0000001 (see Figure 1 top). The data suggest that left-hand responses were faster 
for non-sensible than for sensible sentences. This result was unexpected. However, we 
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can tentatively explain the advantage of the left hand with non-sensible sentences as a 
direct consequence of some sort of inhibition mechanism. In other words, it is possible 
that, given that non-sensible sentences activated an incoherent simulation, participants 
“blocked” their right hand, and this produced as outcome faster responses with the left 
hand.    
Further analyses were performed considering only the Sensible sentences. 
Response times were submitted to a 2 (Response Hand: Right vs. Left) X 2 (Verb 
Dominancy: Right-Dominant vs. Not-Right-Dominant action) mixed factor ANOVA, 
with Response Hand as a between participants variable. In the analysis conducted with 
items as random factor both Response Hand (Right vs. Left) and Verb Dominance 
were manipulated within items. Right Hand responses were  111 ms faster than Left 
Hand responses,  F1 (1, 11) = 4.06, MSe = 79380.84, p<.07; the effect was found also 
in the analysis on items, F2 (1, 23) = 41.72, MSe = 5301.87, p < .00001. Right-
Dominant verb-noun pairs were processed  78 ms faster than Not-Right-Dominant 
pairs, F1 (1, 11) = 21.19, MSe = 1866.20, p<.001; the effect was significant also in the 
items analysis F2 (1, 23) = 23.22, MSe = 5723.06, p < . 0001. The interaction between 
Verb Dominancy and Response Hand was significant only in the items analysis, F2 (1, 
23) = 5.48, MSe = 2789.60, p < .05. Both the analysis on participants and items 
showed the same pattern: participants were faster with Right-Dominant verb-noun 
pairs than with Left Dominant ones both with the Right and the Left Hand. This 
pattern suggests that verbs referring to skilled actions activate more strongly both 
effectors in comparison to verbs referring to more general actions. 
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Figure 1. The interactions between Response Hand and Sensibility in 
Experiment 1a, 2, and 3. Means on items. Bars represent standard error. 
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In order to be sure that the results were not a result of familiarity, an 
independent group of 16 participants was asked to evaluate sensible sentence 
familiarity on a 7 point scale. The correlation between the RTs and the familiarity 
ratings were quite low (r = -0.29), which led us to exclude the possibility that our 
results were due to familiarity of the verb-noun combinations. 
 
 
4.3 Experiment 1.b 
 
A control experiment was performed, in order to verify whether the advantage 
of the dominant hand we found in Experiment 1.a was specific to action sentences or 
whether it was simply due to a semantic compatibility between right hand responses 
and sensible sentences. If the results found in Experiment 1.a are due to semantic 
compatibility, then we should find the advantage of the dominant hand with sensible 
sentences also with sensible sentences that do not refer to action. Such an advantage of 
the dominant hand should not appear in the case of sentences that don’t make sense. 
 
 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants  
Fifteen students of the University of Bologna took part in the experiment. They 
were selected with the same criteria used for Experiment 1.a. 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Materials 
Materials consisted of word pairs composed of a verb and a noun, as in 
Experiment 1.a. We constructed 48 critical pairs composed of a verb followed by a 
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concept noun. None of the concept nouns referred to graspable objects, and the 
selected verbs did not refer to body actions. Some examples of the pairs are: “to think-
solution”, “to memorize-event”, “to evaluate-color”, “to respect-rule”. In addition to 
the 48 critical pairs, the same 48 filler pairs used in Experiment 1.a were utilized. 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1.a. 
 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
All incorrect responses were eliminated. No speed-for-accuracy tradeoff was 
present, so we will discuss the RT analysis. The same trimming method of Experiment 
1.a was used. Removed outliers accounted for 3.9 % of response trials. Two ANOVAs, 
one with participants and another with items as random factor, were performed, with 
the same factors of Experiment 1.a.  Participants responded 33.15 ms more slowly to 
Sensible than to Non-Sensible sentences, F1 (1,13) = 12.16, MSe = 674.89, p <.005; 
the effect was significant also in the items analysis, F2 (1, 92) = 7.67, MSe = 6456.06, 
p <.01, and is probably due to the complexity of abstract noun-verb combinations. 
More importantly to our aim, neither the main effect of Mapping - in the analysis on 
participants, F1 (1,13) = .00, MSe = 50408.22, p = .99, nor the effect of Response 
Hand in the items analysis, F2 (1,92) = 0.10, MSe = 4522.33, p = .75, nor the 
interaction between Sensibility and Response Hand in the items analysis reached 
significance, F2 (1,92) = 0.00, MSe = 4522.33, p = .98. 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
 
The results are in line with the simulation hypothesis. As predicted, the results 
of Experiment 1.a showed that the dominant hand was activated by reading verb-noun 
pairs describing manual actions. Crucially, the advantage of the dominant hand 
concerned only the pairs describing actions that can actually be committed with the 
objects in question. The results of Experiment 1.b confirm that the dominant hand 
advantage is not due to a simple semantic compatibility between right-hand responses 
and sensible sentences. Bekkering, Wohlschläger and Gattis (2000) obtained similar 
results in an action imitation experiment which demonstrated that children use their 
dominant hand more frequently during grasping than during other kinds of manual 
actions, such as pointing. Further support to the simulation hypothesis was given by 
the advantage of Right-Dominant compared to Not-Right-Dominant actions, even 
though there was no evidence of a specific advantage of the dominant hand with right-
dominant actions. Rather, it seemed that all skilled manual actions implying an 
interaction with objects, as the ones used, pre-activated both hands. 
 
 
4.4 Experiment 2 
 
The advantage of the dominant hand found in Experiment 1 provides support 
for the simulation theory. Experiment 2 was designed in order to verify whether the 
effector referred to by the sentence might influence response times. For this reason, we 
used both foot and manual verbs that can be followed by the same noun (e.g., kick vs. 
throw the ball). As in Experiment 1, participants were instructed to indicate their 
decision by pressing a different key to show whether the verb-noun combinations 
made sense or not. As mentioned in the introduction, previous evidence (Pulvermüller 
et al., 2001; Pulvermüller, 2003) suggests that different cortical areas are activated 
while hearing sentences referring to different effectors. Behavioral evidence on the 
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differential role of manual and foot actions has also been provided (Buccino et al., 
2005). However, it has not yet been demonstrated whether responding with the right or 
with the left hand is sensitive to the fact that actions referred to by the sentences are 
performed with different effectors. If, while reading and comprehending the meaning 
of a sentence, participants are sensitive to the effector implied by the verb, no evidence 
of an advantage of the dominant hand with sensible foot-sentences should be found. 
More specifically, we predicted that, in the analysis performed only on sensible 
sentences, responses with the right hand should be faster with hand actions than with 
foot actions. 
 
 
4.4.1 Method 
4.4.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-two volunteers took part in the experiment. They were selected 
according to the same criteria used in Experiment 1. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Materials 
As in the previous experiment, stimuli consisted of pairs composed of a verb 
and a noun. We selected 24 object concept-nouns that could be preceded either by a 
verb indicating a manual action (e.g., to throw – the ball; to pick up – the grapes; to 
throw – the sandal; to rip – the grass) or by a verb referring to an action to perform 
with the foot (e.g., to kick – the ball; to press – the grapes; to wear – the sandal; to step 
on – the grass). We chose a further 48 verb-noun pairs that referred to actions which 
do not make sense. 
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4.4.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were divided into two groups. Half of them were asked to respond 
“yes” with their left hand and “no” with the right hand; the other half was asked to do 
the opposite. The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
 
4.4.2 Results 
 
All incorrect responses were eliminated. As in Experiment 1, there was no 
evidence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff. To screen for outliers, we used the same 
criterion as in the previous experiment. Removed outliers accounted for 3.4% of 
response trials. The remaining response times were submitted to a 2 (Sensibility: 
Sensible vs. Non-Sensible verb-noun combination) X 2 (Mapping: yes-right / no-left 
vs. yes-left / no-right) mixed factor ANOVA with Mapping as a between participants 
variable. In the analysis conducted with items as random factor, Sensibility was 
manipulated between items, whereas Response Hand was manipulated within items. 
Participants responded 33 ms more quickly to Sensible than to Non-Sensible 
sentences, F1 (1,20) = 6.11, MSe = 1998.57, p<.05; however, the effect was not 
significant in the items analysis. Crucially participants were slower (M = 863.51 ms) 
when they had to respond to sensible sentences with the Right Hand rather than with 
the Left one (M = 701.73 ms),  as indicated by both the Mapping factor in the analysis 
on participants, F1 (1,20) = 4.13, MSe = 69086.66, p =. 055, and  the interaction 
between Sensibility and Response Hand in the items analysis, F2 (1, 46) = 81.31, MSe 
= 7307.51, p<.0000001 (see Figure 1 middle). The effect was opposite to the effect 
found in the Experiment 1.a, as responses with the right hand were inhibited. There 
seems to be an interference leading to slower RTs with the right hand. Newman-Keuls 
post-hoc analysis indicates that the fastest responses were obtained in responses 
triggered by Sensible sentences with the left hand and by Non-Sensible sentences with 
the right hand, which differed from both Sensible sentences with the right hand and 
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Non-Sensible sentences with the right hand (p <.01). The results are exactly the 
opposite of the results found in Experiment 1.a and support the simulation hypothesis. 
In fact, the presence of actions to perform with foot probably led to the inhibition of 
participants’ dominant hand. Given that grasping actions are preferentially performed 
with the right hand, it is exactly this hand that has to be mostly inhibited. This 
inhibition might have induced, as a side effect, the advantage in response times of the 
left over the right hand.  
We performed two further 2 (Sensible-Sentence Response Hand: Right vs. 
Left) X 2 (Sentence Modality: Hand vs. Foot) ANOVAs, one on participants and the 
other on items, considering only responses to Sensible sentences.  We found that right 
hand responses (M = 850 ms) were slower than left hand responses (M = 680 ms), both 
in the analysis with participants as random factor, F1 (1, 20) = 3.77, MSe = 83880.65, p 
=.066, and in in the items analysis, F2 (1, 11) = 57.44, MSe = 3254.09, p<.00001. Foot 
actions were processed 9 ms slower and produced more errors (the percentage of errors 
was, respectively, 7.95% vs. 4.74% of the sensible trials) than hand actions; however, 
the effect of Response Hand did not reach significance in the analyses on participants 
and on items. The interaction between Response Hand and Sentence Modality was not 
significant, probably due to the order of presentation of the trials (random vs. blocked). 
Namely, participants may have adopted a general response strategy because foot and 
hand sentences were presented randomly in the same block.  
An independent group of 13 participants evaluated sentences for familiarity on 
a 7-point scale. In addition, given the peculiarity of foot sentences, we decided to 
check the imageability of sentences as well. The correlation between the RTs and the 
familiarity and imageability scores were very low (respectively r = -0.18; r = -0.04), 
leading us to exclude the possibility that our results were due to these factors. The 
reason why we did not pre-select the materials but used post-hoc analyses depends on 
our study’s purpose. Basically we needed noun-verb couples, in which the noun was 
the same in the two conditions. Using the same name we intended to minimize the 
effect due to length, age of acquisition, frequency, imageability of different nouns. We 
dealt with this issue starting the timer at the noun presentation. In Italian it is very 
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difficult to find noun-verb combinations that satisfy our request, that is that can be 
associated with two verbs referring to actions performed with different effectors. 
 
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
 
As predicted, the results differed from those obtained in Experiment 1.a as the 
right hand advantage with sensible sentences was not replicated. This suggests that 
sentence comprehension implies a simulation of the action described, and that this 
simulation is quite detailed, as it apparently takes into account the specific effector 
involved.  
However, in the analysis performed only with sensible sentences, the 
disadvantage of the dominant hand was present both with hand and with foot 
sentences. This result can be accounted for by the fact that participants may have 
adopted a general response strategy because foot and hand sentences were presented 
randomly and not in a blocked way. This account will be tested in Experiment 4.  
Sensitivity to the effector involved in the verb-noun combination was 
demonstrated both by the overall disadvantage of the dominant hand and by the fact 
that foot sentences lead to the production of more errors than hand sentences. The 
disadvantage of foot over hand actions replicate the behavioral results found by 
Pulvermüller et al. (2001). In our study this difference between kinds of actions cannot 
be due to length and frequency of the target-noun, as the noun was the same in both 
conditions, and can hardly be attributed to familiarity and frequency of the preceding 
verb, as the timer started when the noun was presented on the screen. Rather, they are 
probably due to the simulation elicited by the verb-noun combination. 
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4.5 Experiment 3 
 
Experiment 2 showed that the advantage of the dominant hand was not present 
when both hand and foot sentences were presented. In Experiment 3 we compared 
hand and mouth sentences; that is, we used the same noun in combination either with a 
verb referring to a hand action or to a mouth action (e.g., to peel – the apple vs. to bite 
– the apple; to grasp – the pill vs. to swallow – the pill). 
If we accept that a simulation process takes place during language 
comprehension, we can advance two possible predictions. First of all, if the simulation 
driven by the sentence is only effector specific, with sensible sentences there should be 
a processing difference between hand and mouth sentences, as found by Pulvermüller 
et al (2001). Alternatively, it is possible that we simulate the action not only at a 
proximal level, that is at the level of effector, but also at a distal level; that is, that we 
are sensitive both to the effector referred to by the sentence and to the goal the 
sentence expresses. If actions are represented and encoded at a distal level, in terms of 
goals, then the advantage of the dominant hand should be present with both mouth and 
hand sentences (Hommel et al., 2008). To clarify: a mouth-action, such as licking an 
ice cream, typically implies / follows a manual action such as, for example, grasping 
the ice cream. As it can be seen from the examples, all nouns we selected for this 
experiment afford hand-mouth interaction. The sensitivity both to the effector and the 
goal would lead to an advantage of the dominant hand with sensible sentences even 
when the verb refers to actions typically performed with the mouth, such as, for 
example, “bite an apple”. 
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4.5.1 Method 
4.5.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-eight students of the University of Bologna volunteered for the 
experiment. They were native Italian speakers, with normal or corrected vision, and 
right-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire (Oldfield 1971). 
 
 
4.5.1.2 Materials 
As in Experiment 1, stimuli consisted of pairs composed of a verb and a noun. 
56 critical pairs were constructed. 28 object concept-nouns could be preceded either by 
a verb indicating a prehensile action (e.g. to grasp – the pill; to pick up – the apricot; to 
cut – the steak; to unwrap – the candy) or an oral action, that is, an action performed 
with the mouth (e.g., to swallow – the pill; to bite – the apricot; to chew – the steak; to 
suck – the candy). A further 56 pairs referred to actions which did not make sense. 
 
 
4.5.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was exactly the same as in the previous experiments. 
Participants were divided into two groups. As in the previous experiments, one group 
was asked to respond “yes” with the right hand and “no” with the left hand; the other 
group was required to do the opposite. 
 
 
4.5.2 Results 
 
One participant was eliminated as his/her responses contained errors over 15 %. 
The error analysis showed no evidence of speed-accuracy tradeoff, so we focused on 
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response time analysis. Data were filtered according to the same criterion used in 
previous experiments. Removed outliers accounted for 4% of response trials. The 
remaining response times were entered into a 2 (Sensibility: Sensible vs. Non-Sensible 
verb-noun combination) X 2 (Mapping: yes-right / no-left vs. yes-left / no-right) mixed 
factor ANOVA, with mapping as a between participants variable. In the analysis 
conducted with items as random factor, Sensibility was manipulated between items, 
whereas Response Hand was manipulated within items.  
Participants responded 28 ms more quickly to Sensible than to Non-Sensible 
sentences, F1 (1,35) = 7.01, MSe = 2011.85, p<.05; the effect of Sensibility was 
significant also in the items analysis, F2 (1, 54) = 5.06, MSe = 4724.36, p<.05. More 
interestingly, even though the factor Mapping did not reach significance in the 
participants analysis, the predicted interaction between Sensibility and Response Hand 
was significant in the items analysis, F2 (1, 54) = 80.63, MSe = 1259.62, p<.0000001 
(see Figure 1 bottom). Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis indicates that the fastest 
responses were obtained by Sensible sentences with the right hand, followed by Non-
Sensible sentences with the left hand, Sensible sentences with the left hand and, 
finally, by Non-Sensible sentences with the right hand (p <.01). A possible concern 
regards the discrepancy we found in this experiment between the analysis on  
participants and the analysis on items A possible cause of this discrepancy might lie in 
the individual differences among participants. For this reason we selected the 11 faster 
participants in each condition, thus obtaining a sample of 22 participants, equal in 
number to the sample of Experiment 2. In the analysis with subjects as random factor, 
the factor Mapping approached significance, F1 (1,20) = 3.81, MSe = 12738.08, p = 
.065, in keeping with the results obtained in the items analysis. This might suggest that 
the effect of Mapping is a rather precocious one, and that the effect was obscured when 
participants employed longer response times. Therefore, the simulation effect can be 
more clearly detected with fast-respondents than with slow-respondents. Two further 2 
(Sensible-Sentence Response Hand: Right vs. Left) X 2 (Sentence Modality: Hand vs. 
Mouth) ANOVAs were performed, one on participants and the other on items, 
considering only responses to Sensible sentences. The factor Sentence Modality  was 
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significant due to the fact that mouth sentences were 35 ms faster than hand sentences, 
F1 (1, 35) = 11,81, MSe = 1899.02, p < .01; F2 (1, 13) = 5.64, MSe = 4554.56, p <. 05.  
Interestingly, in the items analysis the factor Response Hand was also significant, as 
right hand responses were faster than left hand responses, F2 (1, 13) = 25.44, MSe = 
1861.85, p <.0005. As previously explained, this discrepancy with the Participants 
analysis might be due to the fact that in the participants’ analysis the variable Response 
Hand is not considered per se, as it is embedded in the Mapping factor. The interaction 
between Response Hand and Sentence Modality was not significant. As in Experiment 
2, it is probably due to the fact that mouth and hand sentences were presented 
randomly in the same block. 
As in the previous experiments, 14 participants were required to rate the noun-
verb pairs for familiarity on a 7-point scale. Because the correlation between response 
times and familiarity was quite low (r = -0.31), it is possible to exclude the possibility 
that our results are due to item familiarity. 
 
 
4.5.3 Discussion 
 
The results replicate those found in Experiment 1.a and are in line with the 
simulation hypothesis. As predicted, in the analysis performed with all sentences, the 
fastest responses were obtained through right hand responses to sensible sentences. 
This suggest that while reading a sentence participants simulate a hand movement 
necessary either to perform a manual action or to bring to the mouth an object with 
which to perform the mouth action. More specifically, the advantage of the dominant 
hand found with both hand sentences and mouth sentences suggests that action 
information is encoded in terms of goals rather than at a proximal level (Hommel et 
al., 2001). Consider that with the term goal we do not refer to the final goal. For 
example, we do not refer to the “relief of headache” that follows the action of 
swallowing a pill, but to the fact that the hand action typically represents a pre-
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condition of the mouth action. Thus, for example, the hand is engaged in grasping the 
pill before swallowing it. This interpretation based on the significance of goals can 
also account for the results obtained in the analyses performed only with sensible 
sentences, that is, the fact that faster RTs were obtained with mouth sentences than 
with hand sentences. Manual actions (at least, the manual actions we selected for this 
experiment) are typically more general. That is, they can lead to different action 
sequences and might be justified by different goals. For example, you can grasp an 
apple in order to put it somewhere else, to bite it, to give it to somebody else, to peel it 
and so on. On the contrary, mouth actions, even though they activate also hand 
simulations, are typically more constrained than hand actions, as they tend to refer to a 
specific goal. For example, biting an apple is simply a way to eat it. An alternative 
explanation of the advantage of the right hand with both hand and mouth sentences is 
similar to the one advanced for Experiment 2: it is possible that participants have 
adopted a general response strategy because mouth and hand sentences were presented 
randomly and not in a blocked way. 
 
 
4.6 Experiment 4 
 
In Experiment 2 we found slower RTs with the right than with the left hand and 
in Experiment 3 a facilitation of the right hand. However, the analyses on sensible 
sentences did not show any dominant hand advantage in the hand over the foot 
sentences (Experiment 2) and in the hand over the mouth sentences (Experiment 3). 
The results obtained in Experiment 2 and 3 could be due to the fact that participants 
may have adopted a general response strategy because foot and hand sentences 
(Experiment 2) and mouth and hand sentences (Experiment 3) were presented 
randomly in the same block. Other studies in different areas have demonstrated the 
effects of the composition of the experimental list (random vs. blocked presentation) 
on behavioural tasks (e.g., Tessari & Rumiati, 2004). Experiment 4 was designed to 
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address whether the random vs. blocked presentation of the stimuli may have 
influenced the results. Namely, we presented the sentences in a blocked way and asked 
right-handed participants to respond to sensible sentences with the right hand and to 
non sensible sentences with the left one. If the absence of the right-hand facilitation 
effect in Experiment 2 and 3 was due to the random presentation of the stimuli, we 
predict to find a facilitation of right-hand responses with hand compared to foot 
sentences, but no facilitation with hand compared to mouth sentences. 
 
 
4.6.1 Method 
4.6.1.1 Participants 
Eight volunteers took part in the experiment. They were selected according to 
the same criteria used in previous experiments. 
 
 
4.6.1.2 Materials 
The materials were the same of the previous experiments. The only difference 
consisted in the blocked presentation of the stimuli. Stimuli were presented in 4 
different blocks, two including the foot sentences and the hand sentences presented in 
Experiment 2, and two including the mouth sentences and the hand sentences 
presented in Experiment 3. The block presentation order was balanced across 
participant. 
 
 
4.6.1.3 Procedure 
All participants were asked to respond “yes” with their right hand and “no” 
with the left hand. 
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4.6.2 Results 
 
All incorrect responses were eliminated. Errors analyses did not show any 
evidence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff. To screen for outliers, we used the same 
criterion as in the previous experiments. Removed outliers accounted for 4.52 % (Foot-
Hand Block) and 4.90 % (Mouth-Hand Blocks) of response trials. The remaining 
response times were submitted to four different ANOVAs, two for each pair of blocks 
(‘hand sentences’ vs. ‘mouth sentences’; ‘hand sentences’ vs. ‘foot sentences’), one 
with participants and another with materials as random factor. The reason why we did 
not analyze the data with a 3 levels ANOVA (foot-hand-mouth) was that the nouns 
were not the same for the three conditions. 
4.6.2.1 Foot and Hand Blocks 
RTs were submitted to two 2 (Sensibility: yes, sensible vs. no, no-sensible) X 2 
(Sentence Modality: Hand / Foot sentence) ANOVAs, with Sentence Modality and 
Sentence Sensibility as within participants and within items variables.  
Right hand responses were 192 ms faster than left hand responses, F1 (1, 7) = 
21.94, MSe = 3364, 31, p<.005; the effect was significant also in the items analysis, F2 
(1, 11) = 7.64, MSe = 13.828.99, p< .05. Crucially, in the participants analysis the 
interaction between Sensibility and Sentence Modality was significant, F1 (1, 7) = 
6.42, MSe = 1974.90, p<.05; F2 (1, 11) = 1.87, MSe = 9260.82, p<.19 (see Fig. 2 top). 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis indicates that the fastest responses were obtained in 
responses triggered by Hand Sentences with the right hand. With hand sentences, right 
hand responses were 136 ms faster than left hand responses (p =.002), whereas with 
foot sentences they were only 56 ms faster than left right responses (p =.04). 
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Figure 2. The interaction between Response Hand and Sentence Modality in 
Experiment 4. Bars represent standard error. 
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4.6.2.2 Mouth and Hand Blocks 
We performed the same ANOVAs with the same factors as in the previous 
analysis: 2 (Sensibility: yes, sensible vs. no, no-sensible) X 2 (Sentence Modality: 
Hand / Mouth sentence) ANOVAs. Participants responded 39 ms more quickly with 
the Right than with the Left hand, F1 (1,7) = 4.31, MSe = 2802.61, p<.07; the same 
effect was found in the items analysis, F2 (1,11) = 8.49, MSe = 1715.829, p< .05. More 
interestingly, as in Experiment 3, mouth sentences were responded to 70 ms more 
quickly than hand sentences, F1 (1, 7) = 11.90, MSe = 3306.93, p<.01; F2 (1, 11) = 
8.66, MSe = 6195.619, p< .01. As predicted, no interaction was found (see Fig. 2 
bottom). 
 
 
4.6.3 Discussion 
 
The results of this control experiment suggest that the missing effect of 
Experiment 2 was due to the random presentation of the stimuli. This was not the 
case for Experiment 4. Thus we can conclude that the comprehension of hand and 
mouth sentences leads to the activation of the right hand, whereas this is not true for 
foot sentences. This confirms that sentence comprehension implies a simulation of 
the action described, and that this simulation takes into account the specific effector 
involved. 
 
 
4.7 General Discussion 
 
The results found across the 4 experiments are in line with the predictions of 
the embodied theory. Namely, they suggest that the comprehension of the meaning of 
verb-noun pairs implies a mental simulation. This simulation is quite detailed, as it is 
modulated both by the kind of effector the sentence refers to (hand, foot, mouth), and 
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by the specific hand (dominant, non-dominant) the action expressed by the sentence 
typically involves. As to the differences due to the kind of effector involved, noun-
verb pairs referring to mouth actions were processed faster than pairs referring to hand 
actions, and the latter were processed faster than pairs referring to foot actions. These 
results are consistent with the behavioral results found by Pulvermüller et al. (2001), 
who found a difference in lexical decision between face-, arm- and leg- related verbs. 
However, our study differs from Pulvermüller et al.’s for two main reasons. First of all, 
the effect we found concerned noun-verb pairs (sentences) rather than single verbs. 
Secondly, we used a method implying a deeper processing of the words’ meaning 
instead of a lexical decision task. We also found a difference between the dominant 
and the non-dominant hand. As predicted, the advantage of the dominant hand 
concerned sensible sentences related both to hand and to mouth (Experiment 1.a and 
3). Significantly, the facilitation of the dominant hand with hand and with mouth 
sentences was present only with sensible sentences, thus confirming the hypothesis 
that it was due to a simulation process and not to a general advantage of the right over 
the left hand. In Experiment 2, in which sensible sentences referred to actions 
involving both hand and foot, we found slower RTs with the right than with the left 
hand rather than a facilitation of the right hand. The missing effect of hand sentences 
with the dominant hand in Experiment 2 was due to the random presentation of hand 
and foot sentences. Namely, in Experiment 4, when hand and foot sentences were 
presented in different blocks, we found a marked advantage of the dominant hand with 
sensible hand sentences, but not with sensible foot sentences. The analyses of sensible 
sentences allowed us to draw some conclusions regarding the role played by the 
effectors and the importance of goals in simulating. We believe the advantage of the 
dominant hand obtained with both hand and mouth sentences (even if mouth sentences 
were processed faster than hand ones) to be particularly significant because it means, 
by implication, that during sentence comprehension participants are sensitive both to 
the effector involved and to the goals expressed by the sentence. Namely, mouth-
related actions as “biting an apple” imply the simulation of the whole process of eating 
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the apple, including bringing it to the mouth with the hand. On the contrary, the hand 
is typically not involved in foot related actions, such as “kicking a ball”.  
Our study is in line with studies showing the deep interrelationships between 
language and motor system. We will briefly review recent evidence suggesting that 
words activate the motor system. First, there is evidence that the semantic meaning of 
words affects the grasping and reaching kinematics (Gentilucci, 2003). For example, 
Glover and Dixon (2002) found that the meaning of the words “large” or “small” 
printed on objects had an effect on the grip aperture in the initial grasp kinematics. 
Second, behavioral evidence shows that words activate motor information (Tucker & 
Ellis, 2004). For example, Borghi et al. (2004) found with a part verification task that 
participants responded more quickly when required to press a button in a direction 
compatible with an object’s part location (e.g. responding upward to verify that a horse 
has a head) than when responding in a direction incompatible with the part location. 
Other studies focused on the mental simulation activated while processing sentences 
rather than single words. With a sentence sensibility task Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2002) found that response times were faster in case of congruency between the 
movement implied by the sentence (away vs. toward, e.g., “to close the drawer” vs. “to 
open the drawer”) and the direction implied by the movement required to respond.  
Recent studies on sentence comprehension suggest that the simulation triggered by the 
sentence is quite detailed (see for example Bergen & Wheeler, 2005; Richardson, 
Spivey, Barsalou & McRae, 2003; Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Spivey & Geng, 2001). 
Zwaan et al. (2004) asked participants to listen to sentences implying a movement 
toward or away, such as, for example: “The kids tossed the beach-ball over the sand 
toward you” vs. “You tossed the beach ball over the sand towards the kids.” After 
listening to the sentence, participants were shown two sequentially presented objects, 
one larger and another smaller, implying either a movement toward the observer (if the 
smaller object was followed by the larger one) or away (if the larger object was 
followed by the smaller one) from him / her. They found a congruency effect between 
the movement implied by the sentence and the visual object presentation sequence. 
Kaschak et al. (2005) asked participants to evaluate whether or not sentences implying 
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different kinds of motion (away, towards, up- and downwards: e.g., “The car left you 
in the dust”, motion away) made sense. At the same time, they presented visual stimuli 
moving either in the same or in the opposite direction as that implied by the sentence. 
The interference effect they found suggests that the simulation is quite detailed, and 
that the same neural areas are recruited while processing motion sentences and 
observing motion stimuli (for a more detailed discussion on the differences between 
interference and facilitation effects in studies on language and motor system, see 
Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; De Vega, Robertson, Glenberg, Kaschak & Rinck, 
2004). Recent support for a simulationist view of language comprehension is also 
provided by Zwaan and Taylor (2006). They showed that sensibility judgments for 
manual rotation sentences were made more quickly when the manual response to the 
sentence was in the same rotation direction as the manual action described by the 
sentence. This suggests that comprehension of manual rotation sentences produces 
motor resonance, as evidenced by the effect of this of sentence comprehension on 
actual motor responses. In addition, they showed that motor resonance during sentence 
processing occurred relatively quickly and locally. By asking participants to read 
sentences like “Before /the / big race / the driver / took out / his key / and / started / the 
/ car” while turning the knob one frame at a time, they found that the advantage in 
cases of congruency between actual turning direction and the motion implied by the 
sentence was localized in the verb region. In line with the reported findings, our study 
shows that sentence comprehension activates a simulation process. Importantly, this 
simulation is quite detailed, as it is modulated both by the kind of effector the sentence 
refers to (hand, foot, mouth), and by the specific hand (dominant, non-dominant) the 
action expressed by the sentence typically involves. Accordingly, our study shows that 
objects affordances influence not only the understanding of nouns referring to objects 
but also the understanding of different kinds of words and of more complex linguistic 
structures, such as different kinds of words combinations. As MacWhinney (1999) 
puts it, not only nouns but verbs as well provide affordances and elicit simulations: 
“when we hear the word walk, we immediately activate the basic elements of the 
physical components of walking. These include alternating motion of the legs, 
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counterbalanced swinging of the arms, pressure of the knees and other joints, and the 
sense of our weight coming down on the earth” (p. 219).  
A last point is worth noticing. We believe our study has implications for studies 
on the neural basis of language understanding. The relevance of goal we found is 
consistent with the idea of motor resonance, with ideomotor theories (e.g., Prinz, 1997) 
and with the recent evidence found by Umiltà, Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, 
Keysers and Rizzolatti (2001), that mirror neurons fire in accordance with the 
activated goal, and not only with the activated effector. From a neural point of view, 
the similar effects found with the mouth and the hand sentences are justified by the 
common activation of the Broca area (Buccino et al., 2001). This is convergent with 
evidence indicating that at the neural level hand and mouth actions activate contiguous 
regions, which is not the case with foot and hand actions. Our study confirms the 
existence of a strict interrelationship between hand and mouth actions and it is in line 
with recent studies showing that language evolves from gestures and manual actions 
(e.g., Corballis, 2002; Arbib , 2005; Parisi et al., 2005). 
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 5 The specificity of the simulation with respect to 
the external world. An intrinsic object property - 
weight - and the perception of action 
 
 
Does comprehending sentence about lifting a weight interfere with judgments 
of weights lifted by others? Observers read a sentence describing the lifting of a heavy 
or light weight. Then they were shown a video depicting the lifting of a large or small 
box, and the observers estimated the box’s weight. In the second experiment, boxes 
lifting practice preceded the observation of the videos and led to a dramatic increase in 
the correlations between judged and observed weight.  For the light videos, the light 
sentences produced the lowest correlations; for the heavy videos the heavy sentences 
reduced the correlations. A modification of the MOSAIC model explains these results: 
reading about the lifting of a light/heavy object occupies a module that would 
otherwise be used in making a weight judgment. Previous work has demonstrated 
effects of action systems on comprehension; these results demonstrate a reciprocal 
effect of comprehension on use of motor system to make judgments. 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Behavioral, kinematic and neurophysiological data convincingly demonstrate 
that language comprehension is grounded in perception, action, and emotional 
systems. Behavioral evidence shows that words activate motor information. For 
example, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) with a sentence sensibility task found that 
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response times were faster when there was a congruency between the movement 
implied by the sentence and the movement required to press the response key. In 
addition, there is evidence that the meaning of words affects reaching and grasping 
kinematics (Gentilucci, 2003). Recent support for a simulationist view of language 
comprehension is also provided by Buccino et al. (2005) showing with transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and behavioral studies that simulation while processing 
action sentences are sensitive to the kind of effectors required to perform the action. 
In our study we asked a novel question: will the mere act of comprehending 
language affect the perception of action? We tested this prediction using a weight 
judgment task. Hamilton, Wolpert and Frith (2004) reported that when observers 
actively lifted a weight, it affected their judgments of weights being lifted by others. 
Literally lifting a weight lighter than that of the box being observed resulted in an 
heavier judgments of the observed box, and literally lifting a weight heavier than that 
of the box being observed resulted in lighter judgments. They explain the results using 
the MOSAIC model of action control, in which there are multiple modules that play a 
role in both the perception and production of actions. For example, there may be 
different modules producing different amounts of force for the control of lifting 50 g, 
75 g, 100 g, and so on. Weight judgments result from computing an average of the 
modules activated by the observation of lifting (those corresponding to lifts of weights 
near the one being observed). However, actual lifting takes priority in using a module, 
thereby removing that module from computation of the average and biasing the 
judgment in the opposite direction. This explanation is similar to that provided by the 
Theory of Event Coding (TEC, Hommel et al., 2001), which suggests that motor and 
perceptual processes can make use of the same neural mechanism, but that action plans 
take priority over the perceptual judgment. 
In contrast to literally lifting a weight, we asked whether comprehending a 
sentence about lifting a weight would interfere with subsequent judgments of weights 
being lifted by others. The rationale is as follows: the motor system is used in making 
judgments of weights lifted by others. If language comprehension affects the motor 
system, then the comprehension task should also affect weight judgments. In two 
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experiments, observers read a sentence describing the lift of a heavy weight (e.g., “Lift 
a bowling bowl from the cart to the table”) or a light weight (e.g., “Lift a wine glass 
from the cart to the table”).  The sentence was followed by a video (Bosbach, Cole, 
Prinz and Knoblich, 2005) depicting the lift of a large box or a small box. Then the 
observer estimated the weight of the box. On the basis of the MOSAIC model we 
expected a modulation in the weight judgments. Reading about the lifting of a light 
object will occupy a light module. Because light modules contribute to the judgment of 
the weight of light boxes, this reading will interfere with the weight judgments. In 
contrast, reading about the lifting of a heavy object will occupy a heavy module that 
would not participate in the judgment of the weight of a light box. Hence there should 
be little interference. Similar predictions are made for the judgments of the heavy 
boxes. Namely, reading about the lifting of heavy objects will cause more interference 
in judgments of heavy boxes than reading about the lifting of light objects. 
 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
Thirty-eight volunteers took part in the first experiment and thirty-two 
volunteers took part in the second one. They were all students of the University of 
Bologna, native Italian speakers and right-handed according to the Edinburgh 
Handedness Questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971). 
 
 
5.2.2 Materials 
 
We created 64 Light Sentences (e.g. [1] “Move the rubber ball from the rug 
into the drawer”), and 64 Heavy Sentences (e.g. [2] “Move the gas tank from the 
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ground floor to the attic”). Following the sentence was a comprehension question to 
encourage reading for comprehension. Example questions are: “Can the object that 
was on the rug be drunk?”, light sentence [1]; “Is the object in the attic edible?”, heavy 
sentence [2]. We also used 4 Light Videos (50 g, 300 g, 600 g, 900 g) and 4 Heavy 
Videos (3 Kg, 6 Kg, 12 Kg, 18 Kg) used by Bosbach et al. (2005). 
 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
 
Each trail began with a sentence displayed on a computer screen. The sentence 
could refer to the lifting of a light object or of a heavy object. After reading the 
sentence, participants were required to press the spacebar. Then, the comprehension 
question appeared on the computer screen. If the answer was affirmative, participants 
pressed the spacebar again, otherwise they had to refrain from responding. Reactions 
times slower than 2000 ms were considered as no response. After 2000 ms the 
participants were shown a video of an actor lifting a small box or a large box, and 2000 
ms later a question related to the video appeared on the screen: “What is the box’s 
weight?” and four possible weights were suggested. Participants had to estimate the 
box’s weight choosing among four possibilities, using keys 2, 3, 8, 9, associated to the 
four weights in increasing order (key 2: for the lightest weight; key 9: for the heaviest 
weight). The 128 trials were preceded by five practice trials. 
In Experiment 2, the procedure was modified to include a motor training phase 
before the 128 trials. Participants were asked to lift four light boxes and four heavy 
boxes whose weights matched to the weights of the boxes shown in the videos. 
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5.3 Results 
 
We eliminated trials on which the comprehension question was answered 
incorrectly, and we analyzed the weight judgments. 
Participants committed many errors (experiment 1: 48.60%; experiment 2: 
45.46%) in the weight judgment task. Due to the high percentage of errors, it was 
impossible to perform a reliable analyses on reaction times. Seven participants from 
the first experiment and five from the second one, who made more than 55% errors, 
were excluded from further analyses. We then analysed the correlations between the 
observed and the judged weights of the boxes lifted in the videos. 
 
 
5.3.1 Experiment 1 
 
The correlations were submitted to a 2 (kind of Sentence: Heavy vs. Light) X 2 
(kind of Video: Heavy vs. Light) ANOVA, with both kind of Sentence and kind of 
Video as within factor variables. Heavy Videos produced higher correlations, F (1, 30) 
=4.91, MSe = 0.23, p < .03, perhaps due to the difficulty in deriving the weight from 
kinematic visual cues for light compared to heavy videos. No other significant effects 
were found. 
In Experiment 1, the correlations’ average between judged and observed weight 
was poor (M = 0.65; SD = 0.45), especially for the light boxes. For this reason we 
designed Experiment 2, in which we introduced a motor preparation phase. 
 
 
5.3.2 Experiment 2 
 
During the motor training the observers were required to practice lifting large 
and small boxes (modelled on those in the videos) before the reading and judgment 
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task. The introduction of this training led to an increase in performance. In this 
experiment participants obtained higher correlations, with a lower standard deviation 
(M = 0.79; SD = 0.32) than in Experiment 1. The correlations were submitted to a 2 
(kind of Sentence: Heavy vs. Light) X 2 (kind of Video: Heavy vs. Light) ANOVA, 
with both kind of Sentence and kind of Video as within factor variables. As in 
Experiment 1, correlations were higher for Heavy than for Light Video, F (1, 26) = 
4.86, MSe = 0.13, p < .04. 
Crucially, in the second experiment the interaction between the kind of 
Sentence and the kind of Video was significant: F (1, 26) = 5.89, MSe = 0.05, p < .02. 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis indicated that this was chiefly due to the 
disadvantage of Light Videos with Light Sentences compared to Light Video with 
Heavy Sentences p < .03. Thus, reading sentences about lifting different weights 
seems to affect the perception and the evaluation of observed objects, an effect 
consistent with the claim that language comprehension can affect perception and 
action systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The interaction between the kind of Sentence and the kind of Video. 
Bars represent standard error. 
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Finally the correlations of the first and the second experiment were submitted 
to a 2 (kind of Sentence: Heavy vs. Light) X 2 (kind of Video: Heavy vs. Light) X 2 
(kind of Experiment: Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) ANOVA, with both kind of 
Sentence and kind of Video as within factor variables, and with kind of Experiment as 
between factor variable. Participants obtained significantly  higher correlations for the 
second experiment (M = 0.79) than for the first one (M = 0.65): F (1, 56) = 4.17, MSe 
= 0.26, p < .05. The motor preparation phase seemed to improve the ability to judge 
the boxes’ weights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. After the motor training -exp. 2-, participants obtained significantly  
higher correlations (M = 0.79 vs. M = 0.65). Bars represent standard error. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
 
In the first experiment, the correlations’ average between judged and observed 
weight was poor, especially for the small boxes, maybe due to the complexity of the 
task. In the second experiment, where observers were required to practice lifting large 
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task, we obtained a dramatic increase in the correlation. In addition, for the Light 
Videos, the Light Sentences produced the lowest correlations, whereas for the Heavy 
Videos, Heavy Sentences produced the lowest correlations, although the latter effect 
was not significant. This interference effect is in line with the Hamilton et al. (2004) 
data and the MOSAIC model. First, comprehending the sentence describing a lift 
requires a simulation using the motor system. This simulation temporarily occupies a 
particular module (e.g., the module for lifting a 250 g weight) rendering it unavailable 
for use in the judging the weight of the box observed in the video. Variability of the 
weights simulated (and consequently, variability in the modules used in the judgment 
task) reduces the correlation between judged weight and observed weight. Because the 
modules used in simulating the light sentences are unlikely to be used in judging the 
heavy weights (and vice versa), the correlation is most reduced when the sentence is 
about lifting objects similar to those observed. 
There is other experimental evidence that seems to demonstrate that visual 
stimuli automatically activate the motor system, but the results are not as 
straightforward. Hamilton, Joyce, Flanagan, Frith and Wolpert (2007) tried to define 
the kinematic variables used in the perceptual weight judgment task and to test 
whether observers are sensitive to the variables. The authors decomposed the lifting 
movement into four phases: reach, grasp, lift and place. They found that participants 
tended to judge the objects’ weight relying on the early lift phase, whereas the more 
reliable predictor of the objects’ weight is the duration of the grasp phase. This 
discrepancy does not support a strong simulation hypothesis for weight evaluation. 
These data, much like ours, suggest some degree of motor involvement in the 
perceptual task, but a weaker version of the motor simulation hypothesis, compatible 
with the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al. 2001). 
In theses two experiments we did not obtain straightforward results. It could be 
due to the complexity of the weight evaluation task. Another possibility concerns the 
timing: participants simulate while reading but this simulation doesn't last long enough 
to influence the comparative judgments. In order to disentangle these two possibilities 
and to better understand if comprehending sentences referring to differently weighted 
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objects affects the motor system, we decided to study if the processing of the same 
kind of sentences has an effect on kinematic parameters (action system) as well as on 
weight judgments (perception system). The study is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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 6 The specificity of the simulation with respect to 
the external world. An intrinsic object property -  
weight - and the production of action 
 
 
Language comprehension requires a simulation process that taps perception and 
action systems.  How specific is this simulation?  To address this question, participants 
listened to sentences referring to the lifting of light or heavy objects (e.g., pillow or 
chest, respectively). Then they lifted one of two boxes that were visually identical, but 
one was light and the other heavy. We focused on the kinematics of the initial lift 
(rather than reaching) because it is mostly shaped by proprioceptive features derived 
from weight that cannot be visually determined.  Participants were slower when the 
weight suggested by the sentence and the weight of the box corresponded. This effect 
indicates that language can activate a simulation which is sensitive to intrinsic 
properties such as weight. 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The simulation theory of language (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Gallese, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2007) proposes 
that language comprehension requires a simulation of the situation described using the 
same neural systems that contribute to perception, action, and emotion within that 
situation. In the last fifteen years, many studies have shown that simulating implies 
recruiting these systems without necessity of a transduction process from the 
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sensorimotor experience to an amodal and astract representation (Pecher et al., 2003; 
Saffran, Coslett, Martin & Boronat, 2003; for recent reviews see Barsalou, 2008a, 
2008b; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Martin, 2007). An important question 
within this framework concerns the detail of the simulation. For example, must the 
simulation match the temporal course of the situation? Are lifting forces simulated? 
We investigate these questions by examining the effects of language comprehension 
on the kinematics of bimanual lifting. We begin with a brief review of the literature 
relating language and kinematics, and we develop the case for focusing on the 
interaction of language and actual weight being lifted. We then present the results of 
an experiment demonstrating that interaction. 
Many recent studies provide evidence of language-induced effects in motor 
areas of the brain (Wise, Chollet, Hadar, Frison, Hoffner & Frackowiak, 1991; Martin 
et al., 1996; de Lafuente & Romo, 2004; Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004; 
Kemmerer, 2006; Kemmerer, Gonzalez Castillo, Talavage, Patterson & Wiley, 2008) 
and also on overt motor behavior (Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham & Dixon, 2004; 
Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati & Gangitano, 2000; Gentilucci & Gangitano, 
1998). In particular, kinematics studies have examined the effect of different syntactic 
(adjectives, adverbs and verbs) and semantic (e.g., ‘long’ vs. ‘short’) categories of 
words on the mono-manual reaching and grasping movements (Gentilucci et al., 2000; 
Glover and Dixon, 2002; Boulanger, Roy, Paulignan, Deprez, Jeannerod & Nazir, 
2006). The experiments have demonstrated interactions of language and both intrinsic 
properties, i.e. invariant object features, such as size and shape, and extrinsic (visual) 
object  properties, such as orientation (Gentilucci et al., 2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002). 
Given that the point of these studies was to test whether language affects the visuo-
motor transformations during the programming of movement, kinematics analyses 
focused on mono-manual object grasping. In particular, analyses concentrated on the 
prehension movement, from the beginning of the reaching until object grasping. The 
parameters which are typically considered are the thumb-index finger distance and the 
wrist velocity, both relying on object visual analysis. The thumb-index finger distance 
in shaping the suitable grasp depends on the object intrinsic properties. The wrist 
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velocity in reaching the object is mostly a function of object extrinsic properties, such 
as orientation, thus it is sensitive to subject’s observation conditions. Evidence reveals 
that both the reach and the grasp components of the movement are modulated by 
words. For example, linguistic labels such as “far” and “near” printed on a target 
object affect the reach kinematics, whereas labels such as “large” and  “small” 
influence the initial grasp kinematics (Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998; Gentilucci et al., 
2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002). Evidence shows that not only the meaning but also the 
class of word has a different influence on kinematics: for example, verbs influence the 
action kinematics more than adjectives (e.g., “lift” vs. “high”) (Gentilucci, 2003a). The 
class of words has an influence on timing as well: for example, adverbs (e.g. “up” vs. 
“down”) influence more the grasping action, whereas semantically equivalent 
adjectives (e.g. “high” and “low”) affect more the movement planning phases 
(Gentilucci et al., 2000). 
After grasping an object, the movement is shaped more by proprioceptive than 
by visual features. Object weight is a kind of proprioceptive feature, as it cannot be 
visually predicted. In summary, even though an increasing number of kinematics 
studies deal with language, to our knowledge all of them focus on object properties 
that can be visually detected. None of these studies focuses on the influence of 
language on properties that cannot be visually detected, such as object weight.  
The panorama is similar if we consider, more generally, kinematics evidence 
concerning prehension. The majority of the studies have shown that the manipulation 
of intrinsic object properties influences the grasp component of the movement, and 
that manipulation of extrinsic object properties mainly affects the reaching component 
of the movement (Jeannerod, 1981; Gentilucci, Chieffi, Scarpa & Castiello, 1992; 
Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti & Sakata, 1995). As previously noted, size and shape are 
properties that can be visually detected, so the studied movement phase is the one that 
precedes the interaction with the object.  
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Studies focusing on the effects on movement of object mass1 are scarce. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the heavier the weight, the more lifting time increases, due 
to the applications of larger lifting forces (Brouwer, Georgiou, Glover & Castiello, 
2006; Johansson & Westling, 1984, 1988; Westling & Johansson, 1984). 
Most of the studies of weight manipulate both visual cues for the estimation of 
weight (e.g., size, illusory size, color, object identity), and/or learning and participants’ 
expectancies – for example by presenting participants with a heavy object in a ‘light 
block’ of trials, or, vice versa, by presenting a light object in a ‘heavy block’ of trials. 
For example, Eastough and Edwards (2007) recently found that the weight of the 
object significantly influences prior-to-contact grasp kinematics. The effect of 
participants’ expectations about weight is detectable not only in the lifting phase of the 
movement, but also during the reaching phase. In particular, some studies provide 
evidence of longer lifting time for objects that were unexpectedly heavy, and shorter 
lifting time for objects that were unexpectedly light (Brouwer et al., 2006; Johansson 
& Westling, 1988; Weir, MacKenzie, Marteniuk, Cargoe & Frazer, 1991; Jenlman, 
Schmitz, Forssberg & Ehrsson, 2006). Some of the issues addressed by these studies is 
whether online control of movement is specialized for features such as size and shape, 
and whether it can be extended to non-visual features such as weight. Different studies 
addressed the mono-manual lifting movement to directly investigate whether people 
can adjust their movement plan to visually indicated sudden changes in weight. In 
contrast with previous evidence (Glover, 2004; Goodale, 1998; Milner & Goodale, 
1993), recent results argue against visual online control specialized only for low-level 
features, such as size and shape. Instead, there is some evidence that visual online 
control is also extended to weight (Brouwer et al., 2006). 
Compared with previous studies, our work is novel in at least two respects. 
First, we examine the effects of language on a property that cannot be visually detected 
                                                
1
 Objects mass is an intrinsic object property that does not depend on the object spatial position, 
whereas object weight is the gravitational field effect on this mass. However, from here on, we will refer 
to mass as ‘weight’, following the literature mainstream. 
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(in our experiment), namely, object weight. Whereas the effects of language on 
visually detectable properties such as size and shape have been demonstrated in a 
variety of experiments, this is not the case for a property such as weight. Finding a 
result with weight would contribute to enhancing the role of simulation by showing 
that it takes into account more than visuo-motor transformations. As shown in our 
review, participants’ expectations about weight can be influenced both by visual 
features such as object size (size-weight illusion, see, for example, Brenner & Smeets, 
1996) and shape, and by memory and learning. But in the current experiment, we ruled 
out possible influences of object size and shape by keeping them constant, and we 
randomly changed object weight in order to analyse the effects on kinematics 
parameters of sentences referring to different weighted objects.  
To investigate the effect of language on an intrinsic proprioceptive feature such 
as weight, it is necessary to focus on the placing phase, i.e. on the movement phase in 
which participants interact with the object. Therefore, the second novel aspect of our 
work is investigating effects of language on the motor system after grasping, in the 
early phase of the placing movement. During this phase, participants interact with the 
object, and their movement is shaped by the proprioceptive information which 
constrains the movement very quickly. Our analysis focused mainly on lift delay 
defined as the time immediately after the object is grasped. It has been demonstrated 
that this parameter is the most sensitive to weight manipulation (Weir et al., 1991; 
Johansson & Westling, 1988). 
Thus the aim of the present study is to test whether the simulation activated by 
language takes into account weight, and thereby influences action production. To 
investigate this issue, we presented participants with sentences describing the lifting of 
differently-weighted objects (e.g., light objects such as pillows, and heavy objects such 
as tool chests). After listening to the sentence, participants were required to lift with 
both hands (bimanual lifting) a heavy or a light box placed in front of them.  
We can derive predictions based on two contrasting hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis begins with the assertion that language comprehension does not involve a 
simulation. However, people may use the content of the language to control their 
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behaviour. Thus, when participants hear a sentence describing the lift of a light object, 
they may take that as a hint that the box they are about to lift is in fact light, and the 
converse for sentences describing heavy objects. This hypothesis predicts a main effect 
of sentence content on lift kinematics: hearing about heavy objects will result in the 
application of more force, and hence faster lifting times, than hearing about light 
objects. Here and henceforth, we define faster lifting times in terms of the early 
occurrence of the first peak velocity, rather than in terms of an overall faster 
movement. As noted by an anonymous reviewer,  this hypothesis makes predictions 
substantially similar to a priming hypothesis in which language inputs prime motor 
outputs.   
The second hypothesis is based on the MOSAIC model of action control 
discussed by Hamilton et al. (2004). According to MOSAIC, the force used in an 
action arises from integrating the force parameters from several modules that might 
apply in the situation (e.g., modules for lifting a light box and modules for lifting a 
heavy box). The integration is based on the estimated probability that a module applies 
in the situation. Furthermore, Hamilton et al (2004) demonstrated that modules may be 
rendered temporarily unavailable by simultaneous use in another task, and that this 
produces a type of repulsion effect. That is, when a module for producing a light force 
is being used in Task 1 and hence it is unavailable for Task 2, the integration of forces 
from the remaining modules produce too much force in Task 2; similarly, when a 
module for producing a heavy force is being used in Task 1, the integration of forces 
from the remaining modules produce too little force in Task 2. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, Scorolli, Glenberg, and Borghi (2007) demonstrated that language 
comprehension could serve as Task 1 and render modules unavailable when Task 2 
consists of judging the weight lifted by another.   
Consider how such a repulsion effect would be revealed in the current 
experiment. (One caveat is important, however: movements are complex, and thus the 
MOSAIC for actually generating and controlling such a movement would need to be 
complex. Here we consider just one parameter, namely, the amount of force used in 
lifting a box.) The upper section of Table 1 illustrates the force parameters for six 
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MOSAIC modules. For illustrative purposed, we suppose that the force required to lift 
the Light Box (force = 2) is generated by Module 2 and the force required to lift the 
Heavy Box (force = 5) is generated by Module 5. 
 
 
Light Heavy  
Box & Sentence Box & Sentence 
 Mod1 Mod2 Mod3 Mod4 Mod5 Mod6 
Force 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Prob. .1 .3 .1 .1 .3 .1 
Force No Sentence = (1 x .1 + 2 x .3 + 3 x .1 + 4 x .1 + 5 x .3 + 6 x .1) / 1 = 3.5 
Force Light Sentence = (1 x .1 + 3 x .1 + 4 x .1 + 5 x .3 + 6 x .1) / .7 = 4.14 
Force Heavy Sentence = (1 x .1 + 2 x .3 + 3 x .1 + 4 x .1 + 6 x .1) / .7 = 2.86 
 
Table 1. Computation of forces according to the MOSAIC model. 
 
 
In our experiment, participants experience only two boxes, and thus these 
modules are weighted more than the others. Nonetheless, in the absence of any visual 
information about which box is the one that will be lifted on the current trial, the 
average force (3.5) is generated for every lift (middle section of Table 1). We will also 
assume that simulating a light sentence requires (most often) Module 2 and simulating 
a heavy sentence requires (most often) Module 5. When these modules are removed 
from consideration (because of the simulation) and the contributions of the remaining 
modules renormed, the force generated after comprehending a light sentence is 4.14 
and the force generated after comprehending a heavy sentence is 2.86 (note the 
repulsion effect).    
Table 2 illustrates the relation between the force generated after listening to a 
sentence relative to the force required to lift the boxes. For the Light Box, the force 
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generated after the light sentence is further from the required force than the force 
generated after reading a heavy sentence. Just the opposite obtains for the Heavy Box. 
That is, the force generated after the heavy sentence is further from the required force 
than the force generated after a light sentence. 
 
 
 Generated force relative to required force 
 Light Box Req. (2) Heavy Box Req. (5) 
Force after Light Sent. 
(4.14) 
Further from required Closer to required 
Force after Heavy Sent. 
(2.86) 
Closer to required Further from required 
 
Table 2. Predictions for the MOSAIC model. 
 
 
Once the participant begins to lift a box, she will receive feedback from 
proprioception. Thus the bottom section of Table 1 can also be read as the discrepancy 
between generated force and the required force revealed by feedback. When the 
discrepancy is large, we presume that more time will be needed to recompute and 
apply the new force. Hence, based on the bottom section of Table 1, we derive the 
following prediction: when lifting a Light Box, listening to a Light Sentence will slow 
attainment of some kinematics benchmarks (such as latency to peak velocity) 
compared to listening to a heavy sentence.   In contrast, when lifting a Heavy Box, 
listening to a Heavy Sentence will slow attainment of the benchmarks relative to 
listening to a light sentence. 
 
 
Production of lifting movements 
 103 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
Eighteen students of the University of Bologna (mean age 20 years) were 
recruited and were given credit for research participation. Their height ranged from 
1,62 to 1,80 m and their hand spans2 ranged from 17 to 19 cm. All the participants 
were right handed and were free from pathologies that could affect their motor 
behavior. All subjects gave informed consent to participate in the study and were naïve 
as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
 
6.2.2 Stimuli 
6.2.2.1 Linguistic Materials 
An independent group of 12 participants evaluated a set of 18 object words on a 
seven-point scale in order to assess whether their weights better matched the weight of 
a box with polystyrene (3 kg weighted box) or a box with gold ingots (12 kg weighted 
box). All words referred to bi-manually graspable objects, with about the same size 
and shape. From the original set, 12 words were selected. We chose words whose 
average weight ratings were less than 3.5 points for Light Sentences and words whose 
average weight ratings were greater than 4.5 for Heavy Sentences. Then we built 12 
sentences using the selected object words and embedded them in the same context, 
“Move xxx from the ground to the table”. Thus the linguistic stimuli were constituted 
by 6 sentences referring to the lifting of ‘light’ objects (e.g. “Move the pillow from the 
ground to the table”) and by 6 sentences referring to the lifting of ‘heavy’ objects (e.g. 
“Move the tool chest from the ground to the table”). Each sentence was presented only 
                                                
2
 Span: the distance between the tip of the thumb and the tip of the little finger, when the hand 
is fully extended. 
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once. For each sentence we constructed a comprehension question (e.g., “Is the object 
on the table edible?”; “Does the object that was on the ground contain drinks?”). To 
make the experimental purpose opaque to subjects, we selected comprehension 
questions that did not explicitly refer to weight. Unlike other studies of language 
effects on kinematics, this semantic task allowed us to be sure that the sentence had 
been comprehended (see Boulanger, et al., 2006). 
 
6.2.2.2 Object Materials 
Two boxes, one ‘heavy’ (mass of 12 Kg) and one ‘light’ (mass of 3 Kg) were 
created. Both boxes had exactly the same rectangular shape (40 cm wide X 30 cm high 
X 24 cm deep), were white coloured, and smooth textured. Each box had two handles, 
to allow an easy grasp of the object and to constrain the movement both across 
subjects and across experimental conditions. We examined bimanual rather than 
mono-manual object placing. Using large boxes that required bimanual lifting enabled 
us to introduce a large difference between object weights, thus allowing for easy 
detection of differences in overt motor behavior. 
 
 
6.2.3 Procedure 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter showed the lifting 
movement to the participants. Participants stood with their feet on a fixed point 40 cm 
from the box they would lift. Participants were encouraged to execute the movement in 
a relaxed and natural way. Each trial began with an acoustically presented sentence 
referring to the lifting of a light object or of a heavy object. After listening to the 
sentence, participants were required to lift the box and place it on a pedestal (high 30 
cm; 100 cm far from the starting point) (see Figure 1). After the execution of the motor 
task, participants were required to return in the erect starting position. Finally, they 
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were asked a yes/no question about the sentence to verify that they had comprehended 
it. The 12 experimental trials were preceded by two practice trials which allowed 
subjects to familiarize themselves with the procedure. To minimize possible effects in 
weight estimating due to the involvement of memory, learning processes (Brouwer et 
al., 2006), or expectations, the presentation order of both linguistic and object stimuli 
was randomised. 
 
 
6.2.4 Movement Recordings 
 
A BTS Smart system, constituted by a vision system, three cameras, and a 
control unit, was used in recording the movements. Capture and Tracker software were 
used to record and to track the spatial positions of five markers (infrared light-emitting 
diodes), at a frequency of  60 Hz and with a spatial resolution of  768 x 576 pixel.  
Markers were taped on the hand (third metacarpal bone), on the external wrist 
(carpus), on the elbow (humeral lateral epicondyle), on the shoulder (scapular 
acromion) and on the ankle (talus bone). 
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Figure 1. (left) subject bimanually grasps the handles of the box; (right) subject 
rests the box on the pedestal. 
 
 
6.2.5 Data Analysis 
 
Movements were visualized and analyzed using Smart Analyzer software. Raw 
data were smoothed using a rectangular window filter. Kinematics parameters were 
assessed for each individual movement. The choice to use kinematics parameters as 
dependent variables is based on evidence showing that using force metrics (dynamics) 
confirms results obtained with kinematics measures on lifting movement  (Jackson and 
Shadow, 2000). 
Our major concern is with the lifting phase (Brenner and Smith, 1996; Brouwer 
et al., 2006), as it reflects the time in which the grasp and the lift forces are 
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accumulating. The lifting phase onset was calculated as the end of the reaching 
movement, that is as the last value of a sequence of 9 decreasing points on the basis of 
ankle and wrist velocity profile (both ankle and wrist velocity at zero-crossings). The 
end of the lifting phase, when the object is placed on the pedestal, was defined as the 
last value of a sequence of 9 decreasing points on the basis of wrist velocity (starting 
from wrist velocity zero-crossing). We did not consider the latency of the object 
motion per se because this measure was included in the duration of the lifting phase. 
Within the lifting  phase, we analysed latencies of hand velocity peak and 
elbow angular velocity peak. The elbow angle is formed by wrist-elbow ray and 
shoulder-elbow ray. Positive velocity values determine the extension movement, 
whereas negative ones define the muscular contraction, i.e. the bending movement. As 
outlined in the introduction, we considered only the first velocity peaks recorded in the 
lifting phase of the movement. Velocity peak latencies were defined as the time 
elapsed between lifting phase onset and the first maximum value of the hand velocity 
and the elbow angular velocity. We decided to focus on hand and arm movement as 
they are the first body parts that interact with the object. Our choice to focus on 
velocity rather than on acceleration, as in other studies (Gentilucci, 2003a, 2003b; 
Glover et al., 2004; Lindemann, Stenneken, van Schie & Bekkering, 2006; Zoia, 
Pezzetta, Blason, Scabra, Carrozzi, Bulgheroni & Castiello, 2006), is based on the fact 
we are interested in the change of position in time. In addition, in our study we focused 
on the first velocity peak, which is correlated with acceleration. 
Moreover, we focused on the latencies of velocity peaks rather than on the 
velocity values. The latter measure is sometimes used to study mono-manual grasping.  
Nonetheless, latencies of velocity peaks appear to be a more reliable measure in a 
motor performance characterized (as in our task) by strong individual differences 
between participants as far as force and various bodily characteristics are concerned. 
All kinematics parameters were determined for each individual trial and were averaged 
for each participant as a function of (light / heavy) sentence category. 
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6.3 Results 
 
We excluded from the analysis trials when a) the marker movement was not 
captured correctly, and b) the comprehension question was not answered correctly. 
Removed items accounted for 9.53% (1.17% for wrong answers to the comprehension 
questions) of kinematics recordings. All analyses were performed with both kind of 
Sentence and kind of Box as within-subject factors. 
 
 
6.3.1 Analyses of ‘lifting’ 
 
To specifically investigate if the simulation activated by sentences influences 
movement production, we performed analyses on latencies of hand velocity peak and 
elbow angular velocity peak during the ‘lifting’ phase. For both the parameters we 
considered the first peak immediately after having grasped the box to move it onto the 
pedestal. From this point forward, we will discuss only significant results, taking .05 as 
our level of significance. 
 
6.3.1.1 Hand 
We analyzed the hand movement focusing on the absolute value of the third 
metacarpal bone velocity.  Data from two participants were removed as the hand 
marker was not accurately captured in more than 50% of the trials. We performed a 2 
(kind of Sentence: Heavy vs. Light) X 2 (kind of Box: Heavy vs. Light) analysis of 
variance on velocity latencies with both variables as within participants variables. 
Results showed a main effect of the kind of box, as participants achieved velocity 
peaks earlier during lifting of Light Boxes (M = 0.43 s) than during lifting of Heavy 
ones (M = 0.58 s), F (1, 15) = 19.68, MSe = 0.02, p < .001. This is consistent with 
previous evidence on mono-manual lifting movement showing that the lifting time 
increases with the application of larger lifting forces required for larger weights 
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(Johansson, and Westling, 1984, 1988; Westling and Johansson, 1984; Smeets, and 
Brenner, 1999).  
Crucially, we found a significant interaction between the kind of Sentence and 
the kind of Box, F (1, 15) = 4.35, MSe = 0.01, p < .05 (see Figure 2 top): while lifting 
a light box participants reached the velocity peak later (M = 0.44 s) after listening to a 
light sentence than after listening to a heavy one (M = 0.42 s). Symmetrically, during 
lifting of a heavy box, participants were slower in reaching the hand velocity peak 
after a heavy sentence (M = 0.61 s) than after a light one (M = 0.55 s). Newman-Keuls 
post-hoc analysis indicates that this effect is mainly due to the effect of the Light vs. 
Heavy Sentences during lifting of the Heavy Boxes (p < .04). These results indicate 
that the simulation activated by the sentence affects the lifting movement, and they are 
substantially in agreement with the predictions derived from Hypothesis 2: when a 
MOSAIC module is occupied by an ancillary task (in this case, simulation in the 
service of language  comprehension), integration of force across the remaining relevant 
modules will be biased. 
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Figure 2. [diagrams] Examples of hand velocity profiles during the lifting 
phase. Single movements are represented. Latencies of velocity peak are defined as the 
time elapsed between lifting phase onset and the first maximum value of the hand 
velocity. (top) Light Box lifting; (bottom) Heavy Box lifting. Continuous  lines refer to 
the movement after listening to a Heavy Sentence; grey arrows refer to the first 
velocity peaks; grey segments (below the X axis) refer to the first velocity peaks 
latencies. Dashed lines refer to the movement after listening to a Light Sentence; black 
arrows refer to the first velocity peaks; black segments refer to the first velocity peaks 
latencies. From the figure it might appear that the latencies are measured from the 
moment in which the object starts to move rather than when the hand velocity is at 
zero-crossing. However, this is not the case: the erroneous impression is due to the 
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very brief delay occurring between hand velocity zero-crossings and hand movement 
onset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. (top) Hand: the interaction between the kind of Sentence and the kind 
of Box; (bottom) Arm extension: the interaction between the kind of Sentence and the 
kind of Box. Bars indicate standard error. 
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6.3.1.2 Arm extension 
We analysed the arm extension and bending focusing on the elbow angular 
velocity. We used the velocity vector, instead of the scalar absolute value of velocity, 
as it maintains the information on the specific kind of performed movement: the 
positive sign of the angular velocity vector accounts for the arm extension movement, 
and the negative sign accounts for the arm bending movement. We analysed the two 
kinds of movements separately. 
We submitted the latency to the elbow positive velocity peaks to a 2 (kind of 
Sentence: Heavy vs. Light) X 2 (kind of Box: Heavy vs. Light) ANOVA, with both 
factors as within subjects variables. Neither of the main effects was statistically 
significant. Crucially, the interactions between kind of Sentence and kind of Box was 
significant, F (1, 17) = 4.74, MSe = 0.04, p < .04 (see Figure 2 bottom). When lifting 
Light Boxes participants were significantly slower in reaching the velocity peak when 
they previously listened to Light Sentences (M = 0.56 s) than Heavy Sentences (M = 
0.37 s). Symmetrically, after listening to Light Sentences they were faster (M = 0.47 s) 
in extending the arm to lift the Heavy Box than after listening with Heavy Sentences 
(M = 0.49 s). Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis indicates that the interaction is mainly 
due to angular velocity peak differences between the Light Sentence and Heavy 
Sentence conditions during the Light Boxes lifting (p < .04).  Once again, these results 
indicate that the simulation activated by the sentence affects the lifting movement, and 
they are substantially in agreement with the predictions derived from Hypothesis 2, 
that is, when the weight implied by the sentence and the weight of the box to be lifted 
are similar the time delay is larger compared to when they do not match at all. 
 
6.3.1.3 Arm bending  
The latency to negative velocity peaks were submitted to the same ANOVA. 
The factor kind of Box was significant, as the velocity peaks were faster when lifting 
the Light Boxes (M = 0.26 s) compared to the Heavy ones (M = 0.37 s), F (1, 17) = 
46.93, MSe = 0.01, p < .001. Results showed also a significant main effect of the kind 
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of Sentence: participants were slower with the Light Sentences (M = 0.33 s) than with 
the Heavy ones (M = 0.30 s), F (1, 17) = 7.41, MSe = 0.04, p < .01. The two factors did 
not interact, however. 
 
6.3.1.4 Analyses by halves of the experiment 
To understand why the effect of language did not emerge as clearly as for the 
other two parameters, we analyzed the elbow negative velocity peaks separately for 
trials from first half (see Figure 4 top) and second half (see Figure 4 bottom) of the 
experiment. In the first half of the experiment, the participants may have taken the 
sentences as providing information about the weights of the boxes, as suggested by 
Hypothesis 1. After experiencing the lack of correlation between the weight of the 
object mentioned in the sentence and the weight of the box that was lifted, it is less 
likely that the participants would consider the sentences as providing information 
about the boxes. 
In the analysis performed in the first half of trials, the factor kind of Box was 
significant, as the velocity peaks were faster when lifting the Light Boxes (M = 0.30 s) 
compared to the Heavy ones (M = 0.39 s), F (1, 14) = 7.50, MSe = 0.02, p < .02. 
Results showed also a significant main effect of the kind of Sentence: participants 
were slower with the Light Sentences (M = 0.37 s) than with the Heavy ones (M = 0.32 
s), F (1, 14) = 7.38, MSe = 0.007, p < .02. The two factors did not interact (see Figure 
3 top). Nevertheless, the pattern was interesting, as participants were slower to lift a 
Heavy box after listening to a Light sentence (M = 0.43 s) than after a Heavy one (M = 
0.35 s). In contrast, they were faster to lift a Light box after listening to a Heavy 
sentence (M = 0.28 s) than after a Light one (M = 0.32 s). 
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Figure 4. (top) Arm bending: first half of trials; (bottom) Arm bending: second 
half of trials. Bars indicate standard error. 
 
 
These results are similar to expectation effects about weight (Johansson and 
Westling, 1988; Jenmalm, Schmitz, Forssberg, and Ehrsson, 2006). For example, if 
one expects to lift a light object and instead one lifts a heavy object, the loading phase 
requires more time.  These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
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In the analysis performed on the second half of the trials the factor kind of Box 
was significant, as the velocity peaks were faster when lifting the Light Boxes (M = 
0.24 s) compared to the Heavy ones (M = 0.36 s), F (1, 13) = 15.98, MSe = 0.01, p < 
.02. The main effect of kind of Sentence was not significant. The interaction between 
the kind of Sentence and the kind of Box almost reached significance, F (1, 13) = 2.79, 
MSe = 0.01, p < .11 (see Figure 3 bottom). Most interestingly, the pattern is changed: 
participants were faster to lift a Light box after listening to a Heavy sentence (M = 0.21 
s) than after a Light one (M = 0.26 s), but they were faster to lift a Heavy box after 
listening to a Light sentence (M = 0.35 s) than after a Heavy one (M = 0.37 s).    
Dividing the experiment into two halves greatly reduced statistical power, 
which is the likely reason for the interaction failing to reach statistical significance. 
Nonetheless, the pattern of the means in the second half is similar to the patterns 
obtained for Hand and Arm extension movement, and all of those patterns are 
consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
To understand if the same change of pattern found in the arm bending 
parameter for the lifting of Heavy boxes occurred also for the other kinematics 
parameters, we also performed analyses by halves of the experiment on hand and arm 
extension movement. 
Concerning the hand movement, in the analysis performed in the first half of 
trials, the factor kind of Box was significant, as the velocity peaks were faster when 
lifting the Light Boxes (M = 0.45 s) compared to the Heavy ones (M = 0.67 s), F (1, 
12) = 61.56, MSe = 0.01, p < .02. The factors kind of Box and kind of Sentence did not 
interact. In the analysis performed in the second half of trials, the factor kind of Box 
was significant, as the velocity peaks were faster when lifting the Light Boxes (M = 
0.43 s) compared to the Heavy ones (M = 0.59 s), F (1, 13) = 38.92, MSe = 0.01, p < 
.02. Crucially, the interaction between the kind of Sentence and the kind of Box almost 
reached significance, F (1, 13) = 3.83, MSe = 0.02, p < .07, and the pattern of the 
means was consistent with Hypothesis 3: in the second half of the experiment 
participants were faster to lift a Heavy box after listening to a Light sentence (M = 0.50 
s) than after a listening to a Heavy one (M = 0.67 s). 
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As to the arm extension movement, in the analysis performed in the first half of 
trials we did not find significant effects. Also in the analysis performed in the second 
half of trials we did not find the interaction, but again the pattern switched over. In 
fact, while in the first half of the experiment participants were faster to lift a Heavy 
box after listening to a Heavy sentence (M = 0.39 s) than after a Light one (M = 0.46 
s), in the analyses performed on  the second half of trials we found that participants 
were faster to lift a Heavy box after listening to a Light sentence (M = 0.55 s) than 
after a Heavy one (M = 0.57 s). 
 These results of these analyses, although only tentative given the reduced 
statistical power, are consistent with the following summary: in the first half of the 
experiment, participants may have been using the sentences to form conscious 
expectancies about the weights of the boxes, and then they used those expectancies to 
modify their lifting.  After experiencing the independence of the weights of objects 
mentioned in the sentences and the weights of the boxes, these expectancies were 
weakened. At this point, effects of language simulation, as described by Hypothesis 2, 
were more evident. 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
We have shown that the comprehension of sentences referring to the lifting of 
differently weighted objects effects the production of action. We asked participants to 
lift heavy or light boxes after listening to sentences referring to the lifting of heavy 
objects (e.g,  a tool chest) or light objects (e.g, a pillow). Unlike other kinematics 
studies of language, we used a bimanual rather than a mono-manual lifting task. In 
addition, we focused on sentences rather than on single word processing. Finally, we 
added a semantic comprehension task to make sure that participants comprehended the 
sentences. Most importantly, we focused on an object property that cannot (in our 
experiment) be visually inferred, namely weight. 
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The data provide support to our primary hypothesis that language affects the 
motor system.  Importantly, the data speak in favour of the embodied view, according 
to which during sentence comprehension we internally simulate the actions and 
situations described by the sentence (Jeannerod, 2007; Gallese & Goldman, 2008; 
Zwaan, 2004). In addition, the data suggest that simulations can, in at least some 
situations, consider aspects such as object weights. 
There are at least three results that could be offered in support of the claim that 
simulation can be quite specific. The two most important results are based on analyses 
of hand and arm delay (latencies of first peak velocities) immediately after grasping 
the box. We found that participants’ time delay was larger when the weight implied by 
the sentence and the weight of the box they lifted were similar compared to when they 
were dissimilar. These results are consistent with the operation of the MOSAIC model 
as outlined in Hypothesis 2. 
Third, the effects obtained in the current experiment are consistent with the 
findings shown in Chapter 5. In that study, some participants first practiced lifting 
boxes of various sizes, shapes, and weights to familiarize themselves with the 
kinematics appropriate for those boxes; other participants did not have this practice. 
Then, for all participants, on each trial they read  a sentence describing the lift of a 
Heavy Weight  or a Light Weight, and the sentence was followed by a video (Bosbach 
et al., 2005) depicting the lift of a Large Box or a Small Box. Finally, the participant 
estimated the weight of the box observed in the video. When observers were required 
to practice lifting large and small boxes before the reading and judgment tasks, there 
was a dramatic increase in the correlation between judged and observed weight. 
Crucially, for the Light Videos (depicting lifts of light objects), the Light Sentences 
(describing the lifting of light objects) produced the lowest correlations between 
judged and observed weight, whereas for the Heavy Videos, Heavy Sentences 
produced the lowest correlations.  
The results just described can also be accommodated by the MOSAIC model 
described as part of Hypothesis 2. First, comprehending the sentence describing a lift 
requires a simulation using the motor system. This simulation temporarily occupies a 
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particular module (e.g., the module for lifting a 250 g weight) rendering it unavailable 
for use in the judging the weight of the box observed in the video. Variability of the 
weights simulated (and consequently, variability in the modules used in the judgment 
task) reduces the correlation between judged weight and observed weight. Because the 
modules used in simulating the light sentences are unlikely to be used in judging the 
heavy weights (and vice versa), the correlation is most reduced when the sentence is 
about lifting objects similar to those observed. 
Evidence is rapidly accumulating that simulations during language 
comprehension are rather specific (e.g. Buccino et al., 2005; Glenberg & Kashak, 
2002; Scorolli & Borghi, 2007). The novelty of our study is that it shows for the first 
time that the simulation activated during language comprehension can entail 
information on object weight. As noted in the introduction, weight information cannot 
be inferred from visual stimuli in our experiment; instead it must be based on 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic information. Thus, we have demonstrated through 
observations of kinematics parameters how language can have another type of specific 
effect on the motor system.  
It can be objected that our results, which are in keeping with the MOSAIC 
model, conflict with results of other studies examining language effects on action. The 
reason why this difference appears might lie in the design of the studies. Namely, our 
study was explicitly designed to produce a contrast effect between the modules used 
during the ancillary task, the language processing task, and the modules used during 
the task directly involving the motor system, that is the lifting task. That is, detecting 
the effect requires that the ancillary task uses a MOSAIC module that is likely to be 
needed during the motor task, and that this ancillary task be compared to one that does 
not use that MOSAIC. Consider, for example, evidence by Gentilucci et al. (2000) 
showing that the kinematics of the initial reaching/grasping phase was modulated by 
the labels “LARGE” and “SMALL” written on a cube to be grasped. It is possible that 
in these experiments the MOSAIC required to process a word is not required to set 
reach kinematics. So, these experiments probably reflect a type of priming (e.g., 
Hypothesis 1). 
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One last issue is worth discussion and further exploration. It seems that 
language can have a different effect than expectations. As outlined in the introduction, 
it has been demonstrated with mono-manual lifting (Johansson & Westling, 1988; 
Jenmalm et al., 2006) that when an unexpected heavy weight is lifted after a light 
weight, then the duration of the loading phase is longer than when a heavy weight is 
lifted after another heavy object. Differently, the lifting of an unpredictable light 
weight after a heavy weight results in an early lift off.  
Our results partially differ from those obtained in studies on expectations. 
Namely, we found that participants were faster in the case of heavy box lifting 
preceded by light sentences. Similar to those studies, however, we found that the time 
delay of a light box lifting preceded by a heavy box was shorter. Even though these 
discrepancies might be accounted for by differences in method (e.g., mono- vs. bi-
manual lifting), they raise the interesting possibility that language and expectations 
might tap different mechanisms. In keeping with these speculations, in an fMRI study, 
Jenmalm et al. (2006) found activity in the right inferior parietal cortex regardless of 
whether the weight was heavier or lighter than predicted, as well as differences in 
brain activity (left primary sensory motor cortex and right cerebellum) specific to the 
direction of the weight change. Unfortunately, research on differences between 
language effects and expectancy effects are likely to be complicated because language 
can also be used to change expectancies. Indeed, our analyses of arm bending latencies 
are consistent with the claim that language can produce both expectancy effects (as in 
the first half of the experiment) as well as more subtle effects on action control (as in 
the second half of the experiment). Further research should be conducted to investigate 
whether language affects different brain circuitries than the ones activated by an 
unpredictable weight change, and whether module/modules engaged in the comparison 
between the predicted and the actual sensory feedback are different from that ones 
engaged during language comprehension. 
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‘THE MEANING OF ABSTRACT WORDS’: 
THE LINGUISTIC EXPERIENCE 
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 7 The meaning of abstract words and the impact 
of different languages on cognition 
 
 
One of the main challenges of embodied theories is to account for meanings of 
abstract words. The traditional explanation of embodied theories is that abstract words, 
as concrete ones, are grounded in the sensorimotor system and activate situations and 
introspection; alternatively, they are explained through metaphoric mapping. However, 
evidence provided so far pertains specific domains and such a theory is not able to 
account for abstract words in their variety. It could be necessary to take into account 
not only the fact that language is grounded in the sensorimotor system, but also the fact 
that language represents a linguistic-social experience. Namely, this experience might 
be particularly crucial for abstract words compared to concrete ones. Using cross-
linguistic comparisons is a possible way to investigate the role played by linguistic 
experience in abstract words. We examined different combinations of transitive verbs 
(abstract and concrete ones) and nouns (abstract and concrete ones), focusing on two 
languages that are syntactically different: German and Italian. Compatible 
combinations (concrete-concrete and abstract-abstract) required faster times to be 
processed compared to the mixed combinations. Interestingly, the processing of mixed 
combinations was modulated by the specific language, as when the concrete word 
primed the abstract one participants were faster, regardless of the specific grammatical 
class. Results are discussed in the framework of current views on abstract words; they 
confirm theories assigning a crucial role of both sensorimotor and linguistic experience 
for abstract words. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
One of the most serious challenges that embodied theories need to cope with is 
the explanation of how we understand abstract words. The first problem we find facing 
this issue is that we do not have a good definition of abstractness. Curiously, we 
understand each other when we refer to “abstract entities”, nevertheless we notice a 
high level of disagreement when we try to categorize a specific noun, and even more a 
specific verb, as “abstract”. We all agree that the noun “kiwi” refers to a concrete 
entity as we can touch it, perceive its ruggedness, see its colour, grasp it, peel it off, 
proprioceptively feel it while bringing it to the mouth and, of course, taste it. We also 
agree about the abstractness of the noun “cleverness” as we cannot touch the entity it 
refers to, neither see it, neither perceive it with other senses. So it could seem that our 
exteroceptive senses (that is sight, taste, smell, touch, hearing and balance) allow us to 
discriminate objects and entities in accordance with our dychotomic division. 
Coherently with this claim, nouns like “pain” or “sorrow” should be unambiguously 
categorized as abstract, as we cannot perceive their referents, but we can only represent 
them by introspection. Instead there is a high disagreement in rating them, maybe 
because we can feel them, also physically, by our interoceptive senses: for example, a 
deep sorrow can cause pain in our internal organs (Altarriba, Bauer & Benvenuto, 
1999; Altarriba & Bauer 2004 proposed that emotions constitute a special group of 
entities, distinct from both concrete and abstract ones). In the same way, the noun 
“race” should be considered as concrete, primarily for the high imageability of its 
referent: we can see, as easily imagine, a race, and also hear the noise caused by, for 
example, a horses race. However, even if there is an high level of agreement in judging 
the verb “to run” as concrete (maybe because it explicitly involves our motor system), 
the corresponding noun “race” leads to uncertainty. This last instance arises another 
issue: not all of our senses are equally critical in characterizing a concept as “abstract”. 
The “smell” or the “scent”, for example, are typically categorized as abstract (see, for 
example, Dunabeitia, Avilés, Afonso, Scheepers & Carreiras, 2009), consistently with 
the assumption that what allow us to discriminate abstract from concrete entities is 
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mostly the imageability, the sense of touch and the proprioception. Nevertheless cooks 
classify “smell” as concrete with a high level of agreement, consistently with the fact 
that the meaning is linked to our own perceptive and motor experience, as well as to 
our specific culture. And what about “stink”? It seems to be more concrete than 
“scent”, maybe because its intensity seems to be stronger, or because of its negative 
connotation, that is strongly associated with an avoidance behaviour. 
These few examples referring to single words give us an idea of how much is 
blur the boundary that splits concrete from abstract concepts. Things are even more 
complicated as typically to communicate we do not use single words, but words 
combined in a meaningful sentence. Most of us would agree in judging the very simple 
sentence “to grasp an apple” as concrete, or the sentence “to think about the meaning” 
as abstract. What about the verb-noun pairs “to grasp the meaning”, or “to think about 
an apple”? It’s not easy to judge them. Even more tricky is to rate and to understand 
how we represent sentences like “biting off more than you can chew”, or “chewing 
over the details”, “kicking off the year”, or “time is running” (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, 
Rizzolatti & Iacoboni, 2006). To know the meanings of single words and to be able to 
combine them is not enough to fully understand these sentences. The meaning is often 
related to a specific culture, and it does not work (or it works differently) for other 
ones. Maybe most of us would judge the aforementioned four sentences as abstract, 
because of they are not taken literally. These sentences are considered as metaphorical, 
since there is one domain of knowledge that is applied to another (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980), that is: we can distinguish a target (the subject to which attributes are ascribed) 
and a source (the subject from which the attributes are borrowed). Concerning 
metaphoricity, we can individuate different levels, depending on the ease and the 
immediacy by which we can map one domain on the other one: for example “to grasp 
a concept” could be considered as a metaphor, even if less metaphorical than “biting 
off more than you can chew”. In the first case just the verb refers to the source, and the 
noun refers to the target; in the second case the whole sentence refers to the source, 
and we have to do a further step to link it to the target. Apart from this difference, 
actually both source domains refer to a concrete sensori-motor experience in the world, 
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nevertheless our feeling is that these sentences are not concrete. The “sense of 
abstractness” is probably given by “the abstract link” with the referent/target. This link 
can be culturally determined, and more or less strong (let’s think to some very bizarre 
poetic licenses), in any case it does not directly match the external referent (differently 
from what happens with sentences like “to grasp an apple”).    
Looking at the literature on language grounding in action we find also 
sentences like “Tom gives you a good suggestion”, “Mary tells you the news”, 
contrasted to sentences as “John gives you the cake” (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; 
Glenberg, Sato, Cattaneo, Riggio, Palumbo & Buccino, 2008). Actually the first two 
sentences could be categorized as “not-concrete”, but at the same time they cannot be 
considered as abstract, since we have directly or indirectly experienced the content 
expressed by the sentences, that is the referent-situation. There is still a mapping on 
our previous sensori-motor experiences (“to give something to someone”), as probably 
we firstly learn sentences that refer to a concrete transfer and only later those ones that 
refer to an abstract one. Even so, there isn’t any kind of mental operation that we have 
to do to understand them. The comprehension of these kinds of sentences does not 
depend on the linguistic community we belong to: they are universally and 
unambiguously understandable. In fact to test if they activate the same action schema 
authors manipulate the semantics of the sentences but maintaining a fixed syntactical 
structure. 
 
 
7.1.1 Differences between “abstract” and “concrete” words 
 
By showing the reported examples we intended to emphasize that a definition 
of abstract words and sentences is missing and that we badly need it, as the first step to 
experimentally study a phenomenon is to unambiguously circumscribe the object of 
the research. Actually the definition of abstractness using just an exclusion criterion – 
“all that is not concrete” – is not a good starting point. The dychotomic division 
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between concrete and abstract words is an oversimplification, as the “abstract-concrete 
dimension” reflects a continuum. This hypothesis was tested and confirmed by Nelson 
and Schreiber (1992) and successively by Wiemer-Hastings, Krug and Xu (2001). 
Asking people to judge the concreteness of big sets of words (2172 and1660 words, 
respectively) they found a bimodal distribution (according to particular features, as 
tangibility or visibility): this result is in contrast with the view that concreteness is one 
dimension, and all entities vary along this dimension. Obviously they also found 
variance in concreteness within both clusters of entities. 
Different theories tried to explain this variance. One of the older ones is the 
Dual Code theory (Paivio, 1971; Paivio, 1986), according to which we use two codes 
to represent and process concepts: a language-like code and an imagery-like one. 
While concrete entities can be represented by using both codes, the abstract ones fit 
only the first one. This single coding results in a disadvantage of abstract concepts in 
different tasks, such as comprehension and recall. While according to the Dual Code 
theory the difference between concrete and abstract words rests on imagery ratings, the 
Context Availability theory (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983) points to the ease to 
think about a context (in terms of faster times) as discriminating feature. More 
recently, another theory, the Contextual Constraints theory (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 
2001) also underlines the fact that abstract entities are associated with contexts 
(Schwanenflugel, 1991; Wiemer-Hastings & Graesser, 1998). Authors point out that 
an entity that is not strongly constrained is more abstract than an entity that is 
contingent on a fairly extensive set of constraints. So they maintain that entities are 
abstract or concrete depending on whether they are physical in nature (that is 
perceivable through vision, touch, etc.), nonetheless they highlight that abstractness 
varies as well, according to more specific types of information (two-factor model of 
abstractness). That is, oppositely to common sense, Wiemer-Hastings  et al. (2001) 
suggest that the higher/lower degree of abstractness could rest on factors different from 
the ones that determine different degrees of concreteness. This implies a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative distinction. 
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Another interesting proposal was advanced by Barr and Caplan (1989). They 
suggested that abstract concepts differ from concrete ones as they are characterized 
only by “extrinsic features” (that is “connections” between the conceptual referent and 
other entities). On the contrary, concrete concepts are characterized also by “intrinsic 
features”, that is features pertaining to the referent characteristics. 
An additional line of research focusing on qualitative differences tries to 
identify which specific pattern of information is activated by abstract vs. concrete 
words. Studies conducted both with children (Borghi & Caramelli, 2003) and adults 
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005) show that words referring to natural and artefact 
objects activate perceptual and functional information. On the contrary, words 
referring to abstract entities mainly activate thematic information (that is information 
related to space, time, place, agent, action, event) and instantiations (when participants 
produces an example instead of definitions). The qualitative different representational 
framework (QDR), proposed by Crutch and Warrington (2005), also assumes a 
qualitative distinction, since according to this framework concrete and abstract words 
are differently organized. Namely abstract words are mainly organized by their 
associations with other words (“associative neural network”), which correspond 
approximately to the thematic relations. Concrete words organization is more 
categorical, based on “semantic similarity” between objects and entities (Dunabeitia et 
al., 2009), that roughly corresponds to a taxonomic organization, resting on 
superordinates, coordinates, subordinates. 
  
 
7.2 Perceptual versus amodal representations: some weaknesses of  
the “Embodied Theories” framework 
 
The investigation of the way we represent abstract nouns/verbs is crucial as 
test-bed for “embodied theories”. Recently some authors highlighted that the empirical 
evidence cited in support of embodied theories is compelling with respect to concrete 
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or highly imageable words but has limited reach with respect to abstract ones (Pezzulo 
& Castelfranchi, 2007; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, in press; Borghi & Cimatti, submitted a, 
submitted b; Dove, in press). Starting from different perspectives, they proposed to 
draw attention not only to “grounding” but also to semantic relations. 
We’ll briefly outline the work conducted in the embodied theory framework, its 
strength  and its weaknesses. Then we’ll summarize some new proposals that address 
the issue of abstractness in a systematic way. 
The embodied-situated theories have stressed the continuity between 
perception, action and cognition. In opposition to the classical-cognitivist views, 
concepts and words are no more considered as separate from perception and action but 
rather as grounded in sensorimotor activity. Nowadays lots of evidence supports this 
view (just to give some examples, Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Pecher et al., 2003; 
Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak, 2004,  Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). The majority of these 
experimental investigations focus on concepts referring to ‘concrete entities’. 
Concerning the method, in these studies participants are typically shown a specific 
object, or an action performed on the object, or words or sentences that refer to an 
object concept or to an action performed on it. This kind of approach arises directly 
from the assumption that concepts reactivate the same perceptual and motor experience 
we had with their referents. This “direct” link with the body (as well with an action 
schema, or with a specific external referents) makes the hypothesis “easily testable”. 
The experimental procedure is intrinsically suggested by the hypotheses. Focusing on 
language, for example, many studies manipulate the kind of movements suggested by 
the sentences and the kind of movement required to respond (for example, Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002), looking for “some kind” of modulation of the dependent variable, that 
we generally define as motor system.  
The study of abstract concepts is completely different, given their high 
variability. As drawn above, typically they are thought as “all concepts that are not 
concrete”, so they are more difficult to categorize. Concerning sentences, it’s not 
straightforward what an “abstract sentence” is (think of idiomatic sentences); 
Language and Embodiment 
 130
moreover, the judgment is hardly generalizable, given the amount of inter-languages 
subtle differences. 
By definition it is clear that there is not an external referent with which we 
previously interacted. There is not a “clear trace” in our sensori-motor system that can 
be easily looked for by partial re-activation, as the acquisition process for abstract 
words is completely different: it rests on linguistic-social experiences (Borghi & 
Cimatti, submitted a). This suggests that some sort of theoretical reframing/adjustment 
is necessary. 
Nevertheless inside the embodied framework we can find some studies 
demonstrating that also the comprehension of language about abstract sentences may 
be embodied (for a review see, Glenberg, et al., 2008). There are basically three 
approaches to the embodiment of abstract language. The first one, strongly associated 
with Lakoff (1987) and Gibbs (e.g., Gibbs & Steen, 1999), is based on metaphor. 
Lakoff proposes that bodily structure induces a consistent structure to experiences, and 
these experiences become represented as image schemas. A second approach was 
developed by Barsalou (1999a; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). On this 
approach, at least some abstract concepts arise from simulation processes, that is, in 
order to understand and correctly use a word, one needs to recruit the same 
senorimotor systems involved while experiencing the referent of the word. A third 
approach relates abstract events to actions. For example, the indexical hypothesis 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 1999) asserts that sentences are understood by creating a 
simulation of the actions that underlie them. So, for example, judging the sensibility of 
sentences describing the transfer of concrete objects or abstract information requires 
less time when the action implied by the sentence matches the action required to make 
the response (action-sentence compatibility effect, or ACE, Glenberg & Kaschak, 
2002). This approach can be subdivided into two versions. The first version states that 
comprehension of transfer might involve a simulation process in which the motor 
system is used to simulate the specific actions used to accomplish the transfer. The 
second one assumes that the linguistic material is grounded in motor processes, but not 
necessarily by direct simulation (action schema approach). As highlighted by Glenberg 
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et al. (2008), these various approaches may all be emphasizing different aspects of the 
same phenomenon. Simulation of action is the simulation of an event (Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), and events generally are extended in time and space 
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Richardson et al., 2003). Furthermore, to the extent that 
transfer of information is understood primarily as physical transfer (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al. 2008; Glenberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 2008), its 
understanding is metaphorical (Lakoff, 1987). 
Even if these approaches to the embodiment of abstract language are not 
mutually exclusive, they would need a unique framework in which to be integrated. As 
highlighted above, the heterogeneity of  abstract sentences partially justifies the 
proposal of these “ad-hoc solutions”, which are adequate for specific kinds of abstract 
words. Nonetheless the multiplicity of the approaches to some extent points out a very 
specific problem of the embodied theories. One of the main limitations of these 
experimental approaches can be found in their attempt to overlap with the ones 
designed to investigate the embodiment of concrete concept. Borrowing these methods 
can be useful, but it should be taken into account that they fit only the investigation of 
some kinds of abstract concepts, the ones that can be easily (culturally) mapped on 
external referents, or action schemas. Accordingly, these findings, even if interesting, 
are hardly to generalize, as they work only for particular kinds of abstract concepts. 
 
 
7.2.1 Some theoretical proposals 
 
Providing an overview on the main theories on concrete and abstract concepts, 
Dove (in press) identifies three major approaches: one proposes that concepts are 
generally couched in perceptual or motor representations (Barsalou, 1999a; Damasio, 
1989; Glenberg 1997; Prinz, 2002). A second one reaffirms the orthodox view that 
concepts are couched solely in amodal representations (Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & 
Romani, 1990; Pylyshyn, 1973; Pylyshyn, 1981). A third proposal posits the existence 
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of both amodal and modal conceptual representations in conceptual processing 
(Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). According to the author, while the first approach is not 
sufficient to explain the representation of abstract concepts, the one proposed by 
Pylyshyn (1973) is well suitable to account for it, but it has the limit to explain away 
the increasing body of research that implicates the use of perceptual representation in 
cognitive tasks. Finally, the third approach recognizes the qualitative difference 
between abstract and concrete concepts. In support of the third approach, Dove (in 
press) shows that the empirical evidence for perceptually based conception is 
fundamentally circumscribed: he claims that the general arguments offered in support 
of perceptual symbols are much stronger with respect to concrete or highly imageable 
concepts. Thus the author addresses empirical and theoretical reasons to think that 
some abstract concepts employ amodal representations. At last he proposes a 
“representational pluralism”, that is a “multiple semantic code” approach, holding that 
perceptual simulations play an important role in highly imageable concepts while 
amodal linguistic representations play a crucial role in abstract concepts (independent 
levels of semantic representation). 
In a similar attempt to argue that not just a single type of representation 
underlies knowledge, Barsalou, Santos, Simmons and Wilson (2008) review linguistic 
and modal approaches to the representation of knowledge. They propose the LASS 
(Language and Situated Simulation) Theory as as a preliminary framework for 
integrating them. The authors focus on two sources of knowledge: the linguistic forms 
in the brain’s language systems, and the situated simulations in the brain’s modal 
systems. They assume that linguistic forms and situated simulations interact 
continuously in varying mixtures to produce conceptual processing: different mixtures 
of the two systems underlie a wide variety of tasks. “When superficial linguistic 
processing is sufficient to support adequate task performance, processing may rely 
mostly on the linguistic system and little on simulation […]. Conversely, when 
linguistic processing is unable to support adequate performance, the simulation system 
must be consulted for the required conceptual information. Depending on task 
conditions, conceptual processing may mostly consist of linguistic processing or 
The meaning of abstract words 
 133 
simulation.” (Barsalou et al., 2008, p. 4). So, according to them, previous 
neuroimaging experiments had only found evidence for linguistic representations of 
abstract concepts because they used tasks that allowed and encouraged superficial 
linguistic processing (e.g., lexical decision, synonym judgments). LASS claims that 
the linguistic and simulation systems play different roles in different concepts and in 
different task contexts. Linguistic forms provide a powerful means of indexing 
simulations, and for manipulating simulations in language and thought. As the two 
systems interact, one may dominate momentarily. However, a deeper conceptual 
processing necessarily requires the simulation system.
  
Borghi and Cimatti (submitted a, submitted b) propose to extend the embodied 
view of cognition in order to consider not only language grounding but also the social 
and normative aspects of cognition. In this framework they claim that words cannot be 
conceived of as mere signals of something but also as tools that allow us to operate in 
the world. Their theoretical proposal assumes two simultaneous cognitive sources for 
word meanings. The first one is “individual”, that is circumscribed to the embodied 
individual experience; the second one is “social”. This proposal has important direct 
implications for the abstract words meaning. As drawn above, actually it is almost 
impossible to come up with a general explanation of abstract concepts as grounded in 
the motor system. There are some abstract sentences for which we could reasonably 
predict an activation of the motor system (e.g., “grasping a concept”), but for some 
others we could mainly expect an activation of perceptual areas. Besides, there might 
be abstract concepts that simply involve introspection. As pointed out by the authors, 
in general abstract word meanings rely more than concrete word meanings on language 
and conventions/norms (Borghi & Cimatti, submitted b). This might lead to a different 
acquisition mechanism for concrete and abstract words (Borghi & Cimatti, submitted 
a, submitted b): in the first case the sensorimotor experience “precedes” the linguistic 
one. That is, with concrete words firstly we experience the concrete entities (e.g., 
book) and then we tag their referents using linguist labels (we learn the name “book”). 
In the case of abstract word meaning, instead, we initially learn a word (the label) and 
then we “tag” it with our sensori-motor experience, that is we use the word to assemble 
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a set of experiences (e.g., probably I assemble different experiences of freedom once I 
have learned the word “freedom”). Thus, in some sense abstract word meanings would 
activate more linguistic areas compared to concrete ones. 
The best way to disambiguate these hypotheses would be investigating the 
neural correlates of abstract and concrete words processing with a functional magnetic 
resonance study. The first step in this systematic path should be the selection of a good 
paradigm that allows us to contrast abstract and concrete words combined in sentences. 
Thus far, as shown above, there is a huge amount of evidence on abstract single words. 
As we thought that embodied views should consider the social aspects of languages, 
we’ll focus on full sentences, in two kinds of languages. Testing also the specific 
languages modulation on the way in which we organize categories would allow us to 
understand the variable and cultural dependency of our word use (Borghi & Cimatti, 
submitted b). 
 
 
7.2.2 An attempt to experimentally disentangle the proposals 
 
The aim of the present study is to investigate the comprehension of abstract 
language using very simple sentences, where concrete nouns and concrete verbs are 
contrasted with abstract nouns and abstract verbs. One of the advantages of this design 
is the possibility to study abstractness in a continuum, that is studying combinations in 
which abstract and concrete verbs and nouns are put together. 
We examined different combinations of nouns (abstract and concrete ones) and 
verbs (abstract and concrete ones), in German and in Italian, given that the two 
languages are syntactically different (in German the noun precedes the verb, in Italian 
it is the opposite). Coherently with previous literature, we defined as “concrete” only 
nouns that refer to manipulable objects and only verbs referring to manual actions 
(e.g., “an apple” / “to grasp”). We decided to define as “abstract” only nouns that do 
not refer to an object, rather to an entity that cannot be grasped, neither touched; and 
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“abstract” only verbs that refer to an action1 that cannot be performed with any parts of 
the body, that is an action that do not explicitly require any movement neither any 
activation of the motor system (e.g., “a concept” / “to think”). We balanced the 
materials for familiarity and probability of use. Participants’ task was to judge the 
sensibility of the sentences. 
We’ll briefly outline the predictions advanced by different approaches: a 
strictly modal theory, an amodal theory, a theory based on representational pluralism 
(Dove, in press), a theory resting on language and situated simulation (Barsalou et al., 
2008) and finally our prediction, which assumes two simultaneous cognitive source, an 
individual one and a socially embodied one (Borghi & Cimatti, submitted a, submitted 
b). 
According to a strictly modal theory, there should be no difference in 
processing concrete and abstract words (Barsalou, 1999a). Namely, the difference 
between concrete and abstract words relies in the fact that,  whereas concrete words 
activate more perceptual features, abstract words should activate a different set of 
relations, that is situational and introspective features. Therefore, we should expect no 
difference between the four conditions. Amodal theories of concepts claim that both 
concrete and abstract concepts are represented in the same format, so there should be 
no difference in processing between the two. Therefore no difference between the four 
conditions is predicted. According to a theory based on representational pluralism 
(Dove, in press), processing abstract words should require a different strategy than that 
used to process concrete words. Namely, the latter would be represented in a 
perceptual format, the first in a propositional format. Given that the task is a linguistic 
one, processing of abstract words should require less effort than processing of concrete 
words. The LASS theory (Barsalou et al., 2008) maintains that in abstract concepts 
language plays a more relevant role with respect to concrete ones and that the process 
of simulation occurs at a deep level, whereas linguistic processing is more superficial. 
                                                
1
 Action thought in a more general way, as to include also cognitive processes, or mental 
operations. 
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If this is the case, as our task is a linguistic one, abstract concepts should be processed 
faster than concrete ones. Thus, we should predict that the pairs abstract-abstract are 
processed faster than the pairs concrete-concrete. 
According to the theory proposed by Borghi and Cimatti (submitted a, 
submitted b), both concrete and abstract concepts are modal, and both refer to 
experiences, which do not differ in depth but have the same status. Therefore there 
should not be a difference between abstract and concrete concepts in processing. 
However, given that there might be costs passing from one perceptual modality to 
another, there might be costs in shifting from abstract words to concrete ones. This 
theory does not specify the direction of these costs, however. As this proposal also 
stresses the cultural dependency of our words use, we also predict that in the mixed 
conditions (concrete verb - abstract noun, and vice versa) the response times would be 
modulated depending on the specific language, as the chosen languages have a 
different syntactical structure. 
 
 
7.3 Experimental paradigm 
7.3.1 Method 
7.3.1.1 Participants 
38 students of the University of Hamburg (I group) and 38 students of the 
University of Bologna (II group) took part in the study. All were native German 
speakers (I group) and native Italian speakers (II group), right-handed according to the 
Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971), and all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. They all gave their informed consent to the experimental 
procedure. Their ages ranged from 18 to 32 years old. 
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7.3.1.2 Materials 
Materials consisted of word pairs (sentences) composed by a transitive verb 
and a concept noun. We invented 192 sentences (48 quadruples) in German language 
and 192 sentences in Italian language. Each quadruple was constructed by pairing a 
concrete verb (e.g. to grasp) both with a concrete noun (e.g. an apple) and  an abstract 
noun (e.g. a concept); and by pairing an abstract verb (e.g. to think) both with the same 
concrete and  abstract noun previously used. The majority of these sentences meanings 
matched in both the languages; few of them slightly differ between the two groups as 
some pairs (above all the mixed combinations) did not allow for a literal translation. 
Thus, we built an experimental paradigm that could allow us to study different 
kinds of abstract sentences: we contrasted two kinds of Nouns (Concrete vs. Abstract) 
with 2 kind of Verbs (Concrete vs. Abstract). We defined Concrete Nouns as nouns 
referring to graspable objects; Concrete Verbs as verbs referring to hand actions; 
Abstract Nouns as nouns that do not refer to manipulable objects; Abstract Verbs as 
verbs that do not refer to motor actions. Therefore the quadruples had to contain every 
possible combinations for motor/non-motor verbs and for graspable/non-graspable 
objects: e.g., 1. to grasp/an apple; 2. to think/an apple; 3. to grasp/a concept; 4. to 
think/a concept. We decided to use sentences with a very simple grammatical structure 
(a verb plus a noun) as it was not possible to develop full sentences in a similar 
grammatical structure that fulfilled the criteria of the quadruples. 
Due to the different syntax of German and Italian language, the German 
sentences were composed by a noun followed by a verb; instead the Italian ones were 
composed by a verb followed by a noun. We chose to compare these two languages as 
the specific differences in the syntactical structure allowed us to speculate on the 
different effects caused by a verb preceded by a noun (German sample) versus a noun 
preceded by a verb (Italian sample). 
To select 30 critical quadruples among the 48 ones we asked 20 German 
students and 20 Italian students to judge how familiar each sentence sounded and how 
probably would they use each sentence. They had to rate on a continuous scale (Not 
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familiar - Very Familiar; Not probably - Very probably), by making a cross on a line. 
We selected the quadruples with higher scores for both familiarity and probability of 
use, and, among these ones, we finally chose those quadruples with lower scores’ 
standard deviations. Thus we obtained 120 verb-noun pairs (balanced for familiarity 
and probability of use). 
In addition to the 30 critical quadruples, 30 filler quadruples were constructed. 
We used the same criteria adopted for the critical ones, that is we combined concrete 
verb both with a concrete noun and with an abstract noun; and we combined an 
abstract verb both with the same concrete noun and abstract noun, leading to sentences 
which didn’t make sense (e.g. “to switch off the shoe”). Each quadruple was presented 
only once. 
 
7.3.1.3 Procedure 
Both German and Italian participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
groups. Members of both groups were tested individually in a quiet library room. They 
sat on a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen and were instructed to look at 
a fixation cross that remained on the screen for 1000 ms. Then a sentence appeared on 
the screen for 2600 ms. The German sentences were composed by a determinative or 
not determinative article plus a noun plus a verb, while the Italian ones were composed 
by a verb plus a determinative or not determinative article plus a noun.  
The timer started operating when the sentence appeared on the screen. For each 
verb-noun pair, participants were instructed to press a key if the combination made 
sense, and to press another key if the combination did not make sense. 
Participants in the first group (both German and Italian) were asked to respond 
“yes” with their left hand and “no” with their right hand; participants in the other 
group (both German and Italian) were required to do the opposite. All participants 
were informed that their response times would be recorded and invited to respond as 
quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy. Stimuli were presented in a 
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random order. The 240 experimental trials were preceded by 8 training trials, in order 
to allow the participants to familiarize with the procedure. 
 
 
7.4 Results 
 
We considered only the sensible sentences. Participants were accurate in 
responding as nobody’s responses included errors over 10%. 
All incorrect responses were eliminated. As the error analysis revealed that 
there was no speed-for-accuracy trade-off, we focused on the RTs analysis. To screen 
for outliers, scores 2 standard deviations higher or lower than the mean participant 
score were removed for each participant. Removed outliers accounted for 2.6% of 
response trials.  
The remaining response times were submitted to a 2 (kind of Noun: Concrete 
vs. Abstract) X 2 (kind of Verb: Concrete vs. Abstract) X 2 (Mapping: yes-right / no-
left vs. yes-left / no-right) X 2 (Language: German vs. Italian) mixed factor ANOVA, 
with Mapping and Language as a between participants variables. We conducted the 
analyses with participants as a random factor. 
We did not find a main effect of the kind of Mapping, neither a main effect of 
the kind of Language. 
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Crucially we found a significant interaction between the kind of Noun and the 
kind of Verb: German and Italian participants responded faster to both kinds of 
congruent pairs, that is to pairs composed by an Abstract Verb plus an Abstract Noun 
(M = 1172.56) and to pairs composed by a Concrete Verb plus a Concrete Noun (M = 
1168.83). Instead they were slower with the mixed pairs, that is with pairs composed 
by an Abstract Verb plus a Concrete Noun (M = 1211.95) and pairs composed by a 
Concrete Verb plus an Abstract Noun (M = 1206.81) (F (1, 72) = 48.83, MSe = 
2328.79, p < .0001). Interestingly, Abstract Verbs combined with Abstract Nouns did 
not require a longer time to be processed than Concrete Verbs – Concrete Nouns pairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The interaction between the kind of Noun and the kind of Verb. Bars 
represent standard error. 
 
 
We found also a significant three ways interaction between the kind of 
Language, the kind of Noun and the kind of Verb, F (1, 72) = 5.07, MSe = 2328.79, p 
< .03. Crucially the post-hoc analyses showed that German participants were 13.25 ms 
faster with Abstract Verb plus Concrete Noun pairs than with Concrete Verb plus 
Abstract Noun pairs; on the contrary Italian participants  were 23.51 ms faster with 
Concrete verb plus Abstract Noun pairs than with Abstract Verb plus Concrete Noun 
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pairs, also if this difference reached the significance only for the Italian participants, p 
< .04 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The three ways interaction between the kind of Language, the kind of 
Noun and the kind of Verb. Bars represent standard error. 
 
 
As the syntactic construction of German and Italian is different for pairs 
containing a transitive verb plus an object, German participants firstly saw the noun 
and then the verb, oppositely of the Italian ones. Results with mixed pairs indicate that 
when the first word is a “concrete” one, that is when it refers to an object on which we 
could perform an hand action (German pairs), or to an action to perform with the 
hands (Italian pairs), participants are faster than in the case in which the first word 
refers to a no-manipulable object or to an action that does not involve the hand. This 
suggests a stronger effect of semantic features compared to the syntactic ones. 
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Coherently, we also found an interaction between the kind of Language and the 
kind of Verb, that almost reached significance, F (1, 72) = 3.68, MSe = 3490.70, p < 
.06. German participants were 8.57 ms faster with pairs containing Abstract Verbs than 
with pairs containing Concrete Verbs. On the contrary,  Italian participants were 17.42 
ms slower with pairs containing Abstract Verbs than with the ones containing Concrete 
Verbs. Integrating these results with the previous ones allows us to speculate that the 
order of the words in the pairs strongly determines the time necessary to process the 
sentence, but also that the verb has a stronger effect than the noun. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3. The interaction between the kind of Language and the kind of Verb. 
Bars represent standard error. 
 
 
7.5 German and Italian pairs’ assessment 
 
To check for our materials, 30 students of the University of Hamburg and 30 
students of the University of Bologna were asked to rate on a continuous scale (scores 
ranging from 0 to 100) the ease or difficulty with which each pair evoked mental 
images (imageability: Low imagery rate - High Imagery rate); how literally would they 
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take each pair (literality: Literal - No Literal); whether and to what extent each pair 
elicited movement information (quantity of motion: Not much movement  - Much 
movement). Finally 10 German students and 10 Italian students were also asked to rate 
at which age they approximately had learned to use each pair (age of acquisition 
ratings). For each rating, we calculated the scores’ averages and the scores’ standard 
deviations for each condition. 
 
 
7.5.1 Imageability 
 
Both German and Italian participants judged the Concrete Verb – Concrete 
Noun pairs as the easiest to imagine (Germans: M = 69.10; SD = 12.76; Italians: M = 
77.74; SD = 8.49), followed by the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (Germans: M 
= 52.72; SD = 15.80; Italians: M = 51.33; SD = 18.65), by the Concrete Verb – 
Abstract Noun pairs (Germans: M = 48.53; SD = 12.92; Italians: M = 46.33; SD = 
12.36), and finally by Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (Germans: M = 45.56; SD 
= 14.51; Italians: M = 44.88; SD = 15.23). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Imagebility ratings, scores’ averages. Bars represent standard error. 
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So for imageability ratings German and Italian participants have the same 
pattern: the pair containing both words concrete was judged as the easiest to imagine. 
Moreover the noun is stronger than the verb in determining the imageability of the 
sentence. 
 
 
7.5.2 Literality 
 
Concerning literality, we found that German participants rated the Abstract 
verb – Concrete noun  pairs as the ones that they would take most literally (M = 18.89; 
SD = 13.72), followed by the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 20.22; SD = 
18.12), by the Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M = 31.23; SD = 19.59), and 
finally by Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M = 56.95; SD = 19.01). 
Italian participants rated the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun pairs as the 
sentences that they would take most literally (M = 11.42; SD = 4.57), followed by the 
Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 31.33; SD = 13.11), by the Abstract Verb – 
Abstract Noun pairs (M = 59.42; SD = 13.63), and finally by Concrete Verb – Abstract 
Noun pairs (M = 69.50; SD = 11.78). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Literality ratings, scores’ averages. Bars represent standard error. 
Metaphoricity
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
ABSTRACTverb CONCRETEverb ABSTRACTverb CONCRETEverb
GER ITA
sc
o
re
s 
%
ABSTRACTnoun
CONCRETEnoun
The meaning of abstract words 
 145 
The sentences rated as more literal are the ones which contained a Concrete 
Verb plus a Concrete Noun (Italian participants) and the ones containing an Abstract 
Verb plus a Concrete Noun (German participants). Moreover both groups judged the 
combination Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun as the most metaphorical one. It’s worth 
noting that while the concrete noun meaning remains the same through the quadruples, 
the concrete verb meaning, as well as its concreteness/abstractness, changes through 
the quadruples, depending on the context. Just to give an example, the meaning of the 
verb “to grasp” is not the same in “grasping an apple” and in “grasping a concept 
(Parisi, personal communication). 
 
 
7.5.3 Quantity of Motion 
 
German participants rated the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun pairs as the ones 
that mainly elicited movement information (M = 34.29; SD = 13.95), followed by the 
Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M = 27.22; SD = 12.82), by the Abstract Verb – 
Abstract Noun pairs (M = 17.98; SD = 13.87) and finally by Abstract Verb – Concrete 
Noun pairs (M = 13.99; standard deviation = 7.39). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Motion ratings, scores’ averages. Bars represent standard error. 
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Interestingly, Italian participants’ pattern was different, as they rated the 
Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs as the ones that mainly elicited movement 
information (M = 42.56; SD = 13.28), followed by the Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun 
pairs (M = 35.05; SD = 12.24), by the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 
31.93; SD = 10.58) and finally by the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 
21.56; SD = 11.25). 
So both the groups judged the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun combination as 
the one that elicits less movement. The main difference concerns the combinations 
Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun vs. Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun combination, as 
while the former suggested the biggest amount of movement for Italian participants, 
the latter evoked the huger quantity of motion in German participants. 
 
 
7.5.4 Age of acquisition 
 
A number of studies (Gilhooly & Gilhooly, 1980; Zevin & Seidenberg, 2002) 
have demonstrated the validity of age of acquisition ratings, by showing that age rated 
by adults is the major independent predictor of the objective age-of-acquisition indices. 
In our study German participants rated the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun 
pairs as the firstly learnt ones (M = 7.82 years old; SD = 2.21), followed by the 
Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 8.64 years old; SD = 2.55), and finally by 
both Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs and Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs 
(M = 10.24 years old; SD = 2.35; M = 10.74 years old; SD = 1.95). 
In the same way, Italian participants rated the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun 
pairs as the earliest learnt ones (M = 6.63 years old; SD = 1.97), followed by the 
Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 8.33 years old; SD = 2.34), and finally by 
both Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs and Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs 
(M = 10.45 years old; SD = 2.09; M = 10.74 years old; SD = 2.25). 
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It seems that the different age of acquisition is explained by the noun: as shown 
in the literature on single word age of acquisition, the concrete noun is learned before 
than the abstract one. Consistently, we found that also sentences containing a concrete 
noun, even if in combination with an abstract verb, are acquired earlier than sentences 
containing an abstract noun. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Age of Acquisition ratings, scores’ averages. Bars represent standard 
error. 
 
 
7.5.5 Integrating behavioral results with pairs’ assessment 
 
Integrating the results on response times with the ones on ratings, it seems that 
the advantage for the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun combination can be mainly 
explained resting on its high imageability, low metaphoricity rate and precocious age 
of acquisition. But the same evaluations cannot account for the advantage of Abstract 
Verb – Abstract Noun combination. 
Going back to the predictions, according to a strictly modal theory results on 
response times should be explained by imageability rating. An approach more based 
on metaphors (Lakoff, 1987) should account for the behavioral results resting on 
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literality ratings. Both the hypotheses are not verified by our results on Abstract Verb – 
Abstract Noun condition. Finally, an approach proposing that concepts are generally 
couched in perceptual as well as in motor representations (Glenberg, 1997) would 
predict a relation between the behavioral data and the quantity of motion scores. This 
is not the case, as the results of the two groups are pretty different, and the 
faster/smaller amount of movement suggested by the sentence does not modulate the 
time to execute the semantic-motor task. 
An amodal theory would account for response times resting on age acquisition 
ratings but above all on association rate between verbs and nouns combinations. 
Therefore, the amodal hypothesis would account the advantage of both Concrete Verb 
plus Concrete Noun and  Abstract Verb plus Abstract Noun on the basis of the higher 
association rate of these pairs compared to the one of the mixed combinations. To 
check for this possibility, we calculated the familiarity scores averages for each 
conditions, for the 120 pairs selected for the behavioral experiment. German 
participants rated the Concrete Verb – Concrete Noun pairs as the most familiar (M = 
75.58; SD = 21.42), followed by the Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M = 73.50; 
SD = 20.64), by the Abstract Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M = 69.06; SD = 20.17) and 
by the Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 66.24; SD = 17.24).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Familiarity ratings, scores’ averages. Bars represent standard error. 
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As clearly shown by the data, the advantage of both Concrete Verb plus 
Concrete Noun and  Abstract Verb plus Abstract Noun pairs is not explained by 
familiarity. Besides, the low familiarity of Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun 
combination cannot account for its advantage on Concrete Verb – Abstract Noun 
condition. Focusing on Italian participants, they judged the Concrete Verb – Concrete 
Noun pairs as the most familiar (M = 75.02; SD = 16.51), followed by the Abstract 
Verb – Abstract Noun pairs (M = 74.77; SD = 14.99), by Concrete Verb – Abstract 
Noun (M = 74.43; SD = 15.07), and by Abstract Verb – Concrete Noun pairs (M = 
50.73; SD = 19.70). Again, the advantage of both the Concrete Verb –  Concrete Noun 
and  the Abstract Verb –Abstract Noun combinations on the mixed pairs is not 
explained by a supposed higher familiarity. 
The representational pluralism theory as well as the LASS theory would rest on 
imageability ratings to explain a generically faster processing of pairs containing both 
noun and verb as concrete (even if the same account doesn’t work for the abstract verb 
– abstract noun combination). However, since the task used in the present study is a 
linguistic one, they would predict fastest processing for the trials containing two 
abstract terms, because  the Abstract Verb plus Abstract Noun condition shares the 
same format with the task. The LASS would predict the same result because abstract 
sentence and the task are founded on the same coding, that is a linguistic one. 
Finally a theory based on an individual plus a social source for word meanings 
(Borghi & Cimatti, submitted a, submitted b) would account for response times results 
chiefly resting on age of acquisition ratings, as well as on the use of “social words”. 
Learning of both the concrete and abstract words is based on the same experiential 
modality, that is the systematic association with something else (Parisi, submitted). In 
the first case the earliest association experienced is that one with the referents of the 
word; in the case of abstract words, we firstly make experience of the association 
between the word and particular social-linguistic situations, that finally we’ll be able to 
tag with the word. Importantly these two learning mechanisms do not have a different 
status, and both are active over the time. Even if both kinds of words are experienced-
used in association with both sensori-motor and linguistic experiences (contexts, 
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circumstances), the very first learning, and “the most powerful” use, of concrete 
nouns-verbs and abstract nouns-verbs occur in associations with different contexts. 
This implies a sort of “experiential switch” occurring in the mixed conditions, that 
does not occur in the congruent ones. The cost of this “experiential switch” is mirrored 
by the data. 
 
 
7.6 Discussion 
 
As outlined in the introduction, different studies in the framework of embodied 
cognition tried to investigate abstractness, but they often focus on very specific cases: 
metaphorical-idiomatic sentences (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006), whose grammatical 
structure cannot be strong controlled in an experimental paradigm; sentences that can 
be mapped in a specific action schema, as abstract transfer sentences (Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008); sentences referring to very specific categories, 
such as time (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002); sentences whose meaning can be directly 
mapped on concrete objects (Lakoff, 1987). This heterogeneity makes it very tricky to 
compare and integrate the results of these study, as well as to generalize the findings to 
all abstract words. 
Compared to other studies, our study has the advantage of comparing not only 
abstract and concrete sentences, but also sentences which result from a mixture of 
abstract and concrete nouns and verbs. We believe this can represent an important step 
for a systematic investigation of abstraction. We used the quadruples as we intended to 
reason on different levels of abstractness: in our experimental design, in fact, we have 
every possible combination for motor verbs/non-motor verbs and graspable/non-
graspable objects. Finally, we used simple “transitive verb plus noun” pairs as firstly it 
was not possible to develop full sentences in a similar grammatical structure that 
fulfilled the criteria of the quadruples, and secondly since it allowed us to maintain a 
fixed and mirrored structure for German and Italian pairs.    
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1. Our study basically showed three main new results. Firstly we found an 
interaction between the kind of verb and the kind of noun. Both the abstract verb - 
abstract noun combinations and the concrete verb - concrete noun combinations  were 
processed faster than the mixed combinations. This effect does not allow to favour a 
modal rather than an amodal symbols theory. Nevertheless, as shown in the previous 
paragraph, results on imageability ratings do not support a strictly modal theory, and 
familiarity scores analyses do not match the predictions made by an amodal theory. 
The verb-noun  interaction (essentially the similar timing between the two congruent 
conditions) goes against the predictions of a representational pluralism theory (Dove, 
in press): given that the task is a linguistic ones, processing of abstract words should 
require less effort than processing of concrete words, as the latter are represented with 
a perceptual rather than with a propositional format. Similarly to the multiple semantic 
code approach, the LASS theory would predict that abstract words coding  should be 
linguistic, and would not require a deep simulation. As the task is a linguistic one, the 
processing of  abstract verb – abstract noun combination should be faster that the 
processing of concrete verb – concrete noun combination, contrarily to what we found. 
Finally Borghi and Cimatti (submitted a, submitted b), resting on the two different 
acquisition mechanisms, would predict an “experiential switch” in the mixed but not in 
the congruent conditions. As drawn in the previous paragraph, the very first learning 
and the strongest use of concrete nouns and concrete verbs take place in associations 
with the same experiences (that are different from the ones more powerfully associated 
with abstract nouns and abstract verbs), so when they occur together there is a 
facilitation on sentence processing. 
2. The second major results we found is the three ways interaction among the 
kind of language, the kind of verb and the kind of noun. Italian participants were 
generally slower than German ones, due to the specific inter-linguistic differences, but 
in neither of the two groups there was any significant difference between the no-mixed 
conditions. Consistently with our predictions of a cultural dependency of words use 
(achievable to test due to the different languages grammatical structure), the post-hoc 
analyses showed that the interaction was mainly due to the modulation of German and 
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Italian languages on mixed combinations. Curiously German and Italian students’ 
results on mixed combinations seem to be opposite: with abstract verbs and concrete 
nouns combinations German participants were faster than with the concrete verbs and 
abstract nouns combinations. Italian participants showed a mirror pattern. 
All the above mentioned theories would expect  a slower processing for the 
mixed conditions rather than for the congruent ones, even if due to different reasons: to 
different associative rates between the linguistic symbols combined in a pair (amodal 
theory), or to different ease to simulate the word referent (modal theory), or to 
different kinds of formats (Dove, in press), or to a linguistic versus a deeper coding 
(LASS). They would also predict a  similar time of processing for both the abstract 
verb-concrete noun and for the concrete verb- abstract noun pairs. On the contrary, we 
found different timings for the mixed combinations, depending on the first world 
appearing in the sentence. 
It’s difficult to account for this result if we do not consider that German 
participants firstly saw the noun and then the verb, while Italian ones saw the same 
combination in a reverse order. Thus, participants were faster when the first word 
shown in the sentence was a concrete one, regardless of its grammatical class (verb vs. 
noun) and of the spoken language (German vs. Italian). We think this is the most 
plausible explanation as the abstractness vs. concreteness of the first word is the only 
variable that changed between the two mixed samples. In fact, even if we did not use 
literal translations across languages, the pairs were balanced for familiarity and 
probability of use. Of course, we are not arguing that the processing of the words on a 
sentence is “only” serial, but that the specific task (that is, judging the sensibility of the 
sentence as soon as possible) in a certain sense obliged participants to a sequential 
processing of the words in the sentence. Response times were shorter both when a 
concrete noun (referring to a manipulable object) preceded  an abstract verb, as when a 
concrete verb (referring to an action performed by the hand) preceded an abstract 
noun. 
We think that there are two possible explanations of this advantage. The first 
relies on language acquisition data: the effect could depend on the fact that concrete 
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words are learnt earlier than the abstract ones, thus they result more familiar than 
abstract ones. The other possible explanation rests on the idea that two different 
acquisition mechanisms underlie concrete and abstract words (Borghi & Cimatti, 
submitted a): as drawn above, with concrete words firstly we experience the concrete 
entities and then we tag their referents using linguist labels. In the case of abstract 
words, instead, we initially learn the labels, afterward we “tag” them with our sensori-
motor experience, assembling a set of experiences. Moreover, there are more or less 
complicated and socially constructed ways of using the words: learning to use a word 
such as “lipstick” is simpler then learning to use a word as “justice”. The difference 
between “lipstick” and “justice” could be paraphrased as less or more difficult to learn. 
So it’s more difficult to process a sentence where abstract words are mixed together 
with concrete ones (as shown by the first result we found), and even more difficult to 
process the same mixed combination if a) the first word to process was difficult to 
learn and b) it’s now part of a complex net of situations, objects, human activities and 
so on: this is the case of the abstract word. 
3. The third crucial result is the interaction we found between the kind of 
language and the kind of verb. German participants were faster with abstract verbs 
while Italian ones were slower with the same kind of verbs, regardless of the kind of 
noun that preceded or followed the verb. Integrating the two last findings, it seems that 
the structure of the sentence modulates its processing more strongly than the linguistic 
category (noun vs. verb). Nevertheless there is also an effect of the linguistic category 
(verb vs. noun), as verbs are more powerful than nouns in influencing subjects 
responses. Fascinatingly this result could be in keeping with the idea that the 
grammatical structure of a language shapes to some extent its speakers’ perception of 
the world (Boroditsky, 2003; Gentner, 2003, Mirolli & Parisi, in press). 
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7.7 Future Work 
 
The general aim of the project is to assess whether processing abstract words 
modulates the activity of the motor system as processing concrete words does. To 
investigate further this issue we are planning to use also fMRI technique. We’ll use the 
selected quadruples. We expect to find a large activation in motor and premotor areas 
for motor acts containing graspable objects, but also some lighter effects in the mixed 
conditions. For fMRI analyses we’ll use the non-motor (verbs)/non-graspable (objects) 
combinations as a baseline condition for the estimation of contrasts. We are going to 
specifically investigate the change of signal in the individual motor areas (as opposed 
to a whole brain analysis). This will be facilitated by a preceding localizer task, that 
can be used to identify the individual site of the motor areas (primary motor area, M1; 
ventral premotor cortex, vPMC; dorsal premotor cortex, dPMC; supplementary motor 
area, SMA). 
Besides we predict that, given that abstract words acquisition occurs with the 
mediation of other words, abstract words activate more than concrete ones linguistic 
areas, as they should evoke more phonoarticulatory movements. As far as meaning is 
concerned, we hypothesize that abstract words meanings would activate more areas in 
a diffuse and multimodal way (Rüschemeyer, Brass & Friederici, 2007). Thus far, the 
predictions of the LASS theory (Barsalou et al., 2008), of the theory that words are 
tools (Borghi & Cimatti, submitted b) and of the representational pluralism theory 
(Dove, in press) are similar. However, the latter would assume a differential activation 
of the frontal areas, given that in order to use propositional symbols inferencing and 
reasoning are implied.  
We believe the brain imaging study, together with the behavioral study we have 
conducted, will contribute to shed a new light on the fascinating issue of the 
relationship between concrete and abstract words.  
 
 
 8 General discussion 
 
 
 
The results found in the first two studies are in line with the predictions of the 
embodied theory. Namely, they suggest that the comprehension of the meaning of 
verb-noun pairs implies a mental simulation. This simulation is quite detailed, as it is 
modulated by the kind of effector the sentence refers to (hand, foot, mouth), by the 
specific hand (dominant, non-dominant) the action expressed by the sentence typically 
involves, and by the kind of  effector used for responding. 
In the first study we found that “mouth sentences” were processed faster than 
“hand sentences” when participants were responding with the microphone rather than 
with the pedal. The same facilitation effect was obtained with “foot sentences” 
compared to “hand sentences” when participants were responding with the pedal rather 
than with the microphone. Importantly, this modulation occurred even with a task in 
which the information related to the involved effector was really irrelevant, such as the 
evaluation of the sensibility of sentences. 
In the second study we found an advantage of the dominant hand restricted to 
sensible sentences related both to hand and to mouth. Significantly, the facilitation of 
the dominant hand with “hand” and with “mouth sentences” was present only with 
sensible sentences, thus confirming the hypothesis that it was due to a simulation 
process, and not to a general advantage of the right over the left hand. Finally, in the 
first experiment of the second study, in which sensible sentences referred to actions 
involving both hand and foot, we found slower response times with the right than with 
the left hand. 
Thus these studies show that during sentence comprehension we are sensitive 
not just to the effector involved, but also to the goal expressed by the sentence, 
consistently with the idea of motor resonance and with ideomotor theories (e.g., Prinz, 
1997). As a matter of fact, in both the studies we found a wider difference between 
Language and Embodiment 
 
 
 
156
hand related sentences and foot related sentences than between hand related sentences 
and mouth related sentences. Evidence indicating that foot-verbs have wider cortical 
distributions compared to mouth- and hand-verbs also accounts for these results 
(Pulvermüller et al., 2001). These findings confirm that we simulate the action not only 
at a proximal level, i.e. at the level of effector, but also at a distal level; that is, that we 
are sensitive both to the effector referred to by the sentence and to the goal the 
sentence expresses. To clarify: a mouth-action, such as “licking an ice cream”, 
typically implies / follows a manual action such as, for example, “grasping the ice 
cream”. Moreover, these studies support the hypothesis of the existence of a strict 
interrelationship between hand and mouth actions and it is in keeping with recent 
studies showing that language evolves from gestures and manual actions (e.g., 
Corballis, 2002). 
 
The results found across the third and the forth studies demonstrate a reciprocal 
effect of comprehension on the use of the motor system both in action understanding 
and action production (see MOSAIC model, Hamilton et al., 2004). They reveal that 
the simulation activated by language is sensitive to different objects’ weight; they 
show as well that language comprehension requires a simulation process that taps 
perception and action systems. 
These two studies were explicitly designed to produce a contrast effect between 
the modules used during the ancillary task, the language processing task, and the 
modules used during the tasks directly involving the motor system, that is the weight 
judgment task and the lifting task. That is, detecting the effect requires that the 
ancillary task uses a MOSAIC module (that is likely to be needed during the weight 
judgment as well the motor task), and that this ancillary task be compared to one that 
does not use that MOSAIC module. 
In the first study we specifically investigated if the mere act of comprehending 
language could affect perception in a weight judgment task. We found that when 
observers were required to practice lifting large and small boxes before the reading and 
judgment task, there was a dramatic increase in the correlation between judged and 
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observed weight. Crucially, for the “light videos” (depicting lifts of light objects), the 
“light sentences” (describing the lifting of light objects) produced the lowest 
correlations, whereas for the “heavy videos”, “heavy sentences” produced the lowest 
correlations. This interference effect suggests that language comprehension calls upon 
and thereby affects perception system. 
In the second study we asked if the mere act of comprehending language 
affects also the production of action. If language comprehension affects the motor 
system, then the comprehension task should affect kinematics parameters in bimanual 
boxes lifting. Participants listened to sentences describing the lifting of a “heavy” or 
“light weight”. Then they were required to lift and place different weighted boxes. We 
analyzed kinematics parameters detected immediately after having grasped the box. 
The interaction found on times analyses demonstrates an interference effect between 
the kind of sentence and the kind of box to be lifted. This effect is analogous to the one 
obtained in the previous study and corroborates the hypothesis that language can 
activate a simulation which is sensitive to intrinsic object properties such as weight. 
Moreover, both the results can be accommodated by the MOSAIC model. 
Concerning the study on effects of language in weight perception, we found that 
comprehending the sentence describing a lift requires a simulation using the motor 
system. This simulation temporarily occupies a particular module (e.g., the module for 
lifting a 250 g weight) rendering it unavailable for use in the judging the weight of the 
box observed in the video. Variability of the simulated weights (and consequently, 
variability in the modules used in the judgment task) reduces the correlation between 
judged weight and observed weight. Because the modules used in simulating the light 
sentences are unlikely to be used in judging the heavy weights (and vice versa), the 
correlation is most reduced when the sentence is about lifting objects similar to those 
observed. Analogously, as to the study on the effects of language in lifting movement, 
our results are consistent with the operation of the MOSAIC model since we found that 
participants’ time delay was larger when the weight implied by the sentence and the 
weight of the box they lifted were similar compared to when they were dissimilar. 
Namely, when a MOSAIC module is occupied by an ancillary task (in this case, 
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simulation in the service of language  comprehension), integration of force across the 
remaining relevant modules will be biased. 
 
All these findings favour a fully embodied theory of cognition and language. 
The basic tenet of this theory is that all forms of cognition are grounded in our 
sensorimotor system and are constrained by the kind of body we have and by its 
relationship with the particular environment in which our species has evolved and in 
which we currently inhabit. But, what about words that do not correspond to any things 
in the material world? The well known problem of the meanings of abstract words is 
one of the main challenges of  embodied theories (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). So far, 
evidence has shown that abstract words refer metaphorically to concrete referents 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008), that abstract sentences 
recruit the motor system (Glenberg et al., 2008), that abstract concepts elicit situations 
and simulations of internal states (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). This evidence, 
though compelling, refers only to a subset of phenomena, so its findings are hardly 
generalizable. 
The aim of the fifth study was to use a paradigm suitable to reason on different 
levels of abstractness. We examined combinations of transitive verbs (abstract, 
concrete) and nouns (abstract, concrete), focusing on two syntactically different 
languages (German, Italian). We found that compatible combinations were processed 
similarly and faster than mixed combinations. Instead, processing of mixed pairs was 
modulated by the specific language: when concrete words preceded abstract ones 
responses were faster, regardless of grammatical class. Finally, materials were rated on 
familiarity, imageability, literality, age of acquisition. A strictly modal theory doesn’t 
explain the data, as imageability did not correlate with response times. An amodal 
theory was also disconfirmed since familiarity did not explain the results. Two further 
recent proposals, representational pluralism (Dove, in press) and LASS theory 
(Barsalou et al., 2008), don’t account for the data, as for a linguistic task they would 
predict faster processing for abstract compatible pairs than for concrete compatible 
pairs. An alternative explanation is that linguistic modal experience plays a more 
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relevant role for abstract than for concrete words (Borghi & Cimatti, submitted a). 
Therefore the higher difficulty of abstract first words reflects the way they are 
acquired: differently from concrete words, with abstract ones we first learn linguistic 
labels, then we “tag” them with sparse sensorimotor experiences. 
 
Summing up, the results found across the five studies suggest that in order to 
explain words comprehension it’s necessary to consider language grounding in the 
sensorimotor system, but also the role played by the linguistic experience. As proposed 
by Borghi and Cimatti (submitted a), to account also for the comprehension of abstract 
words its is necessary an extension of classical embodied theory. Such an extension 
could take place without assuming neither a non embodied source of cognition nor the 
existence of amodal mental entities.  
In order to solve problem of so called abstract concepts the authors suggest that 
we basically need three notions: concept, word/tool and meaning. A concept is an 
entity (the re-enhancement of the neural pattern activated when we perceive or interact 
with objects and entities) which is formed through individual bodily and modal 
experience. A word/tool is a thing that one can use to do something in the world 
according to a social rule. The meaning of a word/tool is the set of rules that regulates 
its use in the language. 
Accordingly, Borghi and Cimatti (submitted a) highlight that words are not 
“simple signals for expressing internal and private concepts; words are the unique and 
external things that allow us to entertain apparently amodal forms of cognition. […] 
the uneasiness that any embodied theory of cognition feels when explaining abstract 
words can be mitigated (and perhaps solved) by stressing the social nature of language 
and its impact on cognitive activity” (p. 28). Thus this proposal “is still an embodied 
theory of cognition, that is, a theory of human cognitive activity based on body 
experience” but with also a particular attention to “social experience […] as a typical 
human embodied experience. Embodied experience is not closed inside the boundaries 
of our body. The social linguistic experience is an embodied experience too” (Borghi 
& Cimatti, submitted a, p. 28). 
Language and Embodiment 
 
 
 
160
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 References 
 
 
Alloway, T.P., Corley, M., & Ramscar, M. (2006). Seeing ahead: Experience and 
language in spatial perspective. Memory and Cognition. 34, 380-386. 
Altarriba, J., & Bauer, L. M. (2004). The distinctiveness of emotion concepts: a 
comparison between emotion, abstract, and concrete words. America Journal of 
Psychology, 117, 389-410. 
Altarriba, J., Bauer, L. M., & Benvenuto, C. (1999). Concreteness, context availability, 
and imageability ratings and word associations for abstract, concrete, and 
emotion words. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments & Computers, 31, 
578-602. 
Arbib, M. A. (2005). From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An 
evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
28,105-124.  
Aziz-Zadeh, L., Wilson, S., Rizzolatti, G., & Iacoboni, M. (2006) A comparison of 
premotor areas activated by action observation and action phrases. Current 
Biology, 16, 1818-23. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1999a). Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22, 577-609. 
Barsalou, L.W. (1999b). Language comprehension: Archival memory or preparation 
for situated action? Discourse Processes, 28, 61-80. 
Barsalou, L.W. (2008a). Cognitive and neural contributions to understanding the 
conceptual system. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 91-95. 
Barsalou, L.W. (2008b). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-
645. 
Barsalou, L. W., Santos, A., Simmons, W. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2008). Language and 
simulation in conceptual processing. In M. De Vega, A. M. Glenberg, & A. C. 
Language and Embodiment 
 162
Graesser (Eds.). Symbols, embodiment, and meaning (pp. 245–284). Oxford, 
U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
Barsalou, L.W., Simmons, W. K., Barbey, A.K., & Wilson, C.D. (2003). Grounding 
conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 7, 84-91. 
Barsalou, L.W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. 
Pecher and R. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and 
action in memory, language, and thought, pp. 129-163 . New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Barr, R.A., & Caplan, L.J. (1987). Category representations and their implications for 
category structure. Memory & Cognition, 10, 82-93. 
Bekkering, H., Wohlschläger, & Gattis, A.M. (2000). Imitation of gestures in children 
is goal-directed. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53A, 153-164. 
Bergen, B.K. (2005). Experimental methods for simulation semantics. In M. Gonzalez-
Marquez, I. Mittelberg, S. Coulson, and M.J. Spivey (eds.) Methods in 
Cognitive Linguistics. Ithaca: John Benjamins. 
Bergen, B.K., & Wheeler, K.B. (2005). Sentence understanding engages motor 
processes. Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society. 
Borghi, A.M. (2004). Objects concepts and action: Extracting affordances from 
objects’ parts. Acta Psychologica, 115, 1, 69-96. 
Borghi, A.M. (2005). Object concepts and action. In D. Pecher & R.A. Zwaan (Eds). 
Grounding Cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, 
and thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Borghi, A.M., & Caramelli, N. (2003). Situation Bounded Conceptual Organization in 
Children: From Action to Spatial Relations. Cognitive Development, 18, 40-60. 
Borghi, A.M., & Cimatti, F. (submitted a) Words are not words – For an extension of 
embodied theories of language and cognition. 
Borghi, A.M., & Cimatti, F. (submitted b) Words as tools and the problem of abstract 
word meanings. 
References 
 163 
Borghi, A.M., Glenberg, A.M., & Kaschak, M.P. (2004). Putting words in perspective. 
Memory and cognition, 32, 863-873. 
Borghi, A.M., & Scorolli, C. (2009). Language comprehension and hand motion 
simulation. Human Movement Science, 28, 12-27. 
Boroditsky, L. (2000). Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding time through spatial 
metaphors. Cognition, 75, 1-28. 
Boroditsky, L., & Ramscar, M. (2002). The roles of body and mind in abstract thought. 
Psychological Science, 13, 185–188. 
Boronat, C.B., Buxbaum, L.J., Coslett, H.B., Tang, K., Saffran, E.M., Kimberg, D.Y., 
& Detre, J.A. (2005). Distinctions between manipulation and function 
knowledge of objects: evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 23, 361-73. 
Borreggine, K.L., & Kaschak, M. (2006). The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect: 
Its all in the timing. Cognitive Science, 30, 1097-1112. 
Bosbach, S., Cole, J., Prinz, W., & Knoblich, G. (2005). Inferring another’s 
expectation from action: the role of peripheral sensation. Nature, 8, 1295-1297. 
Boulanger, V., Roy, A.C., Paulignan, Y., Deprez, V., Jeannerod, M., & Nazir, T.A. 
(2006). Cross-talk between language processes and overt motor behavior in the 
first 200 msec of Processing. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 18, 1607-1615. 
Brenner, E., & Smeets, J.B.J. (1996). Size illusion influences how we lift but not how 
we grasp an object. Experimental Brain Research, 111, 473-476. 
Brouwer, A.M., Georgiou, G., Glover, S., & Castiello, U. (2006). Adjusting reach to 
lift movements to sudden visible changes in target’s weight. Experimental 
Brain Research, 173, 629-636. 
Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., Fink, G., Fadiga, R., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. Seitz, R., 
Zilles, K., Rizzolatti, G., & Freund, H.J. (2001). Action observation activates 
premotor and parietal areas in a somatotopic manner: An fMRI study. European 
Journal of Neuroscience, 13, 400-404. 
Buccino, G., Riggio, L., Melli, G., Binkofski, F., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). 
Listening to action related sentences modulates the activity of the motor 
Language and Embodiment 
 164
system: A combined TMS and behavioral study. Cognitive Brain Research, 24, 
355-63. 
Burgess, C., & Lund, K., (1997). Modelling parsing constraints with high-dimensional 
context space. Language and Cognitive Process, 12, 177–210. 
Caramazza, A., Hillis, A. E., Rapp, B. C., & Romani, C. (1990). The multiple 
semantics hypothesis: Multiple confusions? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 7, 
161–189. 
Casasanto, D., & Boroditsky, L. (2008). Time in the Mind: Using space to think about 
time. Cognition, 106, 579-593. 
Collins, A.M., & Loftus, E.F. (1975). A spreading activation theory of semantic 
processing. Psychological Review, 82, 407-428. 
Connell, L. (2007). Representing object colour in language comprehension. Cognition, 
102, 476-485. 
Chao L.L., & Martin A. (2000). Representation of manipulable man-made objects in 
the dorsal stream. NeuroImage, 12, 478-484. 
Clark, H. (1973). The language-as-a-fixed-effect fallacy: critique of language statistics 
in psychological research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
12, 335–359. 
Coleman, E.B. (1964). Generalizing to a language population. Psychological Reports, 
14, 219–226. 
Corballis, M.C. (2002). From hand to mouth: The origin of language. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Crutch, S. J., & Warrington, E. K. (2005). Abstract and concrete concepts have 
structurally different representational frameworks. Brain, 128, 615–627. 
Damasio, A. R. (1989). Time-locked multi-regional retroactivation: A  systems-level 
proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. Cognition, 33, 25–
62. 
De Vega, M., Robertson, D.A., Glenberg, A.M., Kaschak, M.P., & Rinck, M. (2004). 
On doing two things at once: Temporal constraints on action in language 
comprehension. Memory and Cognition, 32, 1033-1043.  
References 
 165 
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). 
Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain 
Research, 91, 176-180. 
Dove, G. (in press) Beyond perceptual symbols: A call for representational pluralism. 
Cognition. 
Dunabeitia, J.A., Avilés, A., Afonso, O., Scheepers, C., & Carreiras, M. (2009). 
Qualitative differences in the representation of abstract versus concrete words: 
Evidence from the visual-word paradigm. Cognition, 110, 284-292. 
Eastough, D., & Edwards, M. (2007). Movement kinematics in prehension are affected 
by grasping objects of different mass. Experimental Brain Research, 176, 193-
198. 
Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2000). Visuomotor neurons: 
ambiguity of the discharge or `motor` perception? International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 35, 165-177. 
Fischer, M., & Zwaan, R.A. (2008). Embodied language: A review of the role of the 
motor system in language comprehension. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 61, 825-850. 
Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2004). Action as a binding key to multisensory integration. 
In G. Calvert, C. Spence, & B. E. Stein (Eds.), Handbook of multisensory 
processes. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought, New York, Crowell. 
Fodor, J.A. (1998). Concepts. Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford University 
Press. 
Fogassi, L., & Ferrari, P.F. (2007). Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Embodied 
Language. Current directions in psychological science, 16, 136-141. 
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P.F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). 
Parietal lobe: From action organization to intention understanding. Science, 
308, 662–667. 
Foltz, P. W., Kintsch, W., & Landauer, T. K. (1998). The measurement of textual 
Coherence with Latent Semantic Analysis. Discourse Processes, 25, 285-307. 
Language and Embodiment 
 166
Gallese, V. (2007). Before and below Theory of mind: Embodied simulation and the 
neural correlates of social cognition. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 
Biological Science, 362, 659-669. 
Gallese, V. (2008). Mirror neurons and the social nature of language: The neural 
exploitation hypothesis. Social Neuroscience, 3, 317-333. 
Gallese V., & Goldman A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-
reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 493-501. 
Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain’s concept: the role of the sensorimotor 
system in conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 21, 455-479. 
Gentilucci, M. (2003a). Object motor representation and language. Experimental Brain 
Research, 153, 260-265. 
Gentilucci, M. (2003b). Grasp observation influences speech production. European 
Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 179-184. 
Gentilucci, M., Benuzzi, F., Bertolani, L., Daprati, E., & Gangitano, M. (2000). 
Language and motor control. Experimental Brain Research, 133, 468-490. 
Gentilucci, M, Chieffi, S., Scarpa, M., & Castiello, U. (1992). Temporal coupling 
between transport and grasp components during prehension movements: effects 
of visual perturbation. Behavioral and brain research, 47, 71-82. 
Gentilucci, M., & Corballis, M. C. (2006).  From manual gesture to speech: A gradual 
transition.  Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 30, 949-960. 
Gentilucci, M., & Gangitano, M. (1998). Influence of automatic word reading on 
motor control. European Journal of Neuroscience, 10, 752-756. 
Gentner, D. (2003). Why we’re so smart. In D. Gentner e S. Goldin-Meadow (a cura 
di). Language in mind. (pp. 195-235). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gibbs, R.W. (2003). Embodied experience and linguistic meaning. Brain and 
Language. 84, 1-15. 
Gibbs, R., & Steen, G. (1999). Metaphor in cognitive linguistics. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
Gibson, J.J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
References 
 167 
Gilhooly, K. J., & Gilhooly, M. L. (1980). The validity of age-of-acquisition ratings. 
British Journal of Psychology, 71, 105-110. 
Glenberg, A. M. (1997). What Memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 1-
55. 
Glenberg, A.M., & Kaschak, M.P. (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychonomic 
Bulletin and Review, 9, 558-565. 
Glenberg, A. M.,  & Robertson, D. A. (1999). Indexical understanding of instructions. 
Discourse Processes, 28, 1-26. 
Glenberg, A. M.,  & Robertson, D. A. (2000). Symbol grounding and meaning: A 
comparison of high-dimensional and embodied theories of meaning. Journal of 
Memory & Language, 43, 379-401. 
Glenberg, A.M., Sato, M., & Cattaneo, L. (2008). Use-induced motor plasticity affects 
the processing of abstract and concrete language. Current Biology, 18, 7, R1-
R2. 
Glenberg, A.M., Sato, M., Cattaneo, L., Riggio, L., Palumbo,D. & Buccino, G. (2008). 
Processing Abstract Language Modulates Motor System Activity. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61, 905-919. 
Glover, S. (2004). Separate visual representations in the planning and control of action. 
Behavioral Brain Science, 27, 3–78. 
Glover, S., & Dixon, P. (2002). Semantics affects the planning but not the control of 
grasping. Experimental Brain Research, 146, 383–387. 
Glover, S., Rosenbaum, D.A., Graham, J., & Dixon P. (2004). Grasping the meaning 
of words. Experimental Brain Research, 154, 103-108. 
Goldstone, R. L., & Barsalou, L. W. (1998). Reuniting perception and conception. 
Cognition, 65, 231–262. 
Goodale, M.A. (1998). Visuomotor control: Where does vision end and action begin? 
Current Biology, 8, R 489–R 491. 
Grafton, S. T., Fadiga, L., Arbib, M. B., & Rizzolatti, G. (1997). Premotor Cortex 
Activation during Observation and Naming of Familiar Tools. Neuroimage 6, 
231-236. 
Language and Embodiment 
 168
Hamilton, A., Joyce, D.W., Flanagan, J.R., Frith, C.D., & Wolpert, D.M. (2007). 
Kinematic cues in perceptual weight judgment and their origins in box lifting. 
Psychological Research, 71, 13-21. 
Hamilton, A., Wolpert, D., & Frith, U. (2004). Your Own Action Influences How You 
Perceive Another Person's Action. Current Biology, 14, 493-498. 
Hauk, O., Johnsrude, I., & Pulvermüller, F. (2004). Somatotopic Representation of 
Action Words in Human Motor and Premotor Cortex. Neuron, 41, 301–307. 
Hjelmslev, L. (1975). Résumé of a theory of language. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin 
Press.  
Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Ascherslebenm, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). The Theory of 
Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 849-878. 
Jackson, S.R., & Shaw, A. (2000). The ponzo illusion affects grip-force but not grip-
aperture scaling during prehension movements. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology : Human Perception And Performance, 26, 418–423. 
Jeannerod, M. (1981). Intersegmental coordination during reaching at natural visual 
objects. In: Attention and Performance IX, edited by Long J and Baddeley A. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 153–168. 
Jeannerod, M. (2007). Motor cognition. What actions tell to the self. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Jeannerod, M., Arbib, M.A., Rizzolatti, G., & Sakata, H. (1995). Grasping objects: the 
cortical mechanisms of visuomotor transformation. Trends in Neurosciences, 
18, 314-320. 
Jenmalm, P, & Johansson, R.S. (1997). Visual and Somatosensory Information about 
Object Shape Control Manipulative Fingertip Forces. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17, 4486–4499. 
Jenmalm, P., Schmitz, C., Forssberg, H., & Ehrsson, H.H. (2006). Lighter or heavier 
than predicted: neural correlates of corrective mechanisms during erroneously 
programmed lifts. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 9015-9021. 
References 
 169 
Johansson, R.S., & Westling, G. (1984). Roles of glabrous skin receptors and 
sensorimotor memory in automatic control of precision grip when lifting 
rougher and more slippery objects. Experimental Brain Research, 56, 550–564. 
Johansson, R.S., & Westling, G. (1988). Coordinated isometric muscle commands 
adequately and erroneously programmed for the weight during lifting task with 
precision grip. Experimental Brain Research, 71, 59-71. 
Kaschak, M. P., & Glenberg, A. M. (2000). Constructing meaning: The role of 
affordances and grammatical constructions in sentence comprehension. Journal 
of Memory & Language, 43, 508-529. 
Kaschak, M.P., Madden, C.J., Therriault, D.J., Yaxley, R.H., Aveyard, M., Blanchard 
A.A., & Zwaan, R.A. (2005). Perception of motion affects language processing, 
Cognition, 94, B79–B89. 
Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cambridge, MA: Mit 
Press. 
Kemmerer, D. (2006). Action verbs, argument structure constructions, and the mirror 
neuron system. In M. Arbib (Ed.), Action to language via the mirror neuron 
system, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp 347-373. 
Kemmerer, D., Gonzalez Castillo, J., Talavage, T., Patterson, S., & Wiley, C. (2008). 
Neuroanatomical distribution of five semantic components of verbs: Evidence 
from fMRI. Brain and Language, 107, 16-43.. 
Lafuente de, V. & Romo, R. (2004). Language Abilities of Motor Cortex, Neuron, 41, 
178-180. 
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about 
the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: the Embodied mind and its 
challenge to western thought. New York: Basic Books. 
Language and Embodiment 
 170
Landauer, T.K., & Dumais, S.T. (1997). A solution to Plato’s problem: The latent 
semantic analysis theory of acquisition, induction, and representation of 
knowledge. Psychological Review, 104, 211-240. 
Landauer, T., McNamara, D.S., Dennis, S. & Kintsch, W. (2006). LSA: A road to 
meaning. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Liberman, A. M., & Mattingly, I. G. (1985). The motor theory of speech perception 
revised. Cognition, 21, 1-36. 
Lindemann, O., Stenneken, P., van Schie, H. T., & Bekkering, H. (2006). Semantic 
activation in action planning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 633–
643. 
Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. In P.H. Nidditch (Ed.), 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Original work published 1690). 
Longo, M.R., Kosobud, A., & Bertenthal, B.I. (2008). Automatic imitation of 
biomechanically possible and impossible actions: effects of priming 
movements versus goals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 34, 489-501. 
Louwerse, M., & Jeuniaux, P. (in press). Language comprehension is both embodied 
and symbolic. In M. De Vega, A.M. Glenberg, & A.C. Graesser (Eds.). 
Embodiment and meaning: A debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacWhinney, B. (1999). The emergence of language from embodiment. In B. 
MacWhinney (ed.). The emergence of language. London: Erlbaum (pp. 213-
256). 
Mahon, B.Z., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A Critical Look at the Embodied Cognition 
Hypothesis and a New Proposal for Grounding Conceptual Content. Journal of 
Physiology - Paris, 102, 59-70. 
Martin, A. (2007). The representation of object concepts in the brain. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 58, 25-45. 
Martin A, & Chao, L.L. (2001). Semantic memory and the brain: Structure and 
processes. Current Opinion in Neurobiology -Cognitive Neuroscience-, 11, 
194-201,. 
References 
 171 
Martin, A., Ungerleider L.G., & Haxby J. V. (2000), Category-specificity and the 
brain: The sensory - motor model of semantic representations of objects. In The 
Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd Edition. Gazzaniga MS (Ed), Cambridge: MIT 
Press, pp. 1023-1036. 
Martin, A., Wiggs, C. L., Ungerleider, L. G., & Haxby, J. V. (1996). Neural correlates 
of category-specific knowledge. Nature 379, 649-652. 
McWhinney, B. (1999). The emergence of language from embodiment. In The 
emergence of language, B. MacWhinney, London: Erlbaum, pp. 213-256. 
Murphy, G.L. (2002). The big book of concepts. Cambridge: MIT. 
Milner, A.D., & Goodale, M.A. (1993). Visual pathways to perception and action. In: 
Hicks, T.P., Molotchniko,V. S., Ono, T. (eds). Progress in brain research, vol 
95. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Mirolli, M., & Parisi, D. (in press). Towards a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics: The 
Role of Language as a Cognitive Tool. New Ideas in Psychology. 
Nelson, D.L., & Schreiber, T.A. (1992). Word concreteness and word structure as 
independent determinants of recall. Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 237-
260. 
Newell, A., & Simon, H.A. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols 
and search. Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, 19, 
113-126. 
Oldfield, R.C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh 
Inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9, 91-113. 
Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery and verbal processes. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston. 
Paivio, A., Yuille, J.C., & Madigan, S.A. (1986). Concreteness, imagery and 
meaningfulness values for 925 words. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
Monograph Supplement, 76, 3, part 2. 
Parisi, D. (submitted). Two problems of the received view of language and how to deal 
with them. 
Language and Embodiment 
 172
Parisi, D., Borghi, A.M., Di Ferdinando, A., & Tsiotas, G. (2005). Meaning and motor 
actions: Behavioral and Artificial Life evidence. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 28, 35-36. 
Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L.W. (2003). Verifying different-modality 
properties for concepts produces switching costs. Psychological Science, 14, 
119-124. 
Pecher, D., & Zwaan, R.A. (2005). Grounding cognition. The role of perception and 
action in memory, language, and thinking. Cambridge University Press.  
Pezzulo, G., & Castelfranchi, C. (2007). The symbol detachment problem. Cognitive 
Processes, 8, 115-131. 
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 9, 129-154. 
Prinz, J. J. (2002). Furnishing the mind: Concepts and their perceptual basis. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pulvermüller, F. (2003). The neuroscience of language: On brain circuits of words and 
serial order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pulvermüller, F. (2005). Brain mechanism linking language and action. Nature 
Publishing Group, 6, 576-582. 
Pulvermüller, F., Härle, M., & Hummel, F. (2001). Walking or talking? Behavioral 
and electrophysiological correlates of action verb processing. Brain and 
language, 78, 143-168. 
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1973). What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain: A Critique of 
Mental Imagery. Psychological Bulletin, 80, 1-24. 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analogue media versus tacit knowledge. 
Psychological Review, 87, 16-45. 
Pylyshyn Z.W. (1986). Computation and cognition, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1999) Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive 
impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 341-
423. 
References 
 173 
Richardson, D. C., Spivey, M. J., Barsalou, L. W., & McRae, K. (2003). Spatial 
representations activated during real-time comprehension of verbs. Cognitive 
Science, 27, 767-780. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, MA (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in 
Neurosciences, 21, 188-194. 
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror neuron system. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 27, 169-192.  
Rüschemeyer, S.A., Brass, M., & Friederici, A.D. (2007). Comprehending 
Prehending: Neural Correlates of Processing Verbs with Motor Stems Source. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 855-865. 
Saffran, E.M., Coslett, H., Martin, N., & Boronat, C.B (2003). Access to knowledge 
from pictures but not words in a patient with progressive fluent aphasia. 
Language and Cognitive Processes, 18, 725-757. 
Saussure, F de. (1959). Course in General Linguistics. Eds. Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw. 
Schwanenflugel, P. (1991) Contextual constraint and lexical processing. In G. B. 
Simpson (Ed.), Understanding word and sentence. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Schwanenflugel, P.J., & Shoben, E.J. (1983). Differential context effects in the 
comprehension of abstract and concrete verbal materials. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 82-102 
Scorolli, C., & Borghi, A. (2007). Sentence comprehension and action: Effector 
specific modulation of the motor system. Brain research, 1130, 119-124. 
Scorolli, C., Borghi, A.M., & Glenberg, A. (2009). Language-Induced Motor Activity 
in bi-manual Object Lifting. Experimental Brain Research, 193, 43-53. 
Scorolli, C., Glenberg, A., & Borghi, A. (2007). Effects of language on the perception 
and on the production of a lifting movement. IV Annual Meeting of Italian 
Association of Cognitive Science, Rome. 
Smeets, J.B.J., & Brenner, E. (1999). A new view on grasping, Motor Control, 3, 237-
271. 
Language and Embodiment 
 174
Smith, L.B. (2005). Cognition as a dynamic system: Principles from embodiment. 
Developmental Review, 25, 278-298. 
Smith E.R., & Semin G.R. (2007) Situated Social Cognition. Current Direction In 
Psychological Science, 16, 132-135. 
Spivey, M.J., & Geng, J. J. (2001). Oculomotor mechanisms activated by imagery and 
memory: eye movements to absent objects. Psychological Research, 65, 235-
241.  
Stanfield, R.A., & Zwaan, R.A. (2001). The effect of implied orientation derived from 
verbal context on picture recognition, Psychological science, 12, 153-156. 
Sternberg, S. (1969). The discovery of processing stages: Extensions of Donders’ 
method. Acta Psychologica , 30, 276-315. 
Tessari, A., & Rumiati, R.I. (2004). The strategic control of multiple routes in 
imitation of actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception 
and Performance, 30, 1107-1116. 
Tettamanti, M., Buccino G., Saccuman, M.C., Gallese, V., Danna, M., Scifo, P., Fazio, 
F., Rizzolatti, G., Cappa, S.F., & Perani, D. (2005). Listening to action related 
sentences activates fronto-parietal motor circuits. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 17, 273-281.   
Thelen, E, & Smith, L.B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of 
cognition and action. Bradford Book series in cognitive psychology. MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2001). The potentiation of grasp types during visual object 
categorization. Visual Cognition, 8, 769-800. 
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2004). Action priming by briefly presented objects. Acta 
Psychologica, 116, 185-203. 
Umilta`, M.A, Kohler, E., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., Fadiga, L., Keysers, C., & 
Rizzolatti G. (2001). I know what you are doing: a neurophysiological study. 
Neuron, 31, 155-165. 
References 
 175 
Weir, P.L., MacKenzie, C.L., Marteniuk, R.G., Cargoe, S.L., & Frazer, M.B. (1991). 
The effect of object weight on the kinematics of prehension. Journal of Motor 
Behavior, 23,192–204. 
Westling, G., & Johansson, R.S. (1984). Factors influencing the force control during 
precision grip. Experimental Brain Research, 53, 277–284. 
Wiemer-Hastings, K., & Graesser, A.C. (1998). Abstract noun classification: A neural 
network approach. Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, 1036-1042. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Wiemer-Hastings, K., Krug, J., & Xu, X. (2001). Imagery, context availability, 
contextual constraints and abstractness. Proceedings of 23rd Annual Meeting of 
the Cognitive Science Society, 1106-1111. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, 9, 625-636. 
Wise, R., Chollet, F., Hadar, U., Frison, K, Hoffner, E., & Frackowiak, R. (1991). 
Distribution of cortical neural networks involved in word comprehension and 
word retrieval. Brain, 114, 1803-1817. 
Wolpert, D.M., Doya, K., & Kawato, M. (2003). A unifying computational framework 
for motor control and social interaction. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society Lond., B 358, 593-602. 
Zevin, J.D., & Seidenberg, M.S. (2002). Age of acquisition effects in word reading and 
other tasks. Journal of Memory and Language, 47, 1-29. 
Zoia, S., Pezzetta, E., Blason, L., Scabra, A., Carrozzi, M., Bulgheroni, M., & 
Castiello, U. (2006). A comparison of the Reach-To-Grasp movement between 
children and adults: a kinematics study. Developmental Neuropsychology, 30, 
719-738. 
Zwaan, R.A. (2004). The immersed experiencer: Toward an embodied theory of 
language comprehension. In Psychology of learning and motivation, Vol. 44. 
B.H. Ross, New York: Academic, pp. 35-62. 
Language and Embodiment 
 176
Zwaan, R.A., Madden, C.J., Yaxley, R.H., & Aveyard, M.E. (2004). Moving words: 
dynamic mental representations in language comprehension. Cognitive Science, 
28, 611-619. 
Zwaan, R.A., Stanfield, R.A., & Yaxley R.H. (2002). Language comprehenders 
mentally represent the shapes of objects. Psychological Science, 13, 168-171 
Zwaan, R., & Taylor, L.J. (2006). Seeing, Acting, Understanding: Motor Resonance in 
Language Comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 
1-11. 
 
 
 Acknowledgments 
 
 
The experimental work was supported by MIUR - Ministero Italiano 
dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca -, Progetto PRIN 2006, by a University 
of Bologna PhD grant and by the FP7 project ROSSI, Emergence of communication in 
RObots through Sensorimotor and Social Interaction, Grant agreement no: 216125 to 
Professor Anna M. Borghi. 
 
 
 
Thanks to Ferdinand Binkofski, Giovanni Buccino, Stefano Ghirlanda, Arthur 
Glenberg, Roberto Nicoletti, Domenico Parisi, Lucia Riggio and Alessia Tessari for 
useful discussions of the data reported in my thesis. Thanks to Roberto Bolzani for the 
statistical advice. 
Thanks also to the students of the University of Bologna and the University of 
Hamburg for their help in executing the experiments. 
 
 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Anna M. Borghi for her supervision and for 
providing the funding and the environment to perform the research reported in this 
thesis. A special thanks for her constant encouragement and above all for her joy and 
enthusiasm in doing scientific research. 
 
 
 
 
Language and Embodiment 
 178
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix - materials 
3 The specificity of the simulation with respect to the body. Different 
effectors: the hand, the mouth and the foot. 
 
 
 
 
 
Linguistic materials 1. Block Hand – Mouth and block Hand – Foot. 
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4 The specificity of the simulation with respect to the body and to the 
goal. The hand: dominant vs. non-dominant hand 
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Linguistic materials 1. Experiment 1.a. 
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Linguistic materials 2. Experiment 1.b. 
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Linguistic materials 3. Experiment 2. 
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Linguistic materials 4. Experiment 3. 
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5 The specificity of the simulation with respect to the external world. An 
intrinsic object property - weight - and the perception of action 
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Linguistic materials 1. Experiment 1 and 2. 
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Videos. Experiment 1 and 2. We used 4 Heavy Videos - 3 Kg, 6 Kg, 12 Kg, 18 Kg - 
and 4 Light Videos - 50 g, 300 g, 600 g, 900 g - (the same used by Bosbach, Cole, 
Prinz, & Knoblich, 2005). 
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6 The specificity of the simulation with respect to the external world. An 
intrinsic object property - weight - and the production of action 
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Linguistic materials and boxes. The Heavy and Light Sentences and the Boxes’ 
weights. An example of the box to lift immediately after the sentence acoustic 
presentation. 
Comprehension questions. The comprehension questions and the right answers. 
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7 The meaning of abstract words and the impact of different languages 
on cognition 
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Linguistic materials. The German quadruples. 
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Linguistic materials. The Italian quadruples. 
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